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INTRODUCTIONt
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("the VRA") is one of the most
remarkable and consequential pieces of congressional legislation
ever enacted. It targeted the massive disfranchisement of African-
American citizens in numerous Southern states. It imposed
measures drastic in scope and extraordinary in effect. The VRA
eliminated the use of literacy tests and other "devices" that South-
ern jurisdictions had long employed to prevent black residents
from registering and voting.' The VRA imposed on these "covered"
jurisdictions onerous obligations to prove to federal officials that
proposed changes to their electoral system would not discriminate
against minority voters.2
t Case citations within this Article have been adapted to better serve the purposes of
the piece and to conserve space. Litigation titles correspond with the Voting Rights Initiative
Master List of cases, infra Appendix, available at http://www.votingreport.org, and have been
abbreviated in accordance with The Bluebook Litigation titles do not reflect the traditional
party versus party designation and often encompass several cases in a particular litigation
"string."
The adapted citation format identifies the state from which the litigation arose in cases
where the traditional citation format does not indicate the state. The relevant state is indi-
cated by its postal service abbreviation, in parenthesis, after the litigation title. Some cases of
particular import do not identify the state in this manner. In order to allow for immediate
identification of the relevant state, short forms are seldom used for case citations.
1. As originally enacted, the VRA banned the use of any "test or device," such as a lit-
eracy test, for five years in areas of the country where a significant portion of the voting age
population either was not registered to vote or failed to vote in the 1964 presidential elec-
tion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-73, tit. I, § 101, tit. II,
§§ 201-03, 206, 89 Star. 400-02 (1975)) (making ban permanent and nationwide).
2. Section 5 of the VRA required that these so-called "covered" jurisdictions obtain
federal "preclearance" before they changed any aspect of their electoral rules. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (2000). Covered jurisdictions may obtain a declaratory judgment to this effect from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or, alternatively, submit a pre-
clearance request to the United States Department ofJustice. Id. §§ 1973b, 1973c. The VRA
required that these jurisdictions demonstrate that the new practice did "not have the pur-
pose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race .... " Id. § 1973c.
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Resistance was immediate, but the VRA withstood the chal-
lenge.' The result was staggering. The VRA ended the long-
entrenched and virtually total exclusion of African Americans from
political participation in the South. Black voter registration rose
and black participation followed such that, by the early 1970s,
courts routinely observed that black voters throughout the South
were registering and voting without interference. Similar benefits
accrued to non-English speaking voters, particularly to Latino vot-
ers in the Southwest, after Congress amended the VRA to protect
specified language minorities in 1975. This increased participation
exposed less blatant inequalities and problems-complex issues
such as racial vote dilution, the contours of which courts are still
tackling today.
These persistent problems have led Congress to extend and ex-
pand the VRA each time its non-permanent provisions were due to
expire. The ban on literacy tests and the "preclearance" provisions
contained in Section 5 initially were enacted to last for five years.
Congress extended these provisions in 1970, again in 1975, and for
twenty-five more years in 1982, at which time Congress also ex-
panded the terms of the core permanent provision of the Voting
Rights Act-Section 2. This summer, Congress renewed and reau-
thorized the non-permanent provisions of the VRA, which were set
to expire in 2007.
The Voting Rights Initiative ("VRI") at the University of Michi-
gan Law School was created during the winter of 2005 to help
inform both the debates that led to this latest congressional reau-
thorization and the legal challenge to it that is certain to follow. A
cooperative research venture involving 100 students working un-
der faculty direction set out to produce a detailed portrait of
litigation brought since 1982 under Section 2. This Report evalu-
ates the results of that survey. The comprehensive data set may be
found in a searchable form at http://www.votingreport.org or
http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights. The aim of this
report and the accompanying website is to contribute to a critical
understanding of current opportunities for effective political
participation on the part of those minorities the Voting Rights
Act seeks to protect.
3. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) (upholding constitu-
tionality of major portions of the VRA).
4. These provisions are the preclearance requirements of Section 5, the federal elec-
tion monitoring and observer provisions set forth in Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9, and the language
minority ballot coverage provisions of Sections 203 and 4(f. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (8)
(2000) (setting 2007 as the next required reauthorization date).
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I. THE PROJECT: BACKGROUND, GOALS, AND METHODS
A. Statutory Background
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted in response to the
continued, massive, and unconstitutional exclusion of African
Americans from the franchise. Despite the ratification in 1870 of
the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits denying or abridging
the right to vote on the basis of "race, color, or previous condition
of servitude," state voting officials continued to devise mechanisms
to exclude African Americans from the franchise.5Judicial invalida-
tion of one such practice often prompted the creation of another
to achieve the same result. Using tactics ranging from outright vio-
lence to explicit race-based exclusions to "grandfather clauses,"
literacy tests, and redistricting practices, many former Confederate
states (and several others) successfully prevented African Ameri-
cans from participating in elections for nearly a century.6
Prompted by several notorious attacks on civil rights activists and
recognition of the scope of African-American disfranchisement,
Congress and the President acted to remedy the ineffectiveness of
existing anti-discrimination provisions in 1965. The statute they
created both reaffirmed the basic constitutional prohibition
against race-based exclusions from the franchise and made those
constitutional prohibitions effective. Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, as originally enacted, closely tracked the wording of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.7 To this Congress added Section 4, which
suspended the use of particular exclusionary practices such as lit-
eracy tests, and Section 5, which demanded that jurisdictions with
extremely low levels of voter registration and turnout seek "pre-
clearance" from federal officials before implementing any changes
to their voting laws and procedures.8 Congress extended the non-
permanent provisions of the Voting Rights Act, including Section
5, in 1970, 1975, and 1982, and again this summer in The Fannie
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
6. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 3 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [herein-
after QUIET REVOLUTION].
7. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
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Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, And Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization And Amendments Act of 2006."
Congress enacted the current version of Section 2 when it
amended the statute in the course of reauthorizing the nonper-
manent provisions in 1982. The amendment was a response to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the VRA in a case brought by
African-American residents in Mobile, Alabama. By the summer of
1975, black citizens in Mobile were registering and voting without
hindrance, a feat that would have seemed impossible a decade ear-
lier. And yet, ten years after passage of the Voting Rights Act, black
residents in Mobile noticed that their participation seemed to be
making little difference to the substance and structure of local
governance. At the time, African Americans comprised approxi-
mately one third of the city's population, white and black voters
consistently supported different candidates, and no African-
American candidate had ever won a seat on the three-person city
commission. Housing remained segregated, black city employees
were concentrated in the lowest city salary classification, and "a
significant difference and sluggishness" characterized the City's
provision of city services to black residents when compared to that
provided to whites. ° Since 1911, Mobile had chosen its commis-
sioners through city-wide at-large elections."
In June of 1975, African-American residents in Mobile filed a
class action lawsuit challenging the city's at-large electoral system.
Two lower federal courts held that this system unconstitutionally
diluted black voting strength. 2 In 1980, the Supreme Court re-
versed. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,13 the Court held that neither the
Constitution nor Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibited
electoral practices simply because they produced racially discrimi-
natory results. The Court determined that these provisions
proscribed only those rules or practices enacted with racially in-
vidious intent. Mobile's at-large system remained permissible
9. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006); Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982);
Pub. L. No. 94-73, tit. I, § 101 & tit. II, §§ 201-03, 206, 89 Stat. 400-402 (1975); Pub. L. No.
91-285, §§ 2-4, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970).
10. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 391 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
11. Id.
12. Id., aff'd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
13. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) ("[lit is apparent that the lan-
guage of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment.... [and] that
it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment it-
self.").
SUMMER 2006]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
unless the plaintiffs could demonstrate that the city adopted the at-
large system for the purpose of diluting black voting strength.
4
In 1982, Congress responded to Mobile by amending Section 2 to
create an explicit "results"-based test for discrimination in voting.
As a consequence, Section 2 provides today:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or [on ac-
count of statutorily designated language minority status].'5
Determining whether a particular electoral rule results in a de-
nial or abridgement of the right to vote is a complex inquiry. The
statute indicates that to prevail under Section 2, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that, "based on the totality of circumstances ... the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a [racial or language minority]." Plaintiffs must show
that members of these protected classes "have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice." Relevant to
the inquiry is "the extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision,"
although the statute is explicit in that it creates no right to propor-
tional representation.
I
The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report to accompany
the 1982 amendment to Section 2, now known as the "Senate Re-
port."' 7 The Supreme Court has since described this report as "the
authoritative source" on the meaning of the amended statute.'8
The Senate Report identified several factors, now known as "the
Senate Factors," for courts to use when assessing whether a particu-
lar practice or procedure results in prohibited discrimination in
14. Id. On remand, the district court struck down the at-large system based on evi-
dence of such intent. Bolden v. Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982). See SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, LAW OF DEMOCRACY 711 (rev. 2d
ed. 2002) [hereinafter ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES]; Peyton McCrary, The Significance of
Bolden v. The City of Mobile, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 47, 48-49 (Chandler Davidson
ed., 1984).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
16. Id. § 1973(b).
17. S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982), as repinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 [hereinafter SEN-
ATE REPORT].
18. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986).
[VOL. 39:4
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violation of Section 2. Derived from the Supreme Court's analysis
in White v. Regester,19 and the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decision in
Zimmer v. McKeithen,0 these "typical" factors are:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination
in the state or political subdivision that touched the
right of the members of the minority group to regis-
ter, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivi-
sion has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provi-
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group;
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether
members of the minority group have been denied
access to that process;
5. The extent to which members of the minority
group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process;
6. Whether political campaigns have been character-
ized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. The extent to which members of the minority
group have been elected to public office in the ju-
risdiction. l
The Senate Report also identified two additional factors that
have "probative value" in establishing a plaintiff's claim under the
amended statute, referred to as Senate Factors 8 and 9. These
query whether "there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members
of the minority group," and whether the justification for the policy
behind the practice or procedure is "tenuous., 22 The 1982
amendment to Section 2 dramatically altered voting rights
19. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
20. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East
Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
21. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 28-29.
22. Id. at 29.
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litigation nationwide. While prior to 1982 plaintiffs had rarely in-
voked Section 2 in its original form, most plaintiffs alleging racial
vote dilution since 1982 have consistently brought their claims un-
der Section 2.3
B. Research Objectives
A detailed understanding of Section 2 litigation informs several
issues related to the reauthorization of the expiring provisions of
the Voting Rights Act. First, the record of judicial implementation
of Section 2 informs the question whether the auxiliary provisions,
such as Section 5, are still helpful today. To be sure, Section 5 is
distinct from Section 2 in that, for covered jurisdictions, compli-
ance with Section 2 is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain
preclearance from the federal government. Nonetheless, analyzing
the judicial record of Section 2 decisions-including the struc-
tured nature of the judicial inquiry under the Senate Factors-
helps illuminate the extent to which meaningful minority partici-
pation in elections has been a reality in recent times.
Section 2 decisions tell a powerful story about the health of mi-
nority political participation throughout the United States since
1982. And they do so in Congress's own terms-in the way Con-
gress asked courts to assess political equality and to determine
whether to issue a remedy. An examination of these decisions also
illustrates how both claims and remedies have changed over the
years. Enacted by Congress in 1965 to address the specific problem
of black disfranchisement in the South, the Voting Rights Act has
been amended to protect language minorities and today is invoked
by several different minority groups to challenge a host of electoral
practices throughout the country. The findings in these cases offer
a lens, provided by Congress itself, through which variations in po-
litical participation over time and region may be viewed and
evaluated.24
Recent Supreme Court decisions have demanded increased
scrutiny of the connection between the perception of a constitu-
tional evil and the remedy enacted under Congress's power to
enforce the Civil War amendments. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Supreme Court announced that Congress could only invoke its leg-
islative powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
23. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 14, at 747.
24. See infra Parts II.B, I.C.
[VOL. 39:4
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where the Congressional legislation was "congruent and propor-
tional" to "remedy or prevent" an underlying constitutional
violation. 5 The same is true for the power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment pursuant to Section 2 of that amendment.
26
Many people read City of Boerne and its progeny to signal that the
reauthorization of Section 5 will survive constitutional scrutiny only
if Congress has adequately documented pervasive unconstitutional
conduct in covered jurisdictions. To the extent the Supreme
Court will require such a record,28 the Section 2 decisions offer one
source for identifying recent instances of unconstitutional conduct
related to voting. To be sure, Section 2's "results"-based test goes
beyond what the Fifteenth Amendment alone commands. And yet,
some Section 2 violations are constitutional violations.29 Moreover,
courts assessing the Senate Factors in the course of adjudicating
Section 2 cases have documented evidence that reveals a range of
unconstitutional conduct by state and local officials in specific
regions across the Nation.0 While these judicial findings are not
25. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
26. Id. at 518 (discussing "Congress' parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fif-
teenth Amendment" as co-extensive with Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
27. Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South ?: Regional Variation and Political Participation Through
the I-ens of Section 2, in DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON REAU-
THORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at nn.4-6, on file
with authors) (discussing this argument).
28. For the argument that it should not require such a record, see id. See also An Intro-
duction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to
Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (statement
of Pamela S. Karlan, Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford University School of Law);
Pamela S. Karlan, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance Under the Voting Rights Act, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY LAW FOR LAW AND POLICY, at 14, 19, June 14, 2006,
http://www.acslaw.org/node/2964.
29. Some lawsuits found both constitutional and Section 2 violations. See Arakaki
Litig., 314 E3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Garza v. L.A. Litig., 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990); Mobile
Sch. Bd. Litig., 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1983); Gadsden County Litig., 691 F.2d 978 (lth
Cir. 1982); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Marks-
Phila. Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 146113 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994);Jeffers Litig., 740
E Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991); LULAC v.
Midland Litig., 648 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1986); Terrell Litig., 565 E. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex.
1983); see also Dean Litig., 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982) (declaratory and injunctive relief
based on "constitutional error" and implied Section 2 violation); Haywood County Litig.,
544 F. Supp. 1122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (preliminary injunction based on proven Section 2
violation and likely success on constitutional claim). Some lawsuits found discriminatory
intent and effect under Section 2. SeeTown of N.Johns Litig., 717 F Supp. 1471, 1476 (M.D.
Ala. 1989); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Harris
Litig., 695 F. Supp. 517, 521 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Buskey v. Oliver Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1485
(M.D. Ala. 1983); see also Town of Cicero Litig., No. Civ.A. OOC 1530, 2000 WL 34342276, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2000) (preliminary injunction based on likely success of showing pur-
poseful discrimination under Section 2); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F Supp. 1347, 1361
(M.D. Ala. 1986) (same).
30. See infra Part II.C. 1.
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formal adjudications of unconstitutional conduct, they represent
the considered judgments of federal judges nationwide that the
evidence they reviewed reveals conduct that runs afoul of the Con-
stitution.
C. Research Project and Design
The Voting Rights Initiative is a faculty-student research collabo-
rative established in January 2005 at the University of Michigan
Law School. Working under the direction of Professor Ellen Katz, a
group of more than 100 Michigan Law students set out to docu-
ment the nature and scope of litigation brought, since 1982, under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Researchers began by searching the federal court databases on
Westlaw and LexisNexis to identify electronically published deci-
sions addressing a Section 2 claim. To develop the master list,
researchers searched these databases for every federal court deci-
sion that cited 42 U.S.C. § 1973 between June 29, 1982, when
Section 2 was amended, and December 31, 2005. The resulting list
was then narrowed by identifying cases in which plaintiffs had filed
an actual claim under Section 2, and removing all decisions that
merely reference Section 2 without involving a claim brought un-
der that provision.'
Researchers then located all related decisions and organized
them by lawsuit with a single litigation title. Within each lawsuit,
researchers determined which opinion provided the final word for
the purposes of this project, since many lawsuits included multiple
appeals and remands. 2 The final word case in each lawsuit is usu-
31. The resulting list includes decisions published in the federal reporters, as well as
some only published on electronic databases. The list includes some lawsuits that have not
yet resulted in a final unappealable decision, but for which at least one opinion was pub-
lished within the specified time period. The study does not include lawsuits that did not
produce a published opinion before 2006. See, e.g., Cottier v. City of Martin, 445 F.3d 1113
(8th Cir. 2006); Quinn v. Pauley, No. 04 C 6581, 2006 WL 752965 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21 2006);
Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, No. 02 C 8346, 2006 WL 681048 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13 2006). The list
does include a few lawsuits decided after the 1982 amendment to Section 2 which did not
apply the new results test. See, e.g., Cross Litig. (GA), 704 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1983); Mo-
bile Sch. Bd. Litig. (AL), 706 F.2d 1103,1106 (11 th Cir. 1983).
32. The final word citation, along with the litigation title, is used as a shorthand refer-
ence to an entire lawsuit (which may have multiple opinions addressing various issues).
While the report frequently cites to the final word opinion to refer to the litigation as a
whole, sometimes a particular judicial opinion within a litigation string is cited in order to
pinpoint a specific finding or issue for discussion. Most lawsuits have only one final word
citation. In the rare situations in which merits issues were severed (e.g. by minority group or
by practice challenged) and addressed in separate proceedings, a lawsuit may have more
[VOL. 39:4
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ally the last case in the lawsuit that assessed liability on the merits
and determined whether Section 2 was violated. If there was no
such case to analyze, researchers coded as the final word the last
published case in the lawsuit making some other determination for
or against the plaintiff, including whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, whether to approve a settlement, what remedy to order,
and whether to grant fees. In these latter cases, the contours of the
underlying Section 2 claim and the court's analysis of it were often
difficult to discern as the reported decision was addressing a dis-
tinct question. Still, these cases, especially preliminary injunction
cases, sometimes included reference to some Senate Factors or
other substantive Section 2 criteria. Even where nothing more than
the fact of decision could be discerned from these opinions, re-
searchers included the lawsuit in the overall list of lawsuits to
attempt to give as broad a picture as possible of Section 2 litigation.
Researchers reviewed each case within a litigation string and fol-
lowed a standard checklist 33 to catalogue the information discussed
and the outcome reached on the Section 2 claim. Researchers re-
corded which of the nine Senate Factors, if any, the reviewing court
found to exist, and whether the court ultimately found a violation
of Section 2. Researchers also tracked how courts have treated the
so-called "Gingles" threshold test,34 the law or practice challenged in
each lawsuit, the implicated governing body, the minority groups
bringing the claim, the involvement of expert witnesses, and other
basic case data such as the judges and lawyers involved with the
case.
Each case was read and catalogued by multiple researchers work-
ing independently, then by research directors, and then checked
for consistency by editors. Since the completion of the case re-
ports, searches have been designed using the database to
document and analyze particular findings in this report.
All of the case reports and searches to access this data are avail-
able at www.votingreport.org. This website includes lists of cases,
organized by lawsuit and by state, in both Section 5-covered and
non-covered jurisdictions that: resulted in a successful outcome for
the plaintiffs; 5 found any of the Senate Factors; challenged specific
than one "final word" case, each corresponding to the final decision on an issue. Many law-
suits may also contain decisions subsequent to the final word opinion that addressed other
matters, such as fees, remedies or other related claims.
33. See The Voting Rights Initiative, Data Key, http://www.votingreport.org, also lo-
cated at http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights.
34. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
35. Suits coded as a successful plaintiff outcome include both those lawsuits where a
court determined, or the parties stipulated, that Section 2 was violated, and a category of
lawsuits where the only published opinion indirectly documented plaintiff success. In this
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
types of electoral practices; challenged certain governing bodies;
and involved particular minority groups. The site also provides a
timeline of racial appeals in campaigns. 36 An abridged version of
the master list and the Section 2 lawsuits analyzed in this study ap-
pears in an appendix to this report.
3
VRI issued a report evaluating its findings in November 2005, as
congressional hearings considering the merits of reauthorization
were proceeding.3 8 With the legislative component of reauthoriza-
tion now complete, this volume of The University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform provides a revised and updated version of the origi-
nal VRI report.
II. THE FINDINGS: DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION
A. Overall Results
1. The Numbers-This study identified 331 lawsuits, encompass-
ing 763 decisions, addressing Section 2 claims since 1982."9 These
lawsuits, of course, represent only a portion of the Section 2 claims
filed or decided since 1982. Of the total number of cases filed,
some plaintiffs failed to pursue their claims, some obtained relief
through settlement, and others saw their cases go to judgment, but
the courts involved did not issue any published opinion or ancillary
ruling published on the electronic databases surveyed. The total
number of claims filed under Section 2 since the 1982 amendment
is, accordingly, not known.
second category of plaintiff success are suits where the only--or most recently-published
case granted a preliminary injunction, considered a remedy or settlement, or decided
whether to grant attorneys' fees after a prior unpublished determination of a Section 2 vio-
lation.
36. For additional analysis and comparisons of the following in covered and non-
covered jurisdictions: rates of success in local and statewide lawsuits, rates of success for
different electoral practices challenged, differing levels of white bloc voting in covered and
non-covered jurisdictions, differing historic rates of minority candidate success, and rates of
success when challenging new, as opposed to longstanding, electoral practices, see Katz,
supra note 27, at app.
37. Infra Appendix.
38. Dave Gershman, Study: Discrimination in Voting Still a Problem: U-M Students Suggest
Congress Take Action, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005; see also VRI website, http://www.
votingreport.org.
39. See VRI Database Master List of the Voting Rights Initiative Database (2006),
http://www.votingreport.org (highlight "Final Report" on the top menu) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter VRI Database Master List]
(including instructions on how to sort data to find lists of lawsuits for each citation in this
report).
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The ACLU reports that approximately one out of five of their
plaintiffs' Section 2 cases filed in Georgia and in South Carolina
ended with a published decision. 40 Insofar as this ratio of filings is
at all representative, this study's compilation of 331 lawsuits con-
servatively suggests that there have been more than 1,600 Section 2
filings nationwide, with filings in covered jurisdictions possibly ex-
ceeding 800.41
Of the identified lawsuits, 211 produced at least one published
merits decision on the question of whether Section 2 was violated.
The remaining 120 include lawsuits in which the only published
decisions addressed preliminary matters (78 decisions) or fees,
remedy, or settlement issues (42 decisions). Of the 211 lawsuits
that ended with a determination on the merits, 98 (46.4%) origi-
nated in jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, and 113 (53.5%) were filed in non-covered jurisdictions.42
Plaintiffs succeeded in 123 (37.2%) of the lawsuits identified in
this study. Of these suits, 92 documented a violation of Section 2-
either on the merits or in the course of another favorable determi-
nation for the plaintiff. Another 31 lawsuits made a favorable
determination for the plaintiff (such as issuing a preliminary in-
junction, granting a settlement, awarding fees, or crafting a
remedy) without stating whether Section 2 was actually violated.a
Plaintiffs won more Section 2 lawsuits in covered jurisdictions
than they did in non-covered jurisdictions even though less than
one-quarter of the U.S. population resides in a jurisdiction covered
by Section 5, and preclearance blocks some portion of discrimina-
tory electoral changes that might otherwise be challenged under
Section 2. 4 Of the 123 successful plaintiff outcomes documented,
40. See LAUGHLIN McDONALD & DANIEL LEVITAS, ACLU, THE CASE FOR AMENDING
AND EXTENDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATION, 1982-2006: A RE-
PORT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2006) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), availabe at http://www.
aclu.org/votingrights/2005-report.pdf.
41. In Texas, the Section 2 litigation record of attorney Rolando Rios suggests an even
higher number, in that 8 of 211 or 3.8% of his law firm's filed Section 2 lawsuits ended with
a reported decision. See List of Cases Litigated by Rolando L. Rios, Law Office, sometimes in
cooperation with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund or with Texas
Rural Legal Aid (on file with the Voting Rights Initiative).
42. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
43. Id.; see also supra note 35.
44. The number of people living in Section 5 jurisdictions is 67,767,900 out of
281,421,906. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Demographic Profiles: 100-
percent and Sample Data: Demographic Profile Data Search, http://censtats.census.gov/
pub/Profiles.shtml (select the appropriate state and county to view and sum county-level
population and demographic data for covered and non-covered jurisdictions) (last visited
June 22, 2006). In addition, census data shows that 39.3% of African Americans in the
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68 originated in covered jurisdictions, and 55 elsewhere. Plaintiffs
in covered jurisdictions also won a higher percentage of the cases
decided than did those in non-covered areas. Of the 171 lawsuits
published involving non-covered jurisdictions, 32.2% ended fa-
vorably for plaintiffs, while 42.5% of the 160 lawsuits from covered
jurisdictions produced a result favorable to the plaintiffs.45
Courts identified violations of Section 2 more frequently be-
tween 1982 and 1992 than in the years since. Of the 92 total
violations identified, courts found 46.7% of them during the 1980s,
38% during the 1990s, and 15.2% since then.46
The nature of Section 2 litigation has changed in recent years. Of
the 100 lawsuits in the 1980s, most involved challenges to at-large
elections (60 or 60%). Since 1990, 231 lawsuits have produced pub-
lished opinions. Of these, 86 (37.2%) challenged at-large elections,
and 89 (38.5%) challenged reapportionment or redistricting plans.47
African-American plaintiffs have brought the vast number of
published claims (272 or 82.2%) under Section 2 since 1982, with
an increasing number of cases involving Latino (97), Native
American (12), and Asian American (7) plaintiffs. African Ameri-
cans were the sole plaintiffs in 93 (75.6%) of the successful
decisions for plaintiffs. Of all lawsuits where any plaintiff achieved
success, 16 involved multiple minority group plaintiffs. s In addi-
tion, Latino plaintiffs won 7 lawsuits independently, and Native
American plaintiffs won 5 published lawsuits. 9
In several lawsuits, courts addressed the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 2 and all upheld the statute." Judicial findings on the Senate
United States live in Section 5-covered areas, 31.8% of Hispanics or Latinos live in covered
jurisdictions, and 25% of Native Americans live in covered jurisdictions. Id.
45. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
46. Id. Of these 92 lawsuits, 43 found violations during the 1980s, between 1982 and
1992, 35 during the 1990s, and 14 from 2000-2006.
47. Id. For an analysis of the types of electoral practices plaintiffs have challenged un-
der Section 2 and comparative success rates in covered and non-covered jurisdictions, see
Katz, supra note 27, at app., fig. 4.
48. See, e.g., Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006); City of Chi.-Bonilla Litig., 141
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998); City of Chi.-Barnett Litig., 17 F Supp. 2d 753 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
49. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39. Two other lawsuits brought by plain-
tiffs of unknown race reached success. Arakaki Litig., 314 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)
(overturning the race-specific candidacy requirement to run for trustee of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs); Jefferson County Litig., 798 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1986) (litigating the
amount of appropriate attorneys' fees after approval of a non-published settlement agree-
nent).
50. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez-Colo. Litig.
(CO), 97 E3d 1303, 1314 (10th Cir. 1996); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 375 (5th Cir.
1984); Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1984); Alamosa County
Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1026, 1040 (D. Colo. 2004); Elections Bd. Litig., 793 F. Supp.
859, 868-69 (W.D. Wis. 1992); Wesley Litig., 605 F. Supp. 802, 808 (M.D. Tenn. 1985);Jor-
dan Litig., 604 F. Supp. 807, 811 (N.D. Miss. 1984); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591
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Factors are discussed in more detail below. Briefly stated, however,
courts found Senate Factor 1-a history of official discrimination
touching the right to vote-in 111 lawsuits. Thirty-three lawsuits
identified evidence of explicit official discrimination against a ra-
cial or language minority group since 1982, of which 12 originated
in covered jurisdictions. l
Since 1982, 105 lawsuits found racially polarized voting or racial
bloc voting, generally analyzing the question under either Senate
Factor 2 or the second and third Gingles preconditions. Where
courts found racial bloc voting, plaintiffs prevailed 73.3% of the
time, or in 77 lawsuits overall. Courts found racially polarized vot-
ing in 52 lawsuits in covered jurisdictions. 2
Ninety lawsuits found that minority candidates had difficulty get-
ting elected under Senate Factor 7. In 88 lawsuits, courts found
that Senate Factor 5-past socioeconomic discrimination-
hindered effective political participation. Courts documented, un-
der Factor 3, the presence of enhancing practices, such as at-large
elections or majority vote requirements, in 52 lawsuits, of which the
vast majority did not involve a direct challenge to the practice
identified under Factor 3. Courts identified Factor 6-overt or sub-
tle racial appeals-to be met in 47 campaigns held between 1982
and 2002. Ten lawsuits expressly found that minorities were denied
access to a candidate slating process (Factor 4); 20 lawsuits docu-
mented a significant lack of responsiveness by current officials to
the needs of the minority community (Factor 8); and 23 found that
only a tenuous policy existed for the challenged practice (Factor
9). Factors 4, 8 and 9 featured less prominently in analyzed law-
suits, but when these factors were present, courts typically found a
statutory violation as well. 5
2. The Trends
a. The Persistence of Discrimination-Four decades after the en-
actment of the Voting Rights Act, racial discrimination in voting is
far from over. Federal judges adjudicating Section 2 cases over the
last twenty-three years have documented a range of conduct by
state and local officials that they have deemed racially discrimina-
tory-and intentionally so. Examples abound 4 The Bone Shirt
F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (W.D. Tex. 1984); City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397, 399
(N.D. Miss. 1984); Major Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325, 345 (E.D. La. 1983)).
51. See infra Part I.C.1; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 39. See also
Ketchum Litig. (IL), 740 E2d 1398, 1408 (7th Cir. 1984) (drawing close analogy to inten-
tional discrimination found in Rybicki Litig., 574 ESupp. 1147, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
52. VRJ Database Master List, supra note 39.
53. Id.
54. See infra Part II.C.1.
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litigation documents how county officials in South Dakota pur-
posely blocked Native Americans from registering to vote and from
casting ballots.55 The Charleston County litigation (South Carolina)
reveals deliberate and systematic efforts by county officials to har-
ass and intimidate African-American residents seeking to vote.56
The North Johns litigation in Alabama describes the town mayor's
refusal to provide African-American candidates registration forms
required by state law.57 The Harris litigation in Alabama tells of Jef-
ferson County's refusal to hire black poll workers for white
precincts-and the blind eye state government turned to the vot-
ing discrimination perpetuated at local polls. 58 A Philadelphia
lawsuit describes a deliberate and collusive effort by party officials
and city election commissioners to trick Latino voters into casting
illegitimate absentee ballots that would never be counted.5 9 The
Town of Cicero litigation (Illinois) categorizes an 18-month resi-
dency requirement as deliberately designed to stymie Latino
candidacies. ° Many more cases tell of state and local authorities
drawing district lines for the express purpose of diminishing the
influence of minority voters, or to protect partisan interests, know-
ing that doing so will hinder minority voting strength.6
Judicial findings under the various factors set forth in the Senate
Report also reveal the persistence of private (typically non-
actionable) discrimination and vestiges of past official discrimina-
tion that continue to hinder meaningful political participation by
various minority groups. Section 2 lawsuits catalogue formal and
informal slating procedures implemented by party officials and
private associations that function to deny minority candidates
meaningful access to the ballot.62 Federal judges have identified a
host of campaign tactics nationwide designed to appeal to base ra-
cial prejudice, including manipulating photographs to darken the
skin of opposing candidates, allusions or threats of minority group
"take over"63 or imminent racial strife, and cynical attempts to in-
65crease turnout among perceived "anti-black"64 voters.
55. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004).
56. Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 E3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004).
57. Town of N.Johns Litig., 717 F Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
58. Harris Litig., 695 F Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
59. Marks-Phila. Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 146113 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
60. Town of Cicero Litig., No. Civ.A. 00C 1530, 2000 WL 34342276, at *1 (N.D. II1. Mar.
15, 2000).
61. See infra notes 247-256 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part II.C.4.
63. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1041 (D.S.D. 2004).
64. Charleston County Litig., 316 E Supp. 2d 268, 296 (D.S.C. 2003).
65. See infra Part II.C.6.
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b. The Power of Partisanship-Courts adjudicating Section 2
claims must confront the significance of the tight linkage between
race and party in many parts of this country. This issue has taken
on greater importance with the emergence of the Republican Party
as a vibrant and influential force in the Southern United States, a
development that complicates claims of racial vote dilution, as tra-
ditionally alleged. Courts must now assess how partisan affiliation
affects minority electoral success and the legal significance to ac-
cord to that relationship.
Courts adjudicating Section 2 lawsuits confront this issue at nu-
merous junctures, but do so most prominently when assessing
racial bloc voting. The LULAC v. Clements litigation famously de-
clared that Section 2 is "implicated only where Democrats lose
because they are black, not where blacks lose because they are
Democrats., 66 The majority of courts today will examine the claim
that party, rather than race, causes minority electoral defeats. Some
Section 2 plaintiffs falter on this requirement, particularly as nu-
merous Section 2 lawsuits document the increasing willingness of
white Democrats to support minority-preferred candidates in the
general election. Concerned that party affiliation masks instances
of racial discrimination among voters, some courts are looking
more frequently to the primary elections as a gauge of minority
political opportunity.67 A host of recent Section 2 lawsuits docu-
ment that significant racial polarization in voting remains
prevalent at this juncture of the electoral process, notwithstanding
the willingness of voters, minority and non-minority alike, to sup-
port the party nominee in the general election. With the
proliferation of noncompetitive districts in the United States, the
primary now forms the critical locus for political participation to-
day such that the racial composition of the primary electorate is
often more critical to minority electoral opportunity than is the
composition of the district as a whole.6
Emphasis on the centrality of party as an organizing principle in
American politics may also obscure the ways in which partisan
conduct itself may diminish opportunities for minority political
participation. State-mandated white primaries are long gone, but
party officials, acting formally or ad hoc, continue to implement
slating procedures that stymie minority candidacies. Some lawsuits
66. LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 854 (5th Cir. 1993).
67. See infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
68. See Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley & David Lublin, Drawing Effective Minority
Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1383 (2001);
Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. Rv. 325 (2004); see also infra note
128.
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document what might aptly be labeled backstabbing by party offi-
cials who omit minority candidates from party campaign literature
or otherwise fail to support their party's minority candidates.6 9
Numerous courts now classify the knowing sacrifice of minority
interests to the quest for partisan gain a form of intentional race
discrimination. °
B. The Gingles Threshold
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision Thornburg v. Gingles distilled
three "preconditions" from the totality of the circumstances test
that Section 2 requires. Satisfaction of these conditions does not
establish a Section 2 violation, but failure to meet them almost al-
ways brings a plaintiffs case to an end.
Since the Court decided Gingles, 169 lawsuits have addressed its
preconditions, and 68 lawsuits found them to be satisfied. Of these,
most (57) proceeded to a favorable outcome for the plaintiff.7' In
many of these cases, courts engaged in only a perfunctory review of
the Senate Factors. Moreover, since Johnson v. De Grandy,7' a num-
ber have restricted their post-Gingles inquiries to assessing whether
the challenged practice achieved "proportionality," and finding a
Section 2 violation only if it did not.
73
In 101 lawsuits considering the Gingles Factors, courts held that
plaintiffs failed to establish one or more of the preconditions.4 A
few of these courts nevertheless proceeded to evaluate plaintiffs'
claims under the totality of the circumstances, typically finding that
plaintiffs lose under this test as well.7' In a few cases, courts have
analyzed claims under the totality of circumstances without engag-
ing in review under Gingles at all. Since Gingles, only 14 cases have
identified a violation of Section 2 without addressing the Gingles
factors.76
69. See infra notes 314-320 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Garza v. L.A. Litig. (CA), 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990); Ketchum Litig.
(IL), 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 (7th Cir. 1984); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 152,
158 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
71. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
72. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
73. See, e.g., Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 1995); Austin Litig., 857
F. Supp. 560, 569-70 (E.D. Mich. 1994); infra Part II.C.10.
74. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
75. See, e.g., Meza Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 69 (D. Mass. 2004); Town of Babylon
Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 884-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
76. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
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Plaintiffs crossing the Gingles threshold are more likely to prevail
in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered areas. Thirty lawsuits
originating in covered jurisdictions found the Gingles factors, and
of these, 28 (93.3%) also ended favorably for the plaintiffs. In non-
covered jurisdictions, 38 lawsuits found all three Gingles factors, of
which 29 (76.3%) ended with plaintiff success.17
1. Gingles I: Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact
a. Sufficiently Large-The first component of the Gingles test re-
quires a minority group to demonstrate that it is "sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district.""' Courts addressing Gingles I have generally
engaged in two inquiries: (1) assessing when the minority popula-
tion is "sufficiently large," and (2) determining whether a proposed
district encompassing that population is "geographically compact.,
79
Discussion of the "sufficiently large" prong has focused primarily
on the size of the population needed to establish a majority in a
single-member district. Most courts define the relevant majority to
be the voting age population, reasoning that absent a majority
among voters, the minority group will not be an effective majority."
Where, however, the minority group contains a large proportion of
non-citizens, some courts have required that plaintiffs demonstrate
the feasibility of creating a district in which the group constitutes a
majority of the citizen voting age population.8' Finally, a few courts
rely on the overall minority population when assessing Gingles L"
Several lawsuits involved claims brought by more than one mi-
nority group. These plaintiffs argued that, if members of the two
77. Id.
78. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
79. Other courts have simply asserted in conclusory terms that Gingles I is, or is not,
satisfied, or have noted that the parties stipulated to its existence. See e.g., Rural West II
Litig. (TN), 209 E3d 835, 839 (6th Cir. 2000); City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749,
774 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig., 759 F. Supp. 525, 526 (E.D. Ark. 1991);
Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 380, 390 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
80. See, e.g., Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 2002); Old Person
Litig. (MT), 230 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000); Brewer Litig. (TX), 876 F.2d 448, 452 (5th
Cir. 1989); Springfield Park Dist. Litig. (IL), 851 F.2d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 1988); Black Political
Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 300 (D. Mass. 2004); Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp.
1022, 1051 (D. Md. 1994).
81. See, e.g., Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999); City
of Chi.-Bonilla Litig. (IL), 141 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 1998); City of Miami Beach Litig. (FL),
113 E3d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1997); Pomona Litig. (CA), 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir.
1988); Meza Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2004); see also Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S.
Ct. 2594, 2623 (2006).
82. See, e.g., County of Thurston Litig. (NE), 129 F.3d 1015, 1025 (8th Cir. 1997); Dick-
inson Litig. (IN), 933 E2d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1991); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp.
2d 152, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Albany County Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820, at *5
(N.D.N.Y Jul. 7, 2003); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F. Supp. 339, 372 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
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(or more) groups were placed together in a single district, they
would constitute an effective majority within the meaning of
Gingles I. Most courts view this type of claim as cognizable under
the statute, so long as the groups can demonstrate political cohe-
siveness under the second Gingles factor, 8 a requirement on which
many aggregation claims falter.
4
Plaintiffs have raised Section 2 claims on behalf of minority
groups too small in number to constitute a majority in a single-
member district. Typically, these plaintiffs take issue with district
lines that divide the minority group members among several dis-
tricts, and argue that the challenged districting plans hinder their
ability either (1) to elect representatives of choice by forming coa-
litions with other voters ("coalition districts" or "ability to elect
districts"), or (2) more amorphously, to influence elections ("in-
fluence districts") . This past June in the Perry litigation, the
Supreme Court held that influence alone is not sufficient to estab-
lish a Section 2 claim.8 6 Perry nevertheless expressly left open the
possibility that Section 2 might protect coalition districts, a ques-
tion that has divided lower courts. 7
b. Geographically Compact-Under Gingles I, courts have exam-
ined the proposed district's shape,8 the extent to which it
comports with the jurisdiction's traditional districting principles, 9
83. See, e.g., Hardee County Litig. (FL), 906 F.2d 524, 526 (lth Cir. 1990); Baytown
Litig. (TX), 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988); Albany County Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003
WL 21524820, at *11 (N.D.N.Y.July 7, 2003); France Litig., 71 F. Supp. 2d 317, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1071, 1092 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
84. See, e.g., Forest County Litig. (WI), 336 F.3d 570, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2003); Kent
County Litig. (MI), 76 F.3d 1381, 1396 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Stockton Litig. (CA), 956
F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992); Pomona Litig. (CA), 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989); Perry
Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 509 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 409
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); San Diego County Litig., 794 F. Supp. 990, 998 (S.D. Cal. 1992).
85. Gingles itself expressly left open this question. See Gingles Litig., 478 U.S. 30, 46
n.12 (1986) (reserving the question of "whether § 2 permits, and if it does, what standards
should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a mul-
timember district impairs its ability to influence elections"). The Supreme Court again
reserved the question in the Quilterlitigation. Quilter Litig. (OH), 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993).
86. Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625-26 (2006).
87. Compare Metts Litig. (RI), 363 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F.
Supp. 2d 346, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Page Litig., 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 362 (D.N.J. 2001); Ar-
mour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1059-60 (N.D. Ohio 1991), with Hall v. Virginia Litig., 385
F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2004); Kent County Litig. (MI), 76 E3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
88. See, e.g., Sensley Litig. (LA), 385 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2004); Mallory-Ohio Litig.
(OH), 173 F.3d 377, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2000).
89. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989, 992 (D.S.D. 2004); Monte-
zuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167 (D. Colo. 1998).
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and how it compares to other proposed or existing districts. 90 Some
courts view compactness as a "practical or functional" concept to
be assessed in terms of whether the district captures a community."
Since 1994, courts have invoked Shaw v. Reno 2 and its progeny93
when discussing compactness under Gingles I.94 The Shaw cases re-
quire close scrutiny of districting plans in which racial
considerations predominate over traditional districting principles
in the drawing of district lines. An oddly shaped district is not a
prerequisite to a Shaw claim, but courts often look to shape to as-
sess whether race was the primary consideration when the district
was drawn. Since Shaw, some courts have invoked bizarre shape to
measure compactness under Gingles I, 95 and generally consider dis-
tricts compact when they appear more compact than those struck
down in the Shaw cases.9r
The Supreme Court's decision this past June in the Perry litiga-
tion holds that compactness under Shaw is not sufficient to
establish compactness under Gingles I. Perry finds that an excep-
tionally large district that combines minority populations with
"disparate needs and interests" fails to satisfy the first Gingles fac-
tor.
97
2. Gingles II and III: Racial Bloc Voting-Racial polarization in
voting, also known as racial bloc voting, constitutes a critical com-
ponent of a Section 2 claim.98 The majority of successful Section 2
90. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F Supp. 2d 976, 989, 992 (D.S.D. 2004); City of Co-
lumbia Litig., 850 £ Supp. 404, 413 (D.S.C. 1993).
91. See, e.g., Sensley Litig. (LA), 385 F.3d 591, 597-98 (5th Cir. 2004); City of Chi.-
Barnett Litig., 17 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp.
1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (M.D.
Ala. 1988);Jefferson Parish I Litig., 691 E Supp. 991, 1007 (E.D. La. 1988).
92. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
93. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
94. Sensley Litig. (LA), 385 E3d 591, 596-98 (5th Cir. 2004); Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296
F.3d 1065, 1071 (11th Cir. 2002); Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 E3d 476, 492 (2d
Cir. 1999); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), 139 F.3d 1414, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998); City of Rome
Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1376 (11th Cir. 1997); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp.
2d 152, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); France Litig., 71 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); La-
fayette County Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Miss. 1998); Chickasaw County II
Litig., No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); Town
of Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Calhoun County Litig., 881 F. Supp.
252, 253-54 (N.D. Miss. 1995); Marylanders Liig., 849 £ Supp. 1022, 1056 (D. Md. 1994).
95. See, eg, County of Thurston Litig. (NE), 129 £3d 1015, 1025 (8th Cir. 1997); City
of Minneapolis Litig., No. 02-1139 (JRT/FLN), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19708, at *49-50 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2004).
96. See, e.g., Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1315 (10th Cir. 1996); Town of
Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
97. Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2006).
98. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 27-30. Unlike the other Senate Factors, which
were largely derived from judicial decisions predating the 1982 amendments, racial bloc
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suits (77 of 123, or 62.6%) identified in this study found legally
significant racial bloc voting." Racial bloc voting factors into the
evaluation of Section 2 claims at two junctures. The second and
third of the Gingles "preconditions" to a Section 2 claim call for an
inquiry into racial polarization in voting. They require courts to
determine whether minority voters are politically cohesive, and
whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority-
preferred candidate.00 Courts who so find (and also find the first
Gingles factor '°0 ) must then evaluate whether the plaintiffs can sus-
tain their claim under "the totality of circumstances. 02 This
inquiry includes analysis of the Senate Factors, one of which is the
extent of racially polarized voting.
1 0 3
In practice, however, courts that consider racial bloc voting gen-
erally engage in one inquiry, typically under the Gingles factors. 
04
Of those that deem Gingles satisfied and proceed to the totality of
circumstances review, some simply refer back to their previous
analysis of racial bloc voting under Gingles. Other courts engage in
additional analysis, typically examining within the totality of cir-
cumstances the question whether race is the cause of the polarized
voting emerged as a formal element of the Section 2 inquiry for the first time in 1982. See,
e.g., Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 384 (5th Cir. 1984). Supporters of the 1982 amend-
ments to Section 2 invoked racial bloc voting as the critical restraint that would keep the
amended statute from devolving into a mandate for proportional representation. See ISSA-
CHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 14, at 741.
99. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39. The exceptions are: (1) cases involving
challenges to specific voting procedures that identified Section 2 violations without consid-
ering racially polarized voting, see Operation Push Litig. (MS), 932 E2d 400, 401 (5th Cir.
1991) (voter registration system); Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 573-75 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (poll official conduct); Marks-Phila. Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 146113, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994) (absentee ballots); Town of N. Johns Litig., 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1471
(M.D. Ala. 1989) (withholding of candidacy filing forms); Harris Litig., 695 F. Supp. 517,
517 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (policy of appointing only white poll officials); Madison County Litig.,
610 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (invalidation of absentee ballots), and (2) cases that
found a violation of Section 2 based on invidious intent without considering racially polar-
ized voting, seeArakaki Litig. (HI), 314 E3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2002); Rybicki Litig., 574 F.
Supp. 1147, 1149 (N.D. I1. 1983).
100. SeeGingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
101. See id. at 32; see also supra Part II.B.
102. See, e.g., De Grandy Litig. (FL), 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994); City of Holyoke
Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831,
849-50 (5th Cir. 1993).
103. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 27-30.
104. Decisions between the 1982 amendments and the Court's decision in Gingles obvi-
ously did not employ the Ginges test. Instead, these courts applied varied standards to
evaluate racial bloc voting under Senate Factor 2. See, e.g., Terrell Litig., 565 E Supp. 338,
348-49 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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voting patterns identified under Gingles. °5 This Report discusses
racial bloc voting solely within this Section.
Of the lawsuits analyzed, 155 considered the extent of racially
polarized voting, 105 found the factor to exist. In covered jurisdic-
tions, 52 lawsuits found racial bloc voting; 53 in non-covered. 6 Of
suits finding this factor, 77 (73.3%) also resulted in a favorable
outcome for the plaintiff.
10 7
The discussion that follows describes several recurring issues
that pervade judicial analyses of racial bloc voting.
a. Identifying the Minority-Preferred Candidate-Courts assessing
racial bloc voting must identify the minority-preferred candidate in
order to determine "whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usu-
ally to defeat"08 this candidate. In making this determination,
courts overwhelmingly agree that the race of the candidates must
inform the analysis at least to some degree. Courts have thus not
followed Justice Brennan's position in Thornburg v. Ginges that a
candidate's race should be irrelevant when assessing racial bloc
voting.'0
Most courts, for example, more easily identify a minority candi-
date as minority-preferred than they do a non-minority candidate.
Some implicitly or explicitly assume the minority candidate is
105. See, e.g., Westwego Litig. (LA), 946 F.2d 1109, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991); Charleston
County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 277-78 (D.S.C. 2003). Many courts also have held that
causation should be considered in the totality of the circumstances assessment. See infra Part
II.B.2. Some courts then import the causation question into a consideration of Factor 2. See,
e.g., Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029-33 (D. Colo. 2004) (finding Ginges
met, but no racially polarized voting due to causation). Others simply consider causation as
a different part of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Alamance County Litig. (NC),
99 E3d 600, 616 n.12 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he best reading of [Gingles] ... is one that treats
causation as irrelevant in the inquiry into the three Gingies preconditions but relevant in the
totality of circumstances inquiry." (internal citation omitted)); see also infra notes 131-168.
106. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
107. Id. Twenty-eight lawsuits found racially polarized voting but ultimately did not end
in a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs. Id. Sixty percent of these were in non-covered ju-
risdictions. Seven deemed GingLes I or II unsatisfied, id., eight identified "rough
proportionality" as defined in Johnson v. De Grandy, see infra Part II.B (discussing cases that
found Gingles but no violation due to proportionality), two remanded the case for further
review, see City of Chi.-Bonilla Litig. (IL), 141 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 1998); Carrollton
NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987), and six declined to find a viola-
tion under a more general totality of the circumstances review, see Old Person Litig. (MT),
312 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002); NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 E3d 361, 374 (5th
Cir. 2001); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 1218, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000); Niag-
ara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1019-24 (2d Cir. 1995); Democratic Party of Arkansas
Litig. (AR), 902 F.2d 15, 15 (8th Cir. 1990); City of Boston Litig. (MA), 784 F.2d 409, 414
(lst Cir. 1986).
108. Gingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986).
109. Id. at 68.
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the minority-preferred candidate, l° and some demand evidence
on point, although typically less than what they require to
demonstrate a white candidate is minority-preferred."' No court
has held that white candidates cannot be minority-preferred.1
2
Decisions in several circuits, however, have held that courts
should engage in a searching inquiry before identifying a white
candidate as minority-preferred. This approach, typically associated
with the Jenkins v. Red Clay School District litigation that articulated
it, deems election results only a preliminary component of the in-
quiry."' Courts must determine not only who gets minority votes,
but also the depth and vigor of minority support for that candi-
date, the scope of that candidate's interest in the minority
community, whether and why a viable minority candidate did not
run, and whether minority candidates had run previously."4 Be-
cause this approach looks at factors such as candidate slating, it
implicitly imports into the racial bloc voting inquiry some of the
110. See, e.g., Brooks Litig. (GA), 158 F.3d 1230, 1235, 1240 (lth Cir. 1998); City of
Chi.-Barnett Litig. (IL), 141 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR),
71 E3d 1382, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1995);Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 4 F.3d 1103,
1126 (3d Cir. 1993); Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1987); City of Boston
Litig. (MA), 784 F.2d 409, 413 (lst Cir. 1986); Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016,
1029-33 (D. Colo. 2004); Campuzano Litig., 200 E Supp. 2d 905, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2002); St.
Bernard Parish Sch. Bd. Litig., No. CIVA. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug.
26, 2002); Rural West I Litig., 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1108 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
111. Some courts allow for a lesser burden to establish that a minority candidate is mi-
nority-preferred. See, e.g., Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1320-21 (10th Cir. 1996);
Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 4 F.3d 1103, 1129 (3d Cir. 1993); De Grandy Litig.,
815 F. Supp. 1550, 1572-73 (N.D. Fla. 1992); Rockford Bd. of Educ. Litig., No. 89 C 20168,
1991 WL 299104, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1991); Gretna Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1133 (E.D.
La. 1986).
Others require the same evidence regardless of the candidate's race. See, e.g., City of Santa
Maria Litig. (CA), 160 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1998); Alamance County Litig. (NC), 99
F.3d 600, 615 (4th Cir. 1996); Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir. 1988);
Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 303 (D. Mass. 2004); Rodriguez Litig.,
308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Armour Litig., 775 E Supp. 1044, 1057 (N.D.
Ohio 1991).
112. See generally City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), 160 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1998);
City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1379 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997); Alamance County Litig.
(NC), 99 F.3d 600, 608 (4th Cir. 1996); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 E3d 1382, 1387-
88 (8th Cir. 1995); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1016 (2d Cir. 1995); Cincinnati
Litig. (OH), 40 F.3d 807, 813 (6th Cir. 1994);Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 4
F.3d 1103, 1126 (3d Cir. 1993); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 882-83 (5th
Cir. 1993); Bond Litig. (CO), 875 E2d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1989); Black Political Task
Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 304 (D. Mass. 2004); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections
Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1324, 1325-26 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
113. Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 4 F.3d 1103, 1129 (3d Cir. 1993).
114. See, e.g., id.; Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1321 (10th Cir. 1996); Blythe-
ville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1995); Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 F.3d
1494, 1540 (11 th Cir. 1994); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 997-1017 (D.S.D. 2004).
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Senate Factors typically reviewed only after the Gingles threshold is
crossed.
Courts in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits expressly reject
this approach, maintaining that this "subjective" inquiry into mi-
nority preferences is inappropriate and impractical. These courts
posit that the inquiry should be limited almost exclusively to elec-
tion results to identify the minority-preferred candidate. With a few
caveats, these courts define the preferred candidate as the one who
receives the most votes from minority voters." 5 The Fourth Circuit
appears to follow a similar approach, albeit not explicitly, 16 while
the Seventh Circuit seems to assume that a minority candidate is
the minority-preferred candidate."7
In practice, however, many courts do not strictly adhere to one
or the other of these tests."" For instance, after adopting the Jenkins
v. Red Clay School District approach, 9 the Eighth Circuit, in the St.
Louis Board of Education litigation, noted "it is a near tautological
principle that the minority preferred candidate 'should generally
be one able to receive [minority] votes.' 020 Likewise, the Eleventh
Circuit relies on the totality of the circumstances to demonstrate
that a white candidate is minority-preferred, but its most recent
decisions treat the candidate who receives the majority of the mi-
nority vote as minority-preferred. 2' In the context of multi-seat
elections, moreover, where voters are permitted to cast as many
votes as there are seats, both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have
combined the quantitative and subjective approaches to assess the
115. See, e.g., City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), 160 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 1998); Niagara
Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1995); Cincinnati Litig. (OH), 40 F.3d 807,
810 n.1 (6th Cir. 1994); Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir. 1988).
116. Older cases in the Fourth Circuit allowed room for subjective inquiries. See, e.g.,
City of Norfolk Litig. (VA), 816 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1987). More recently, however, the
Fourth Circuit has moved closer to the Second Circuit's approach. See Alamance County
Litig. (NC), 99 E3d 600, 614 (4th Cir. 1996).
117. See, e.g., City of Chi.-Bonilla Litig. (IL), 141 F.3d 699,703 (7th Cir. 1998).
118. Courts in the Fifth and First Circuits do consider voting patterns, testimony from
the community, and evidence of active minority support for a particular candidate. See
LULAC v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), 123 F.3d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1997); Black
Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 307-08 (D. Mass. 2004); LULAC v. Roscoe
Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., No. 1:94-CV-104-C, 1996 WL 453584, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 1996);
City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1393, 1395 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
119. Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 E3d 1382 (8th Cir. 1995).
120. St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig. (MO), 90 F.3d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1996).
121. Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065, 1072-73 (11th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Chiles Litig.
(FL), 139 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (11th Cir. 1998); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355,
1377, 1379 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997).
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status of candidates that do not place first among black voters, but
do receive a substantial percentage of the black vote.
122
b. Probative Elections--Courts in most circuits generally place
more weight on elections involving a minority candidate than on
those involving only white candidates. 2  Some courts discount
white-on-white elections based on concern that the candidate re-
ceiving minority votes is not truly minority-preferred. 24 Others do
so because of concern that these elections mask polarized voting
patterns that should be deemed legally significant.125 Not infre-
quently, candidates preferred by minority voters in elections
between white candidates prevail. These victories suggest that white
voters are not voting sufficiently as a bloc to defeat minority-
preferred candidates. And yet, minority candidates in the same
jurisdictions are often defeated even though they receive over-
whelming support from minority voters, suggesting white voters are
voting as a bloc within the meaning of the third Gingles factor.
26
Discounting elections between white candidates consequently
helps courts discern polarization of a sort that might otherwise be
obscured.
For similar reasons, courts have increasingly looked to primary
elections to determine which candidate is minority-preferred. Be-
cause primary elections remove party as a causal explanation for
voting patterns, some courts view these elections as allowing better
122. See, e.g., City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1379 n.9 (lth Cir. 1997); Ala-
mance County Litig. (NC), 99 F.3d 600, 614 (4th Cir. 1996).
123. See Old Person Litig. (MT), 230 E3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Sanchez-Colo.
Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1996); City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d
973, 988 n.8 (1st Cir. 1995); S. Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281, 1293 (11th
Cir. 1995);Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 4 F.3d 1103, 1128 (3d Cir. 1993); Mag-
nolia Bar Ass'n Litig. (MS), 994 F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th Cir. 1993); City of Indianapolis Litig.
(IN), 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992); Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F.2d 496, 503-04 (5th Cir.
1987);Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196, 209 (E.D. Ark. 1989); City ofJackson, TN Litig., 683 F.
Supp. 1515, 1531 (W.D. Tenn. 1988). But seeAlamance County Litig. (NC), 99 F.3d 600, 608,
610 n.8 (4th Cir. 1996); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1995).
124. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 304 (D. Mass. 2004);
Metro Dade County Litig., 805 F. Supp. 967, 984-85 (S.D. Fla. 1992); City of Dallas Litig.,
734 F. Supp. 1317, 1388 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
125. See LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 903 F. Supp. 1071, 1092-93 (W.D. Tex.
1995); City of Columbia Litig., 850 F. Supp. 404, 416 (D.S.C. 1993); Jeffers Litig., 730 F.
Supp. 196, 209 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1317
(E.D. Ark. 1988).
126. See S. Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281, 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 1995);
City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 775 (N.D. Ga. 1997); City of Columbia Litig., 850
F. Supp. 404, 416 (D.S.C. 1993); Nipper Litig., 795 F. Supp. 1525, 1534, 1548 (M.D. Fla.
1992); City of Starke Litig., 712 E Supp. 1523, 1530 (M.D. Fla. 1989);Jeffers Litig., 730 F.
Supp. 196, 209 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1316,
1317 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
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focus on the role of race in voter decisionmaking.12 Primaries,
moreover, are increasingly the only election of consequence as
noncompetitive districts have proliferated nationwide.1
2
Many courts, consequently, discount minority support for a par-
ticular candidate in the general election where minority voters
supported another candidate in the primary."9 A few courts have
also held that white support for a minority-preferred candidate in
the general election does not bar finding the third Gingles factor,
so long as white voters supported a different candidate in the De-
mocratic primary. s13  Highlighting this point, the district court in
the Black Political Task Force litigation observed that "black and
white voters in Boston preferred the [black] Democratic candidate
at a general election is hardly news.... [It] says less about race
than about partisan politics."13'
Courts have also relied on primary election results to examine
whether two minority groups seeking to aggregate their voting
strength in a Section 2 claim prefer the same candidate. While
most courts have held that multi-minority coalition claims are cog-
nizable under Section 2, several decisions find that party affiliation
masks a lack of cohesiveness between, for example, black and La-
tino voters. 32 In this context, evidence that members of the
minority groups supported different candidates in the primary
weighs against finding political cohesion, even if voters from both
groups supported the same candidate in the general election. As
such, voting patterns in primary elections are probative on the
127. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 305-06 (D. Mass.
2004); Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Anthony Litig., 35 F. Supp. 2d
989, tbl. iv (E.D. Mich. 1999); Cousin Litig. (TN), 145 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1998); San-
chez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 E3d 1303, 1317 n.25 (10th Cir. 1996); LULAC v. Clements Litig.
(TX), 999 F.2d 831, 884 (5th Cir. 1993); Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 380, 392 (E.D.
Tenn. 1989); City of Starke Litig., 712 E Supp. 1523, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1989); County of Big
Horn (Windy Boy) Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1009-10 (D. Mont. 1986).
128. See Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F Supp. 2d 291, 305-06 (D. Mass. 2004);
City of Starke Litig., 712 E Supp. 1523, 1534, 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1989); see generally MORRIS
FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1996); Katz, supra note 68; Sam Hirsch, The United
States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistrict-
ing, 2 ELECTION LJ. 179 (2003).
129. See Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1019 (2d Cir. 1995); Nash Litig., 797 F.
Supp. 1488, 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
130. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 305-06 (D. Mass.
2004); Garza v. L.A. Litig., 756 F Supp. 1298, 1335 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
131. Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 306 (D. Mass. 2004).
132. See Pomona Litig. (CA), 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989); Perry Litig., 298 E
Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004). Cf France Litig., 71 E Supp. 2d 317, 327 (S.D.N.Y
1999).
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issue of cohesion because such elections remove partisanship as an
explanation for voting behavior.
1 3
Although no court has expressly rejected consideration of pri-
mary elections, some courts have identified reasons that suggest
caution before weighing primary elections too heavily. To the ex-
tent that primary voters are fewer in number and more extreme in
political persuasion than those participating in the general elec-
tion, the candidate who garners minority group support in the
primary may not be the preferred candidate of most minority vot-
ers. Some courts, therefore, have expressed concern that the
preferences of politically active members of the minority commu-
nity should not define the candidate preferred by the minority
community as a whole.134 Some courts have also questioned
whether general election results should be discounted simply be-
cause minority voters supported a different candidate in the
primary. These courts suggest that doing so privileges minority vot-
ers to an improper extent, effectively relieving them of the
obligation to "pull, haul, and trade" that all voters confront.3 5
c. Causation-The Justices in Thornburg v. Gingles disagreed
about the role causation should play in the racial bloc voting in-
quiry. Justice Brennan rejected causation in his plurality opinion,
arguing that "it is the difference between the choices made by blacks
and whites-not the reasons for that difference" that is impor-
tant.136 Justice O'Connor, however, thought the inquiry should
address "evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be
explained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying
divergence in the interests of minority and white voters." 7 Justice
White was the critical fifth vote on the issue and his separate opin-
ion did not definitively resolve the question. Lower courts ever
since have disputed the role causation should play in the racial
bloc voting analysis. When courts consider causation, they all ask
the same underlying question: namely, whether race, as opposed to
partisanship or some other factor, best explains why white voters
133. See Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F.
Supp. 2d 346, 389, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Page Litig., 144 E Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001);
County of Big Horn (Windy Boy) Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986).
134. See, e.g., CityofSantaMariaLitig. (CA), 160 F.3d 543,552 (9th Cir. 1998).
135. City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F3d 1355, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1997); Alamance
County Litig. (NC), 99 F.3d 600, 615 (4th Cir. 1996).
136. Gingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986).
137. Id. at 100 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) ("Evidence that a candidate preferred by the
minority group ... was rejected by white voters for reasons other than those which made
that candidate the preferred choice of the minority group would seem clearly relevant in
answering the question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority
candidates.").
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failed to support the minority-preferred candidate. Courts in nine
judicial circuits now expressly or implicidy incorporate causation
when they assess racial bloc voting, either under the second and
third Gingles factors or as part of the totality of circumstances test. 1
s
And yet, courts suggest that the juncture at which they ask this
question matters. A finding that political party best explains diver-
gent voting patterns under Gingles means that the court will not
find legally significant racial bloc voting and that a plaintiffs re-
sults-based voting discrimination claim likely fails.39 Instead,
consideration of causation within the totality of the circumstances
review means that the plaintiffs have already satisfied the Gingles
preconditions and, as a result, an inference may come into play
that "racial bias is at work."1 40 In the Mount Holyoke litigation, the
appellate court posited that "cases will be rare in which plaintiffs
establish the Gingles preconditions yet fail on a Section 2 claim be-
cause other facts undermine the original inference.',
4
1
In practice, however, the juncture at which courts consider cau-
sation may matter less than these courts suggest. Regardless of
where they consider causation, courts do not typically require that
plaintiffs disprove that factors other than race caused divergent
voting patterns, 42 but most require that plaintiffs demonstrate that
race is the causal linkage when defendants proffer evidence sup-
porting an alternative explanation. 43 Proving the linkage is difficult
138. See, e.g., Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 F.3d 341, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2004); Town
of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 493 (2d Cir. 1999); Mallory-Ohio County Litig., 38
F. Supp. 2d 525, 575-76 (S.D. Ohio 1997), affd, 173 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1999); Milwaukee
NAACP Litig. (WI), 116 F.3d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1997); Attala County Litig. (MS), 92 E3d
283, 290 (5th Cir. 1996); Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1307-08, 1313 (10th Cir.
1996); City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995); S. Christian Leadership
Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1995); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1008 (D.S.D. 2004);
Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346,
393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
139. See LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Unless the
tendency among minorities and whites to support different candidates, and the accompany-
ing losses by minority groups at the polls, are somehow tied to race ... plaintiffs' attempt to
establish legally significant white bloc voting, and thus their vote dilution claim under § 2,
must fail.").
140. Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 F.3d 1494, 1525 (11th Cir. 1994); see also City of Holyoke
Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that Gingles preconditions "rise to an
inference that racial bias is operating through the medium of the targeted electoral struc-
ture to impair minority political opportunities").
141. City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995).
142. See, e.g., id. (examining causation and stating that plaintiffs need not "affirmatively
... disprove every other possible explanation for racially polarized voting."); Attala County
Litig. (MS), 92 F3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1996).
143. See, e.g., City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[O]nce the
defendant proffers enough evidence to raise a legitimate question in regard to whether
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regardless of the juncture, 144 and numerous lawsuits have held that
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to successfully rebut defen-
dants' evidence on this point.
4
5
d. Special Circumstances-Courts have identified a variety of
"special circumstances" that influence the racial bloc voting inquiry
and have excluded or discounted elections involving such special
circumstances as distinct from the "usual predictability" of voting
patterns.1 46 Some circuits have identified numerous special circum-
stances, others few or none. Typically, the recognition of special
circumstances makes an ultimate finding of racial bloc voting more
likely. A few cases, however, have discounted elections where the
minority-preferred candidate was defeated due to special circum-
stances, thus having the opposite effect.14v Some recent decisions
voice resistance to discounting elections because of special circum-
nonracial factors adequately explain racial voting patterns, the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the factfinder that the voting patterns were engendered by race rests with the
plaintiffs."); Mallory-Ohio Litig., 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 539, 575-76 (S.D. Ohio 1997) ("In this
case, numerous factors, other than race, explain losses at the polls by particular minor-
ity candidates .... Two factors in particular, 'partisanship' and 'incumbency,' accurately
explain electoral outcomes in numerous judicial elections involving African-American can-
didates.").
144. But see Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 F.3d 341, 353 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that "even controlling for
partisanship in Council elections, race still appears to play a role in the voting patterns of
white and minority voters in Charleston County"); Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d
476, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendants' argument that minority-preferred candi-
dates were defeated because of party not race, due to the town Republican Party's slating
process which effectively excluded minorities).
145. See, e.g., Bexar County Litig. (TX), 385 F.3d 853, 867 (5th Cir. 2004); Hamrick
Litig. (GA), 296 F3d 1065, 1078 (11th Cir. 2002); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 E3d 1355,
1383 (11th Cir. 1997); S. Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 E3d 1281, 1293-94 (11th Cir.
1995); Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 F.3d 1494, 1547 (11th Cir. 1994); Liberty County Comm'rs
Litig. (FL),899 F.2d 1012, 1021 (11th Cir. 1990); Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d
1016, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 2004); Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (con-
cluding that minority groups are not politically cohesive because they "do not vote
cohesively in primary elections, where their allegiance is free of party affiliation"); City of
Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1997); Mallory-Ohio Litig., 38 F. Supp. 2d 525,
539 (S.D. Ohio 1997) ("The 'clear partisan patterns' reflected in Dr. King's Report suggest
that party affiliation is a, if not the, predominant factor in Ohio judicial elections."); Town
of Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 881-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); City of Columbia Litig., 850 F
Supp. 404, 418, 420 (D.S.C. 1993) (concluding that plaintiffs' evidence was "simply not suf-
ficient to overcome the evidence that the blacks who lost owe their losses as much to blacks'
failure to vote more cohesively or to turn out at all as to failure to achieve white support");
Bandemer Litig., 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1489-90 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (finding that minorities in
Indiana vote as a bloc for the Democratic candidate and that therefore "the voting efficacy
of [minorities] was impinged upon because of their politics and not because of their race").
146. Cano Litig., 211 F Supp. 2d 1208, 1235-42 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
147. See, e.g., Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065, 1978 (11th Cir. 2002) (using incum-
bency to dismiss the loss of the minority-preferred candidate); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist.
(TX), 89 F.3d 1205, 1217 (5th Cir. 1996) (discounting a minority loss because the candidate lost
to an incumbent).
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stances, preferring instead to consider all the evidence pre-
sented.
1 4 s
Incumbency: Numerous courts have held that legally significant
white bloc voting may exist, notwithstanding white support for a
black candidate, if the black candidate is an incumbent.1 49 Others
disagree, finding that "incumbency plays a significant role in the
vast majority of American elections," such that its use as a special
circumstance "would confuse the ordinary with the special."' 0
Majority-Minority Districts Some courts have identified the major-
ity-minority district as a "special circumstance" that alters the
conventional racial bloc inquiry."' In such districts, white voters are
by definition a minority of the population, and thus, courts have
reasoned that the inability of white voters to defeat the minority-
preferred candidate is less probative evidence of a decline in racial
bloc voting than it would be elsewhere. The Ninth Circuit said that
"[tlo do otherwise would permit white bloc voting in a majority-
white district to be washed clean by electoral success in neighbor-
ing majority-Indian districts."'
5 2
Post-Lawsuit Elections: Some courts have discounted the results of
elections occurring after a lawsuit was filed. This approach is prem-
ised on the view that the very filing of a Section 2 lawsuit makes
white voters more likely to support the minority-preferred candi-
date and that this support is somehow not genuine. The concern is
that post-lawsuit elections might "work[] a one-time advantage for
[minority] candidates in the form of unusual organized political
support by white leaders concerned to forestall single-member
148. See, e.g., Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 422 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (noting that it
would be possible to find anomalies in most elections and refusing to discount 3 elections
because of low turnout, a little known candidate, and controversy).
149. See, e.g., Gingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S. 30, 76 (1996); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist.
Litig. (TX), 89 F.3d 1205, 1217 (5th Cir. 1996); Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 F.3d 904, 911 (8th
Cir. 1995); Metro Dade Count) Litig. (FL), 985 E2d 1471, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1993); City of
Norfolk Litig. (VA), 883 E2d 1232, 1342 (4th Cir. 1989); Black Political Task Force Litig.,
300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 306 (D. Mass. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 E Supp. 2d 346, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 775-76 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Town of
Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843,879, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Texarkana Litig., 861 F. Supp. 756
(W.D. Ark. 1992); Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 380, 394 n.200 (E.D. Tenn. 1989);Jeffers
Litig., 730 E Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
150. Cincinnati Litig. (OH), 40 F.3d 807, 813, 814 n.3 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Milwaukee
NAACP Litig. (WI), 116 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting incumbency as a spe-
cial circumstance when minority judges ran unopposed); Alamance County Litig. (NC), 99
F.3d 600, 617 (4th Cir. 1996).
151. Old Person Litig. (MT), 230 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000); Black Political Task
Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 305 (D. Mass. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976,
1011 (D.S.D. 2004).
152. Old Person Litig. (MT), 230 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
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districting."'5 3 Other courts will consider such elections, either out-
right, 54 or with the caveat that plaintiffs are unable to show
unusual white support for the minority-preferred candidate.'
Unusual Elections- Courts have held that the success of minority-
preferred candidates may be discounted when reason exists to view
voting behavior as unusual. Courts have excluded elections based156 anunp157 ani
on a plurality victory, an atypical primary, an unopposed candi-
dacy,'18 and a candidacy against only a third-party candidate.9
Courts have also excluded elections where a minority candidate
was seen as "anti-busing" at a time when a local school desegrega-
tion lawsuit was pending,'5 a candidate was under federal
indictment at the time of the election, 6' and a winning black can-
didate had been a professional athlete.' 62 Further, courts discount
elections not involving serious or well-known candidates,'65  and
some have approved discounting minority success when the race of
the candidate was not widely known.' Courts are often skeptical,
153. Gingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S. 30, 76 (1986). See, e.g., City of Santa Maria (CA), 160
F3d 543, 548-50 (9th Cir. 1998) (discounting the election because days before the election,
the candidate told a local newspaper that his victory would prove "that the city of Santa
Maria is not racist"); City of Norfolk Litig. (VA), 816 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1987) (discount-
ing an election where the mayor made a public statement suggesting the election of two
black candidates could moot the pending litigation).
154. See, e.g., Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1033 (D. Colo. 2004);
NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2001).
155. See, e.g., Nat'l City Litig. (CA), 976 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Nor-
folk Litig. (VA), 816 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1987); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F. Supp.
339, 376 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
156. See, e.g., Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d 1382, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1995).
157. Jordan Litig., 604 F. Supp. 807, 812 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (concluding that the primary
was "atypical" because of "a variety of factors, including uncertainty about election dates, the
recent realignment of the district ... the lack of an incumbent" and "a court order allowing
Republican voters to participate in the democratic primary").
158. See, e.g., Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 E3d 1382, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1995).
Some other courts do, however, consider these elections on the grounds that the candidate
would not be unopposed if not supported by the white voters. See, e.g., Milwaukee NAACP
Litig. (WI), 116 F.3d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1997) ("One good measure of white voters' will-
ingness to support black candidates is the failure of white candidates to present themselves
for election even when a majority of the electorate is white. Potential opponents concede
the election only when they face certain defeat. That 6 black candidates ran without opposi-
tion therefore is highly informative.").
159. Old Person Litig. (MT), 312 F.3d 1036, 1048 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002).
160. Chattanooga Litig., 722 E Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
161. Kirkseyv. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
162. Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIVA. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *4
(N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997).
163. Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
164. Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987). But see Ala-
mosa County Litig., 306 F Supp. 2d 1016, 1032 (D. Colo. 2004).
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however, of "special circumstances" that simply illustrate good
campaigning on the part of the minority candidate.
1 65
Low Turnout. Some courts have been unwilling to find white bloc
voting where minority voters did not turn out to vote in substantial
numbers.166 Some courts phrase this issue as one of causation:
namely, those plaintiffs must establish that white bloc voting caused
the minority defeat, as opposed to a seemingly independent cause
such as low turnout. The premise is that if there had been higher
minority turnout, the minority-preferred candidate might have
been elected. 67 Other courts warn that indicators of vote dilution,
such as official discrimination, may contribute to low turnout."
C. The Senate Factors
1. History of Official Discrimination in Voting-The first factor
listed in the Senate Report asks courts to assess "the extent of any
history of official discrimination" in the jurisdiction that "touched
the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote,
or otherwise to participate in the democratic process."' 69 Courts
assessing Factor 1 have documented numerous instances in which
state and local officials engaged in intentional race discrimina-
tion. ° These judicial findings record the nature, frequency, and
recentness of this conduct.
165. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1021 (2d Cir. 1995); Anthony
Litig., 35 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
166. See, e.g., Meza Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 65 (D. Mass. 2004) ("These elections on
their face provide evidence of ethnic voting polarization by both Hispanic and non-Hispanic
voters in Chelsea. We note that the force of this evidence is diminished to some extent be-
cause the election results reveal low turnout rates for Hispanic voters in these elections.").
167. See, e.g., City of Columbia Litig., 850 F. Supp. 404, 418, 420 (D.S.C. 1993) (conclud-
ing that plaintiffs' evidence was "simply not sufficient to overcome the evidence that the
blacks who lost owe their losses as much to blacks' failure to vote more cohesively or to turn
out at all as to failure to achieve white support"); see also Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist. Litig.
(TX), 964 E2d 1542, 1550-51 (5th Cir. 1992).
168. See, e.g., Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d 1382, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995) (sug-
gesting lower turnout may follow from the moving of a polling place in a minority area, a
sense of defeat, or the absence of ballot issues that may turn out the minority vote); City of
Holyoke Litig. (MA), 72 F.3d 973, 986 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that "low voter turnout in the
minority community sometimes may result from the interaction of the electoral system with
the effects of past discrimination, which together operate to discourage meaningful elec-
toral participation"); see also Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1321 (10th Cir. 1996).
169. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 27-30.
170. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
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One hundred and fifty-two lawsuits considered Factor I. 7' Of
these, 111 (73%) lawsuits found that Factor 1 was met, including
61 in covered jurisdictions and 50 in non-covered. 72 An additional
30 cases concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish that the
identified history "touched" the present-day ability of members of
the minority group to participate in the political process.73 Of the
111 lawsuits that found Factor 1, 69 reached a decision favorable to
the plaintiffs.
74
Many courts assessing Factor 1 discussed instances of discrimina-
tory conduct dating from the nineteenth century and continuing
through much of the twentieth. These accounts addressed literacy
tests, grandfather clauses, poll taxes, white primaries, racially dis-
criminatory voter registration requirements as well as state laws
mandating segregation, the separation of names by race on voter
registration lists, and other official discriminatory practices in edu-




173. NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 E3d 361, 367-68 (5th Cir. 2001); Calhoun
County Litig. (MS), 88 E3d 1393, 1399 (5th Cir. 1996); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d
1002, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1995); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 884 (5th Cir.
1993); Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist. Litig. (TX), 964 E2d 1542, 1555-56 (5th Cir. 1992); Car-
rollton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1561 (11 th Cir. 1987); City of Boston Litig. (MA),
784 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 1986); Wesley Litig. (TN), 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986);
McCarty Litig. (TX), 749 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1984); Alamosa County Litig., 306 F.
Supp. 2d 1016, 1034-35 (D. Colo. 2004); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d
291, 313 (D. Mass. 2004); Meza Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 74 (D. Mass. 2004); France Litig.,
71 F Supp. 2d 317, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);Jones v. Edgar Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 979, 981 (C.D.
I11. 1998); Lafayette County Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1998); City of Chi.-
Bonilla Litig., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1446 (N.D. I11. 1997); City of Chi. Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C
5112, 88 C 9800, 1997 WL 102543, at *12 (N.D. I11. Mar. 5, 1997); City of Holyoke Litig., 960
F. Supp. 515, 526 (D. Mass. 1997); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1557-
59 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F Supp. 339, 363-64 (S.D. Cal. 1995);
LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 903 F. Supp. 1071, 1083 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Armstrong
v. Allain Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1320, 1332 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Metro Dade County Litig., 805 F
Supp. 967, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Nipper Litig., 795 F. Supp. 1525, 1544 (M.D. Fla. 1992);
Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417, 422-23 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Chickasaw County I
Litig., 705 F. Supp. 315, 320 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (though the court in the Chickasaw County II
litigation found this factor met); Pomona Litig., 665 F. Supp. 853, 862 (C.D. Cal. 1987); City
of Fort Lauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-99 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Cincinnati Litig., No.
C-1-92-278, 1993 WL 761489, at *15 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1983); Rybicki Litig., 574 F. Supp.
1147, 1151-52 (N.D. I11. 1983).
174. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39. Seven lawsuits found a violation of Sec-
tion 2 without considering Factor 1. Ten others identified a violation of Section 2 after
considering, but not finding, Factor 1. Id.
175. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1013-34 (D.S.D. 2004); DeSoto
County Litig., 995 E Supp. 1440, 1442-50 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Emison Litig., 782 F. Supp. 427,
439 n.35 & 440 n.39 (D. Minn. 1992); City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1320-21 (N.D.
Tex. 1990); Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 380, 385-89 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Neal Litig., 689
F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (E.D. Va. 1988); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-60
(M.D. Ala. 1986); Edgefield County Litig., 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1180-87 (D.S.C. 1986); Gretna
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Seventy lawsuits considering evidence of Factor 1 identified offi-
cial discrimination post-dating the enactment of the VRA.'76 A
number of these focused on instances of discriminatory conduct
during the period between the VRA's passage in 1965 and the 1982
amendments. Courts in these lawsuits cited official resistance to
school desegregation orders, employment discrimination settle-
ments and judgments against local governments,'17 and violations
of the VRA itself.17 8 Courts took note of various states' and counties'
failures to hire minority poll officials, 79 a county registrar's refusal
to register black citizens as voters,' ° the "hostility and uncoopera-
tion" displayed by public officials in Texas when Mexican-American
candidates ran for office,8 the race-based retention of a majority-
vote and post system, and the retention of unenforceable laws
mandating segregation.'82 In the Harris litigation, the court refused
to absolve the State of Alabama of responsibility for discrimination
occurring at the local level, given that Alabama continued to allow
"the poll official ... to play a 'gate keeping' role, to assure that if
blacks did slip through and register and vote they voted in a cer-
tain way.,1
83
Judicial findings documenting official, intentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or language minority status identify a wide
range of conduct by public officials. Thirty-three lawsuits identified
more than 100 instances of intentionally discriminatory conduct in
voting since 1982. Twelve of these lawsuits originated in covered
jurisdictions; 21 originated in non-covered. While several findings
identified intentional discrimination in the drawing of state reap-
portionment plans, conduct by local governmental officials
Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1116-18 (E.D. La. 1986); Butts v. NYC Litig., 614 F. Supp. 1527,
1544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 779 E2d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing district court's
Factor 1 finding); Major Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325, 339-40 (E.D. La. 1983).
176. See, e.g., Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 E2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1984); Hamrick Litig.,
No. Civ. 2:91-CV-002-WCO, 1998 WL 476186, at *7 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 1998), rev'd on other
grounds, 196 E3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 1999); Mehfoud Litig., 702 E Supp. 588, 594 (E.D.
Va. 1988); Gretna Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (E.D. La. 1986); Gingles Litig., 590 F. Supp.
345, 359 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
177. See, e.g., Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546, 1568 (11th Cir. 1984); City of
LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 757 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F.
Supp. 1347, 1359-60 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
178. See, e.g., Quilter Litig., 794 F. Supp. 695, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1992); City of Greenwood
Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
179. See, e.g., Edgefield County Litig., 650 E Supp. 1176, 1182 (D.S.C. 1986) (first black
poll officials not hired until 1970); Harris Litig., 601 F. Supp. 70, 72 (M.D. Ala. 1984).
180. Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097,1103 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
181. Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir, 1984).
182. City of LaGrange Litig., 969 E Supp. 749, 767 (N.D. Ga. 1997); City of Starke Litig.,
712 F. Supp. 1523, 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
183. Harris Litig., 695 E Supp. 517, 524-25 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
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accounted for the vast number of instances of official discrimina-
tion identified.
1 8 4
Findings of Intentional Discrimination in Covered Jurisdictions Since
1982-
In Charleston County, South Carolina8 5
* The "consistent and more recent pattern of white
persons acting to intimidate and harass African-
American voters at the polls during the 1980s and
1990s and even as late as the 2000 general election,"
including "significant evidence of intimidation and
harassment" that was "undeniably racial" and that
"never occurred at predominantly white polling
places, including those that tended to support De-
mocratic candidates.' ' 6
The participation of county officials, including at
least one member of the Charleston County Elec-
tion Commission and at least one county-employed
poll manager, in the Ballot Security Group which,
in the 1990 election, "sought to prevent African-
American voters from seeking assistance in casting
their ballots."'88
* The county's assignment of white poll managers,
described as "bulldogs," in unspecified recent elec-
tions since 1982, to majority African-American
precincts, where they "caused confusion, intimidated
African-American voters.... had the tendency to be
condescending to those voters," and engaged in "in-
appropriate behavior."8 9
* The "routine" assignment by "the Election Commis-
sion... [of] one particularly problematic poll
184. See text infra, this Section; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 39. Precise
quantification of these findings is difficult because, as these excerpts demonstrate, some
courts describe official policies or multiple actions taken over time as a single example of
official discrimination, and other courts specifically mention repeated instances of similar
conduct by officials.
185. Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286 n.23, 287-89 (D.S.C. 2003); see
also Charleston County Litig., 365 F.3d 341, 353 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's
fact findings and finding of a violation).
186. Charleston County Litig., 316 E Supp. 2d 268, 286 n.23 (D.S.C. 2003).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 289.
189. Id. at 287.
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manager to predominantly African-American polling
places in different parts of the County during the
1980s and early 1990s. At the polls, this poll manager,
who is white, routinely approached elderly African-
American women seeking to vote." He would often
"make a scene": approaching them, putting his arm
around them and speaking loudly, when "It]hey just
wanted to come in and sign up and vote. And it hap-
pened repeatedly just to that class of voter."'190
The "recurring" official harassment of elderly Afri-
can-American voters during the 1980s and 1990s, so
severe that the Charleston County Circuit Court "is-
sue[d] a restraining order against the Election
Commission requiring its agents to cease interfering
with the voting process."1 9
The persistence of problematic "treatment of Afri-
can-American voters by some white poll managers,
even though the Election Commission [had] pro-
vided training to poll managers on this subject."'92
The refusal of county workers at the polls to provide
African-American voters with legally required voting
assistance in elections from 1992-2002; including:
the discriminatory practice employed by white poll
managers working at black-majority precincts of
hassling African-American voters who asked for
help voting, including "asking questions such as:
'Why do you need assistance? Why can't you read
and write? And didn't you just sign in? And you
know how to spell your name, why can't you just
vote by yourself? And do you really need voter assis-
tance?' 093
The absence of comparable questioning of white
voters who were allowed to have their voting assistor
of choice without being challenged, since "no evi-
dence exists of any instances of harassment,
intimidation, or interference directed against white
190. Id. at 288.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 287.
193. Id. at 288.
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or African-American voters at predominantly white
polling places."' 94
The county's retention of a poll manager who had
exhibited a "threatening attitude" toward black vot-
ers at the Joseph Floyd Major Precinct in the 1996
election, after his refusal to respond to a county
election commissioner's reprimand; and the reten-
tion of this poll manager as a county employee at
majority African-American polls in Charleston
County in 2004.
* The decision of "the Charleston County Council [to
reduce] the salary for the Charleston County Pro-
bate Judge in 1991, following the election of the
first and only African-American person elected to
that position" from $85,000 to $59,000 annually.95
* The state legislative delegation's proposal to replace
the School Board's non-partisan electoral system with
a partisan one and to remove control of budgetary
matters from the Board following African-American
candidate success in School Board elections in 2000;
both proposals were made without communicating at
all with members of the School Board at the time.
In South Dakota1
96
* The display of discriminatory "negative reactions"
by county voter registrars to Native Americans dur-
ing voter registration drives in the 1980s, ranging
from "unhelpful to hostile.' 97
The limitation imposed by county officials on the
number of voter registration forms given to people
intending to register Native American voters despite
the absence of a legal limit on the provision of such
forms.
The refusal of county officials to accept Internet voter
registration forms from Native American voters.
The "erroneous rejections of registration cards"
from Native American applicants by county officials
194. Id.
195. Id. at 289.
196. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1023-28 (D.S.D. 2004) (covered jurisdic-
tions include the counties of Shannon and Todd, S.D., with all examples discussed by the
court provided here).
197. Id. at 1025.
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who, after apparent protest, accepted them without
explaining why they had first been rejected. 9
0 The state's requirement that voters provide photo
identification and other new voting requirements
enacted by the South Dakota legislature following
the 2002 election, passed after a legislative debate
that included the following:
* Statement by Rep. Van Norman that in passing
these provisions, "the legislature was retaliating
because the Indian vote was a big factor in new
registrants and a close senatorial race."
99
* Statement by Rep. Ted Klaudt defending
driver's license requirements by referring to Na-
tive American voters: "The way I feel is if you
don't have enough drive to get up and drive to
the county auditor.., maybe you shouldn't really
be voting in the first place.,
200
* Statement by Rep. Stanford Adelstein opposing
provisions that would have made voting registra-
tion easier and, in reference to Native American
voters, claiming: "Having made many efforts to
register people ... I realize that those people we
want to vote will be given adequate opportunity.
I, in my heart, feel that this bill... will encourage
those who we don't particularly want to have in
the system.... I'm not sure we want that sort of
person in the polling place. I think the effort of
registration... is adequate.20 '
* The state legislature's 1996 decision to combine two
single-member house districts, including a majority-
Native American district where a Native American
had won the Democratic primary in 1994, in order
to create one multi-member, majority-white house
district.
* The 2002 refusal of Bennett County commissioners
to move two polling places to Indian housing
areas that would "increase convenience for Indian
198. Id.
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voters," after Indian residents petitioned the County
for the stations.2
Wholly unsubstantiated public claims made by Ben-
nett County officials just before the 2002 election
that Indians involved in voter registration were en-
gaged in voter fraud, and investigations that
followed these claims in Pine Ridge and Rosebud,
which produced no actual charges but "intimidated
Indian voters.
20 3
* The 1986 refusal of the Dewey County Auditor to
provide Native Americans with sufficient voter regis-
tration cards to conduct a voter registration drive
on the Cheyenne River Reservation, conduct that
prompted a court order instructing the auditor to
supply 750 additional cards and extend the registra-
tion deadline.
The 1984 refusal of the Fall River County Auditor
"to register Indians who had attempted to register
as part of a last-minute voter registration drive on
the Pine Ridge Reservation," a refusal that led to a
court order the day before the election requiring
that voters be allowed to register and cast their bal-
lots.
204
" The discriminatory retention by Buffalo County of
"[a] redistricting plan, which had been in use for
decades, [and which] confined virtually all of the
county's Indian population to a single district con-
taining approximately 1500 people," leaving white
voters in control of the remaining two districts,
"which essentially gave them control over the county
government," an arrangement that prompted a law-
suit settled in 2004, in which the county "admitt[ed]
that the plan was discriminatory.,
20 5
" The 1999 refusal by Day County officials to let Na-
tive Americans vote in a sanitary district election, an
action that prompted a lawsuit which ended in a
settlement under which "the county and the district
202. Id. at 1027.
203. Id. at 1026.
204. Id. at 1025.
205. Id. at 1024.
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admitted that the district's boundaries unlawfully




In Bleckley County, Georgia
7
* The county's 1984 decision to replace numerous
polling places that "provid[ed] ready access to vot-
ers in the outlying areas"2 08 with a single precinct for
the 219 square mile county and to locate this single
precinct in an "all-white civic club"00 (the Jaycee
Barn in Cochran); and the county's decision to use
the precinct as the sole polling place for county
commissioner and county school board elections
throughout the 1980s and up to the court's 1992
decision.
In Dallas, Texa 1°
* The city's attempt to keep a partially at-large elec-
tion system after minority voters petitioned for its
change and city officials recognized the existing sys-
tem "denied both blacks and Hispanics access to





* The city's reliance on at-large elections with stag-
gered terms for five member city council,
adjudicated on the merits to constitute intentional
racial discrimination, compounded by the city's set-
tlement of a lawsuit "alleging that poll workers
improperly refused to let certain black citizens
vote, '1 and the city's refusal in 1983 to establish a
polling place repeatedly sought by black residents.
In North Johns, Alabama 4
* The town mayor's 1988 refusal to provide registration
forms required by state law to two African-American
206. Id. at 1023-24.
207. Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), 955 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992) (later reversed by the
Supreme Court, Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), on the question of whether plaintiffs
could challenge single commissioner form of government).
208. Id. at 1566 n.3.
209. Id. at 1566.
210. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
211. Id. at 1320.
212. Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
213. Id. at 341.
214. Town ofN.Johns Litig., 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
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city council candidates, the first African Americans
to run for town office after the entry of a consent
decree that replaced an at-large regime with a dis-
tricted one, where "[t]he mayor was aware that
Jones and Richardson, as black candidates, were
seeking to take advantage of the new court-
ordered single-member districting plan and that
their election would result in the town council be-
ing majority black.""
5
* The town's prosecution of the two successful black
candidates for failing to file the forms required by
state law that the mayor refused to give them, a fail-
ure that a federal court later attributed to the
mayor's intentionally discriminatory actions.
* The town's refusal to seat the candidates after they
were elected in 1988 until a federal court ordered
the town to do so.
In Jefferson County, Alabama11
6
* The express refusal of Jefferson County officials to
appoint black workers in white precincts in 1984 on
the ground that white voters would not listen to
black poll officials, a refusal that a federal court
equated with "open and intentional discrimination"
that "is lawless and inexcusable." The court stated
that "try[ing] to excuse the practice under cover of
the purported intolerance of their own constituents




* The mayor's proposal of a city ordinance in 1981,
following a series of annexations, to lower the Afri-
can-American population in majority-black district 3
to "the lowest level he understood to be legally pos-
sible in order to reduce the possibility that district
3's council member could be reelected."2 1 9 Still in
place as of 1983, the ordinance was found to be "in
substantial measure the product of a scheme pur-
215. Id. at 1476.
216. Harris Litig., 601 F. Supp. 70, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1984).
217. Id. at74.
218. Buskey v. Oliver Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
219. Id. at 1483.
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posefully designed and executed to decrease the vot-
ing strength of the black electorate in district 3.''22o
In Alabama21
The intentional and systematic failure of the Gov-
ernor and Attorney General of Alabama to remedy
past discrimination and ongoing racial harassment
at the polls.
The conduct of white poll officials who "continue to
harass and intimidate black voters" including "nu-
merous instances of where white poll officials
refused to help illiterate black voters or refused to
allow them to vote, where they refused to allow
black voters to cast challenged ballots, and where
they were simply rude and even intimidating toward
black voters.
222
Findings of Intentional Discrimination in Non-Covered Jurisdictions
Since 1982-
In Berks County, Pennsylvania 2
2
* Hostile public statements by officials at the polls to
Latino and Spanish-speaking voters, statements
such as "This is the U.S.A.-Hispanics should not be
allowed to have two last names. They should learn
to speak the language and we should make them
take only one last name,, 224 and "Dumb Spanish-
speaking people ... I don't know why they're given
the right to vote.22 5
* The subjection of Latino voters "to unequal treat-
ment at the polls, including being required to show
photo identification where white voters have not
been required to do so.
226
* The county's refusal to "appoint bilingual persons
to serve as clerks or machine inspectors, and to fill
220. Id.
221. Harris Litig., 695 E Supp. 517, 524-25, 527 & n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
222. Id. at 525.
223. Berks County Litig., 277 F Supp. 2d 570, 575-77, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Berks
County Litig., 250 F Supp. 2d 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
224. Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
225. Berks County Litig., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
226. Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
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vacant elected poll worker positions" showing an
"apparent unwillingness to ensure that poll workers
included persons reflective of the community.
22 7
* The conduct of poll officials in the City of Reading,
who "turned away Hispanic voters because they
could not understand their names, or refused to
'deal' with Hispanic surnames."
228
* The County's imposition of more onerous require-
ments for applicants seeking to serve as translators
at the polls than those applying to be other types of
poll officials, a requirement that impeded the
court's order requiring the County to hire bilingual
poll officials.
* Boasts by county officials and poll workers, flaunt-
ing their racially discriminatory motivations and
practices to federal officials observing elections in
May 2001, November 2001, May 2002 and Novem-
ber 2002, including statements from poll officials in
the City of Reading to Justice Department observers
"boast[ing] of the outright exclusion of Hispanic
voters ... during the May 15, 2001 municipal pri-
mary election."
229
In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
2 30
* The operation by city election commissioners, in
conjunction with campaign workers, of a fraudu-
lent "minority absentee ballot program" to
manipulate the outcome of a 1993 city election. Ef-
forts included "specifically target[ing] Latino and
African-Americans as groups to saturate with the il-
legal absentee ballot program," and "deceiving
Latino and African-American voters into believing
that the law had changed and that there was a 'new
way to vote' from the convenience of one's home.,
231
227. Id. at 577.
228. Berks County Litig., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
229. Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 575-576.
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In Montezuma County, Colorado
32
* The refusal of county officials during the 1980s and
early 1990s to allow residents to register to vote at
Towaoc on the Ute Reservation, even though the
county created satellite registration in the non-
Indian communities of Mancus and Dolores.
" The county's imposition of significant limitations on
the hours it would make available mobile voter reg-
istration on the Ute reservation, as compared to the
non-Indian communities, after the County decided
to allow such registration in the 1990s.
In Big Horn County, Montana
3
• The use of a discriminatory voter registration proc-
ess, and the appointment of deputy registrars and
election judges in 1986 with the County's "intent to
discriminate" against Native Americans.
* The county's failure to include "the names of Indi-
ans who had registered to vote ... on voting lists in
1982 and 1984 ",234 and the county's removal of the
names of Indians who had voted in primary elec-
tions from voting lists such that they were not
allowed to vote in the subsequent general election.
* The county's refusal to provide "[a]n Indian candi-
date for the state legislature .. . voter registration
cards in 1984, "2 35 forcing her to obtain them at the
State Capitol.
* County officials' refusal to provide a Native Ameri-
can man more than a scant number of voter
registration cards based on the claim that few cards
remained, even though the official shortly thereaf-
ter provided a white woman with fifty more cards.
" The subjection of Native Americans to a more tech-
nical and more difficult voter registration process
than whites, in which county officials "looked for
minor errors in [Native American] registration
232. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1162 (D. Colo. 1998).
233. County of Big Horn (Windy Boy) Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D. Mont. 1986).
234. Id. at 1008.
235. Id.
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applications and used them as an excuse to refuse
to allow registration."
2 3 6
On the Eastern Shore of Maryland
2 37
* The operation of "a kind of unofficial slating or-
ganization for white candidates" by some all-white,
state-funded volunteer fire departments on the
Eastern Shore until at least the mid-1980s.238
* The failure of the State of Maryland to stop funding
departments engaging in this practice until an
amendment to the Code of Fair Practices the Gov-
ernor made upon the recommendation of the
Attorney General in 1988.
* The discriminatory placement of polling places,
that continues "[e]ven today, [in] counties on the
lower Shore ... in white-dominated volunteer fire
companies, a hostile environment that may depress
black electoral participation."
239
* Through the 1980s, the only "black councilman was
allowed to 'attend[] all meetings except the annual
banquet, from which he was excluded. His
colleagues sent his dinner on a paper plate to his
home.' ,,240
241
In Little Rock, Arkansas
* The state of Arkansas in 1983 and 1989 pass-
ingmajority-vote requirements immediately after
the election of black candidates in Little Rock and
West Memphis as "a systematic and deliberate at-
tempt to reduce black political opportunity....
[which] is plainly unconstitutional. It replaces a sys-
tem in which blacks could and did succeed, with
one in which they almost certainly cannot. The in-
ference of racial motivation is inescapable."
2 42
" Decisions in the 1980s by county officials to move
polling places on short notice.
236. Id.
237. Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1057 n.56, 1061 (D. Md. 1994).
238. Id. at 1061.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1057 n.56.
241. Jeffers Litig., 740 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (E.D. Ark. 1990);Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp.
196, 210 & n.8, 211 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
242. Jeffers Litig., 740 F. Supp. at 594-95.
688 [VOL. 39:4
Documenting Discrimination in Voting
The county's appointment, "with isolated excep-
tions," of deputy voting registrars "only as a result of
litigation;" other recent, unspecified efforts to "in-
timidate black candidates."
243
* The intimidation in 1986 by an unnamed white
county sheriff of a black lawyer, Roy Lewellen, run-
ning for State Senate, including: first, warning him
"not to run," and, second, when that advice was ig-
nored, an unnamed prosecutor's "institution [of] a
widely-publicized criminal prosecution against Mr.
Lewellen for witness bribery" 44-treatment that "a
white lawyer, even one who opposed the political
powers that be" would not have received;245 and
conduct amounting to "racial intimidation" that
shows "that official discrimination designed to sup-
press black political activity is not wholly a thing of




* The enactment of a redistricting plan in 2001 de-
scribed by the court as "a textbook case of packing
. concentrating large numbers of minority voters
within a relatively small number of districts," de-





* The manipulation of district lines "to benefit two
white incumbents" where the State House did not
"paus[e] to investigate the consequences of its ac-
tions for minority voting opportunities," thereby
using race "as a tool to ensure the protection of in-
cumbents."
249
In New Rochelle, New York
2 50
* The enactment of a city council redistricting plan in
2003 that diluted minority voting strength by re-
placing a majority-minority district with a plurality
243. Id.
244. Jeffers Litig., 740 E Supp. at 210 n.8.
245. Id. at 211,
246. Id. at 210.
247. Black Political Taskforce Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 314-15 (D. Mass. 2004).
248. Id. at 314.
249. Id. at 315.
250. City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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district, a plan reflecting "a course of conduct which
can only be characterized as intentional and delib-
erate."25'
In Los Angeles County, California
2 52
The County's reliance in 1990 on a districting plan
that was found to be discriminatory because it "in-
tentionally fragmented the Hispanic population
among the various districts in order to dilute the ef-
fect of the Hispanic vote in future elections and
preserve incumbencies of the Anglo members of
the Board of Supervisors."'2 5' A concurring judge ob-
served that this conduct illustrated the County's
"single-minded pursuit of incumbency," which led it




In Thurston County, Nebraska
2 55
* The County's refusal to adjust its 1990 redistricting
process to address a documented increase in the
Native American population, and its decision in-
stead to maintain its existing districting system, a




" The state legislature's retention and defense in a
1983 lawsuit of its districting plan for the state legis-
lature, which diluted minority voting strength in
order to protect two incumbent white senators in
Chicago.
* The state redistricting commission's drawing of dis-
trict lines with "the immediate purpose ... to
preserve the incumbencies of two white state Sena-
tors .... [T]his process was so intimately
intertwined with, and dependent on, racial dis-
crimination , and dilution of minority voting
strength that purposeful dilution has been clearly
251. Id. at 158.
252. Garza v. County of LA. Litig. (CA), 918 F.2d 763, 766, 768-69, 772 (9th Cir. 1990).
253. Id. at 769.
254. Id. at 778-79 (Kozinski,J., concurring on liability question).
255. County of Thurston Litig. (NE), 129 F.3d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 1997).
256. Rybicki Litig., 574 E Supp. 1147, 1151 (N.D. Il. 1983) (citing pre-amendment dis-
trict court opinion in 574 E Supp. 1082, 1110, 1112 (N.D. Il. 1982)).
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demonstrated in the construction of Commission
senate districts 14, 17 and 18
In Western Tennessee 8
0 "[V] oting rights violations by public officials in rural
west Tennessee as late as the 1980's .... Official dis-
crimination not only prevents blacks from electing
representatives of their choice, it also leads to disil-
lusionment, mistrust, and disenfranchisement ....
can cause black voters to drop out of the political
process and potential black candidates to forgo an
election run.,
2 59
* The city council's amendment of the Bolivar city
charter creating a majority-vote requirement for
mayoral elections "in response to the success of two
black candidates for mayor," which was challenged
in a 1983 lawsuit against the city of Bolivar. "The dis-
trict court approved a class action settlement setting
up a new 'system which will ensure the opportunity
of black citizens of Bolivar to meaningfully partici-
pate in the political process'. . . . [C] ases challenging
newly adopted election systems indicate to the court
that official discrimination against blacks in voting
is not entirely a thing of the past in west Tennes-
see.
26°
Intentional Discrimination Considered at Other Litigation Stages-
Some courts have credited allegations of current official discrimi-
nation in the course of issuing Section 2 plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction, action that reflects the view of these courts that plain-
tiffs were likely to prevail on their claims, but that did not reach
the question of whether Section 2 had been violated on the merits.
Examples include:
257. Id.
258. Rural West II Litig., 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Rural West I Litig.,
836 F. Supp. 453, 460-61 (W.D. Tenn. 1993).
259. Rural West II Litig., 29 E Supp. 2d at 459.
260. Rural West I Litig., 836 E Supp. at 460-61.
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In Crenshaw County, Alabama
* The consistent and repeated creation of at-large sys-
tems for local governments by the Alabama
legislature, "during periods when there was a sub-
stantial threat of black participation in the political
,,262process.
* Barriers "consistently erected" by the state "[f]rom
the late 1800's through the present [1986] to keep
black persons from full and equal participation in
the social, economic, and political life of the state,"




" The creation of these "systems ... in the midst of
the state's unrelenting historical agenda, spanning
from the late 1800's to the 1980's, to keep its black
citizens economically, socially, and politically down-
trodden, from the cradle to the grave."
264
In Haywood County, Tennessee
2 65
* The 1982 decision by the Haywood County Com-
mission to replace 10 district seats for the Road
Commission with 9 seats elected at-large after the
first black road commissioner was elected, a deci-
sion the court "finds from the evidence in the
record ... occurred as a result of the purposeful in-
tention to dilute black voting strength in Haywood
County, Tennessee."
266
261. Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-57, 1360-61 (M.D. Ala. 1986)
(granting preliminary injunction). This court's findings of official discrimination were later
cited in many other Alabama cases. See, e.g., Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459,
1466-67 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding that "this court demonstrated in Crenshaw County that
from the late 1880's to the present the State of Alabama and its political subdivisions have
,openly and unabashedly' discriminated against their black citizens by employing at differ-
ent times such devices as the poll tax, racial gerrymandering, and at-large elections, and by
enacting such laws as the anti-single-shot voting laws, numbered places laws, and the Sayre
law").
262. Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (M.D. Ala. 1986)
263. Id. at 1356.
264. Id. at 1357.
265. Haywood County Litig., 544 E Supp. 1122, 1131,1135 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
266. Id. at 1131.
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In Cicero, Illinois
267
* Town board's adoption in January 2000 of an 18-
month residency requirement to register to vote,
and its placement on the March primary ballot-a
requirement that "was adopted, at least in part, with
the racially discriminatory purpose of targeting po-
tential Hispanic candidates for disqualification and
thereby seeking to prevent Hispanic voters from
having the opportunity to vote for and/or elect
candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.,
268
Courts relied on varied sources when evaluating Senate Fac-
tor 1.269 Sixty-five (58.5% of those finding Factor 1) cited statutes or
other official policies;27° 35 (31.5%) noted actions and statements
267. Town of Cicero Litig., No. Civ.A. OOC 1530, 2000 WL 34342276 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15,
2000).
268. Id. at*l.
269. Thirty-two lawsuits (28.8%) found Factor 1 without reference to any evidence,
equally divided between covered and non-covered jurisdictions. See De Grandy Litig. (FL),
512 U.S. 997 (1994); Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2002); Old Person Litig.
(MT), 312 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), 139 F.3d 1414 (lth Cir.
1998); Attala County Litig. (MS), 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist.
Litig. (TX), 89 E3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d 1382 (8th
Cir. 1995); U.S. v.Jones Litig. (AL), 57 F.3d 1020 (11th Cir. 1995); Democratic Party of Ark.
Litig. (AR), 902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990); Baytown Litig. (TX), 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988);
Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 (5th
Cir. 1984); Opelika Litig. (AL), 748 F.2d 1473 (lth Cir. 1984); City of Minneapolis Litig.,
No. 02-1139(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 2212044 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004); Perry Litig., 298 E
Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Albany County Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820
(N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); St.
Bernard Parish Sch. Bd. Litig., No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589 (E.D. La. Aug. 26,
2002); City of Chi.-Barnett Litig., 17 F. Supp. 2d 753 (N.D. Ill. 1998); African-American Vot-
ing Rights LDF Litig., 994 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Chickasaw County I1 Litig, No.
CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); Jenkins v. Red Clay
Sch. Dist. Litig., 116 F.3d 685 (D. Del. 1997); Rural West I Litig., 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D.
Tenn. 1995); Texarkana Litig., 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Rockford Bd. of Educ.
Litig., No. 89 C 20168, 1991 WL 299104 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1991); Holbrook Unified Sch.
Dist. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 56 (D. Ariz. 1989); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459
(M.D. Ala. 1988); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Dallas
County Comm'n Litig., 636 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ala. 1986); Marengo County Litig., 623 E
Supp. 33 (S.D. Ala. 1985); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex.
1984); Dean Litig., 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982).
Another 7 did so based upon defendants' stipulation to a history of official discrimina-
tion, 5 of these in covered jurisdictions. Chisom Litig. (LA), 501 U.S. 380 (1991); Westwego
Litig. (LA), 946 E2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1991); City of Woodville Litig. (MS), 881 F.2d 1327 (5th
Cir. 1989); Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Va. 1988); Edgefield County Litig., 650 F.
Supp. 1176 (D.S.C. 1986); Texarkana Litig., 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Rockford
Bd. of Educ. Litig., No. 89 C 20168, 1991 WL 299104 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1991).
270. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-60 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
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taken by public officials; 7 ' 24 (21.6%) discussed expert testimony;
72
16 (14.4%) mentioned history books, newspapers or scholarly arti-
cles, 275 15 (13.5%) mentioned other witness testimony.274 Some listed
the jurisdiction's status as a covered (or non-covered) jurisdiction
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
27s
Fifty-six lawsuits (50.5% of those finding Factor 1) looked to
prior judicial decisions identifying official discrimination in a
range of conduct.276 Some of these decisions found such discrimi-
nation in education, housing, employment. Others specifically
addressed claims of discrimination in voting, including a jurisdic-
tion's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5 of the
VRA.2  Numerous cases addressing Factor 1 cited as evidence the
Factor 1 findings from a prior Section 2 case in the same state or
jurisdiction. This earlier decision typically engaged in lengthy
analysis of the historical record, and the subsequent suit in the
state cited back to that decision, sometimes without making further
findings. 9
271. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1026 (D.S.D. 2004); Jeffers Litig.,
730 F. Supp. 196, 210 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
272. Repeat players cited by courts include: Chandler Davidson, Richard Engstrom,
Morgan Kousser, Peyton McCrary, Raphael Cassimere, Jr., David Sansing, Allan Lichtman,
Jerrell Shofner, Gary Mormino, Thomas Hofeller, Philip Hauser, William Rogers, Stephan
Thernstrom, Abigail Thernstrom, Dr. Mollenkopf, and Lilian Williams. Most experts cited by
courts in their Factor 1 discussion were trained historians or university professors with de-
grees in history or sociology.
273. See, e.g., Berks County Litig., 277 E Supp. 2d 570, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing local
newspaper articles); Town of Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 885 n.36 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (cit-
ing ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS (1987)); Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1062 (D. Md. 1994) (citing
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 25 n.63 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992)); Harris Litig., 695 F. Supp. 517, 522 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (citingJ.
MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974)).
274. See, e.g., Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 288 n.23 (D.S.C. 2003);
Harris Litig., 695 F. Supp. 517, 525 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Terrazas Litig., 581 F. Supp. 1329,
1349-50 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
275. See, e.g., Town of Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 885 n.38 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); City of
Greenwood Litig., 599 K Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
276. See, e.g., Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 E2d 1546, 1568 (11th Cir. 1984).
277. See, e.g., City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
278. See, e.g., Mallory-Ohio Litig., 38 F. Supp. 2d 525,541-42 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
279. See, e.g., Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196, 204 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Clark Litig., 725 E
Supp. 285, 295 (M.D. La. 1988). Compare Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-
JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997) (finding Factor I and "tak[ing]
judicial notice of Mississippi's and Chickasaw County's history of discrimination in the area
of voting ... through the use of poll takes, literacy tests, good moral tests, and other policies
and laws," without requiring plaintiffs to establish contemporary political effect), with
Chickasaw County I Litig., 705 F. Supp. 315, 320 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (finding Factor I not met
because plaintiffs had not shown current "political detriment").
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Twenty-three lawsuits (20.7% of all lawsuits finding the factor)
included within their Factor 1 analysis examples of private or unof-
ficial discrimination, although no court relied exclusively on such
evidence in finding Factor 1.280
Forty-one lawsuits addressed but did not find Factor 1.81 Some
courts deemed instances of discrimination "too remote in time" to
count towards Factor 1. 282 Some found that plaintiffs presented no
evidence of official discrimination, and refused to take judicial no-
tice of this factor absent such evidence.2 2 Several courts deemed
Section 5 coverage alone insufficient to satisfy Factor 1, and instead
have demanded evidence of official discrimination in the specific
locality in question.28 4 Courts in covered and non-covered jurisdic-
tions alike have deemed evidence of intentional discrimination in a
neighboring locality inadequate, even when that discrimination
was of recent vintage.28'
Thirty of the lawsuits addressing but not finding Factor 1 parsed
the factor into two components, namely a history of official
discrimination, and a showing that this history "touched" the con-
temporary right to vote.286 These courts found the requisite history,
280. See, e.g., De Grandy Litig., 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1573-74 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (citing both
English-only legal initiatives and "suspension of a supermarket clerk for speaking Spanish in
front of customers and the refusal of a personnel agency to refer people with foreign ac-
cents to job openings at a Miami bank" as relevant to showing a history of official
discrimination against Latinos in Florida); Armour Litig., 775 E Supp. 1044, 1055 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (including within Factor I the media's use of racial labels to describe an African-
American candidate in 1985, the failure in the same year of party officials to support a mi-
nority candidate and the 1970 bombing of the house of the first African-American member
of the Youngstown School Board in Youngstown, Ohio).
281. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
282. City of Chi.-Barnett Litig., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1446 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Cousin
Litig. (TN), 145 E3d 818, 832 (6th Cir. 1998) (considering relevant to Factor I only exam-
ples occurring within the last thirty years).
283. Belle Glade Litig. (FL), 178 E3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999); Salt River Project Litig.
(AZ), 109 E3d 586, 596 (9th Cir. 1997); St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig. (MO), 90 F.3d 1357
(8th Cir. 1996); Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 E2d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988); Suffolk County
Litig., 268 E Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 532 (E.D.
Pa. 1993); Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., 579 E Supp. 1504, 1510-12 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
284. See, e.g., Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., 579 F. Supp. 1504, 1510 (N.D. Ala. 1984)
("There was certainly no evidence that black citizens in Jasper have had as much difficulty in
voting as has been experienced by black citizens in some Southern communities.").
285. See, e.g., id.; Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowl-
edging as "troubling" the evidence from recent litigation in Yonkers, but deeming this
insufficient to establish Factor 1 because Yonkers made up only a fraction of the challenged
district); Kent County Litig. (MI), 790 E Supp. 738, 745 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (finding evi-
dence of a city's official discrimination was not relevant to a challenge to county action).
286. See cases cited supra note 173.
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but deemed evidence of accompanying effect insufficient."7 In the
Liberty County Commissioners litigation, for example, the defendants
conceded an extensive history of official discrimination and the
court recounted this history in detail.2s8 The court concluded that
this history of discrimination did not "still affect[] the rights of
blacks to have equal access to the political process."289 The primary
example of more recent official discrimination was a school em-
ployment lawsuit decided in 1986, which "indicate[d] lingering
prejudice on the part of whites even in their official capac-
ity... [but] did not touch the issues involved in a determination of
whether the Voting Rights Act is being violated."
2 90
For some courts, affirmative steps taken by a jurisdiction to im-
prove voting rights ameliorated historic discrimination.91 Others
deemed the absence of contemporary examples of discrimination
reason to discount evidence of past conduct. For example, a 1997
Massachusetts case noted that "[t]he 1995 election witnessed the
complete absence of election-related problems that plagued elec-
tions in the 1980s.
,
,292
For other courts, the very prevalence of discrimination meant it
should be discounted. Thus, while some courts in Southern states
assumed or outlined a long local and state history of official dis-
crimination, 99 others maintained that this discrimination was too
common and too widespread to weigh heavily within the Section 2
287. Id.; see, e.g., Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417, 422 (N.D. Miss. 1990) ("The
court finds no evidence that black voter registration is presently impeded by any historical
official discrimination.").
288. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1557-59 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (up-
held by Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 221 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming district
court's finding of no violation)).
289. Id. at 1558.
290. Id. at 1559 n.86.
291. Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F Supp. 339, 363-64 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (citing "the
numerous laws enacted by the California Legislature in the last 30 years to improve minority
voting participation and to liberalize the political process"); see also Butts v. NYC Litig. (NY),
779 F.2d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 1985).
292. City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 515, 526 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Tensas Parish
Sch. Bd. Litig. (LA), 819 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1987); City of Woodville Litig., 688 F. Supp.
255, 260 (S.D. Miss. 1988); City of Boston Litig., 609 F. Supp. 739, 745 (D. Mass. 1985).
293. See DeSoto County Litig. (FL), 204 F.3d 1335, 1443 (11th Cir. 2000); Brooks Litig.
(GA), 158 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 1998); Mobile Sch. Bd. Litig. (AL), 706 F.2d 1103,
1104-07 (11th Cir. 1983); Ben Hill County Litig., 743 F. Supp. 864, 865-68 (M.D. Ga. 1990);
City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1320-33, 1401-03 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Kirksey v. Allain
Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1192-93 (S.D. Miss. 1987); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp.
1347, 1356-60 (M.D. Ala. 1986); Gretna Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1116-18 (E.D. La. 1986);
LULAC-Midland Litig., 648 F. Supp. 596, 600-01, 613-21 (W.D. Tex. 1986); Major Litig., 574
F. Supp. 325, 339-40 (E.D. La. 1983).
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analysis.294 For instance, the court in City of Woodville explained that
the city "has a past history of racial discrimination as does every
other Mississippi town or city.
2 95
Some courts in Northern states minimized a local history of dis-
criminatory practices by contrasting that history with the record of
what occurred in the South. In the Butts litigation, for example, the
appellate court took issue with the district court's suggestion that
racial discrimination in voting is hardly confined to the South,296
stating that "[u] nlike many of the jurisdictions typically involved in
Voting Rights Act cases, New York has ensured to black citizens the
right to vote on the same terms as whites since 1874 (when the fif-
teenth amendment was ratified) " In another New York lawsuit
against the Town of Babylon, the district court noted that
"[no] thing in the history of New York even remotely approaches
the systematic exclusion of blacks from the political process that
existed in the South.
'29
8
2. Extent of Racially Polarized Voting--Senate Factor 2 calls for an
evaluation of the extent of legally significant racially polarized vot-
ing.29 This Report discusses lawsuits finding this factor in the
Gingles section, Part II.B above. That section includes a considera-
tion of the 105 judicial findings of racially polarized voting since
1982, both before and after the Supreme Court's 1986 Gingles deci-
sion, for the sake of organizational clarity.
3. Use of Enhancing Practices: At-large Elections, Majority Vote Re-
quirements-Factor 3 inquires about the "extent to which the state
294. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001); Calhoun
County Litig. (MS), 88 F.3d 1393, 1399 (5th Cir. 1996); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig.
(TX), 89 F.3d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1996); Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 F.3d 904, 914 (8th Cir.
1995); U.S. v. Jones Litig. (AL), 57 F.3d 1020, 1025 (11th Cir. 1995); LULAC v. Clements
Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 884 (5th Cir. 1993); Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist. Litig. (TX), 964
E2d 1542, 1555-56 (5th Cir. 1992); Tensas Parish Sch. Bd. Litig. (LA), 819 F.2d 609, 612
(5th Cir. 1987); Lafayette County Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1998);
LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 903 E Supp. 1071, 1085 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Armstrong
v. Allain Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1320, 1332 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
295. City of Woodville Litigation, 688 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Miss. 1988); see also
Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065,1224 (11th Cir. 2002).
296. Butts v. NYC Litig., 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
"[c]ontrary to the popularly held belief that racial discrimination only takes place within the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, plaintiffs' exhibits ... support the finding that Black and His-
panic voters in New York City have been the subject of various procedures ... which have
had the effect of abridging their voting rights").
297. Butts v. NYC Litig. (NY), 779 F.2d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 1985) (overturning district
court's prior finding of a Section 2 violation); see also France Litig., 71 F. Supp. 2d 317, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
298. Town of Babylon Litig., 914 E Supp. 843, 886 (E.D.N.Y 1996); see also City of Bos-
ton Litig. (MA), 784 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 1986).
299. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 27-30.
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or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity
for discrimination against the minority group. 0 0 Courts in 52 law-
suits found that at least one practice existed that might enhance
the opportunity for discrimination potentially resulting from the
practice directly challenged in those lawsuits.301
Of the courts that found Factor 3, 36 lawsuits (or 69.2%)
reached a favorable outcome for the plaintiff. Thirty-three (63.5%)
of the lawsuits finding Factor 3 arose in covered jurisdictions. In 23
of these the plaintiffs ultimately succeeded. Of the 19 lawsuits
(36.5%) finding this factor in non-covered jurisdictions, 13 re-
302sulted in plaintiff success.
Thirty-four suits found majority-vote requirements, 26 found
anti-single shot provisions, such as staggered terms and/or num-
bered-place requirements, 13 found the use of at-large elections,
11 found unusually large districts, and six found other enhancing
practices, including the use of an automatic voter removal or
"purge" law (based upon voting frequency), a short interval be-
tween an initial election and the runoff election, candidate
registration fee, candidate residency requirement, or low financial
compensation for elected officials.03
Factor 3 differs from the other Senate Factors in that courts ad-
dressing it usually engaged in virtually no analysis. Unlike, for
example, identifying a racial appeal (Factor 6) or an exclusive slat-
ing process (Factor 4), identifying Factor 3 devices is almost always
perfectly obvious. The jurisdiction either uses an at-large system or
it does not. Most courts have found little to analyze and little to say
apart from identifying the practice.
Even so, some courts that found Factor 3 discounted its import,
typically by deeming the identified practice as having a minimally
discriminatory effect on the ground. These courts suggested that
300. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29. Single shot voting is a practice by which vot-
ers can direct their votes to a single candidate running in a multi-member district, and
choose not to cast their remaining votes for other candidates running at the same time.
Doing so increases the relative weight of their votes by reducing the number of votes other
candidates receive. An anti-single shot provision may prevent voters from doing this, typi-
cally by disqualifying any ballot where a voter has not used all available votes. See QUIET
REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 46.
301. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39. Of the 52 lawsuits finding Factor 3, 25
were decided in the 1980s (20 violations), 22 in the 1990s (12 violations), and 6 since 2000
(3 violations). Id. Note that where a practice enumerated in the Factor 3 list was directly
challenged in the lawsuit, a court did not always consider or find Factor 3 independently of
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while Factor 3 practices may generally foster discriminatory results,
no evidence establishing that effect was presented in the particular
304case.
4. Candidate Slating-Factor 4 asks whether members of the
minority group have been denied access to a candidate slating
process, assuming such a process exists in the jurisdiction. While
the term "slating" is not defined by the Senate Report, the Fifth
Circuit has described it as "a process in which some influential
non-governmental organization selects and endorses a group or
'slate' of candidates, rendering the election little more than a
stamp of approval for the candidates selected. ' ' 305 A denial of such
access was an important component of a Section 2 claim prior to
the 1982 amendments, 30 but the factor appears to be of dimin-
ished importance under the amended provision.
Courts in 10 lawsuits expressly found the existence of a dis-
criminatory slating process. Of these, four originated in
jurisdictions covered by Section 5. All but one also found a viola-
tion of Section 2.307 An additional three courts identified slating-
like conduct without expressly labeling it as such.0  Courts finding
Factor 4 have identified slating in four general circumstances.
Official Slating. Three courts identified official party action as dis-
criminatory slating or slating-like conduct. The Town of Hempstead
litigation documented a slating process under which the Republi-
can Party Chairman for the County selected candidates to run for
office subject to approval by the Party's 69-member executive
committee, which invariably affirmed the Chairman's selections
304. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1194 (S.D. Miss. 1987) ("Al-
though it is obvious that abolition of the majority vote requirements and post system without
adoption of anti-single-shot voting laws would make it easier in some situations for black
candidates to be elected, this Court cannot hold that these provisions as they now exist dis-
criminate against blacks per se."); see also NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 E3d 361, 365
(5th Cir. 2001); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355 (11 th Cir. 1997); Niagara Falls Litig.
(NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1020 (2d Cir. 1995); S. Christian Leadership Lifig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281
(11th Cir. 1995); Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist. Litig. (TX), 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992); Ala-
mosa County Litig., 306 E Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Colo. 2004); City of Cleveland Lifig., 297 F.
Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997
WL 33426761 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); Town of Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y.
1996);Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D.
Tex. 1983).
305. Westwego Litig. (IA), 946 F.2d 1109, 1116 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991).
306. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973); Turner v. McKeithen, 490
F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1973); Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 631-32 (M.D. Ala.
1978).
307. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
308. See, e.g., Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1061 (D. Md. 1994); City of Phila.
Litig., 824 E Supp. 514, 537 & n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056
(N.D. Ohio 1991).
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without debate. 09 The only African-American candidate ever slated
was not initially supported by a town-based organization of African-
American Republicans, but instead was "a close friend and tennis
partner" of the Party Chairman."' These circumstances led the ap-
pellate court to observe that, in this predominantly white,
predominantly Republican town, the lack of access to the Republi-
can slating process meant that "blacks simply are unable to have
any preferred candidate elected to the Town Board."31 '
Similarly, in the City of New Rochelle litigation, the district court
found that candidate selection by party members placed barriers
on non-party affiliated candidates and limited the prospects for
candidates preferred by the African-American community to gain
access to the ballot.3 1 2 So too, in the Albany County litigation the dis-
trict court found a lack of access based on anecdotal evidence
coupled with the major parties' failure ever to nominate a minority
candidate for county-wide office.313 Although not directly identified
as slating, in the Bridgeport litigation, the appellate panel noted that
while a black candidate won the 1983 mayoral primary, an influen-
tial group called the Democratic Town Committee failed to
endorse him. The candidate went on to lose the general election in
an overwhelmingly Democratic city.
314
The Marylanders litigation also cited the practice through the
mid-1980s of allowing state-funded, all-white fire departments on
the Eastern Shore of Maryland to control the candidate slating
process, although the court did not expressly address this evidence
under Factor 431
Unofficial Party Slating or Backstabbing. Two courts found unoffi-
cial conduct by party officials to constitute slating.:1 In the City of
Sprngfield litigation, the court called unofficial party endorsements
and support in ostensibly nonpartisan elections "a subtle and cov-
ert" form of slating--one that contributed to the failure of African-
American candidates to be elected.1 7 In the Bone Shirt litigation the
court cited informal activities by the party organizations that sty-
mied Native American candidacies. The court highlighted the
309. Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 483-86 (2d Cir. 1999).
310. Id. at 486.
311. Id. at 496.
312. City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
313. Albany County Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820, at *46 (N.D.N.Y. July 7,
2003).
314. Bridgeport Litig. (CT), 26 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1994).
315. Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1061 (D. Md. 1994).
316. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1036 (D.S.D. 2004); City of Springfield
Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1030 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
317. City of Springfield Litig., 658 E Supp. 1015, 1030 (C.D. Il. 1987).
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conduct of the chairman of the Democratic Central Committee,
who campaigned against his party's nominees for county commis-
sioner in the 2002 general election after Indian candidates
unseated non-Indian incumbents in the primary. 8
Although not expressly characterized as "slating," conduct docu-
mented in two other lawsuits may be similarly understood. In the
Armour litigation, the court cited the failure of party officials to
support minority candidates despite rules requiring such sup-
port.3 9 The City of Philadelphia litigation cited campaign materials
distributed by the Democratic Party listing all city council candi-
dates running at-large except for one African American and oneLatino • 320
Latino candidate.
Private Slating Three courts found that conduct by private or-
ganizations denied minority candidates access to slating
processes. In the City of Chicago Heights litigation, the court cited
the activities of an organization called the Concerned Citizens
Group, a group that had no African-American members and chose
candidates for city council elections. The court noted the absence
of evidence showing either that black voters had input into this
slating process or that they could gain access to the ballot absent
access to that process. 322 In the City of Gretna litigation, the district
court found that electoral success hinged on the endorsement of a
local political faction known as the Miller-White Ticket, and that
the Ticket routinely blocked black candidates. 3 In the Pasadena
Independent School District litigation, the court noted that essential
campaign contributions flowed to candidates endorsed by a group
called Communities United for Better Schools ("CUBS"). Since a
CUBS endorsement typically led to candidate success on Election
Day, and because CUBS had only once endorsed a Latino candi-
date, the court concluded that Factor 4 was satisfied.2 4
Inference of Slating. One court inferred a denial of access to slat-
ing processes given the absence of African-American candidates
running for office.25
318. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1036 (D.S.D. 2004).
319. SeeArmour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
320. City of Phila. Litig., 824 F Supp. 514, 537 & n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
321. City of Chi. Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C 5112, 88 C 9800, 1997 WL 102543 (N.D. I1.
Mar. 5, 1997); Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 958 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Gretna
Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. La. 1986); see also Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 E2d 1017, 1022
(5th Cir. 1984).
322. City of Chi. Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C 5112, 88 C 9800, 1997 WL 102543, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 5, 1997).
323. Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1987).
324. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 958 E Supp. 1196,1223-24 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
325. City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F Supp. 749, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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Slating Not Found: In 13 cases, plaintiffs introduced what they
contended was evidence of slating but courts did not find that mi-
nority candidates had been denied access. Courts in six cases
rejected evidence regarding private slating processes either be-
cause the activities of the group in question did not fit the court's
definition of a slating organization... or because the slating organi-
zations were defunct by the time litigation was initiated.327
Anecdotal evidence of slating was conclusorily rejected in another
328two lawsuits.
Three lawsuits viewed electoral success by minority candidates as
evidence of access to slating processes.329 Additionally, in the Ala-
mosa County litigation, the court assumed without deciding that
the Democratic Central Committee played a functional role in the
selection of county commission candidates, but concluded that an-
ecdotal testimony about ethnically biased comments and "boorish
behavior" by some members of the committee was insufficient to
establish a "policy or practice" that denied non-white candidates
access to slating.3 1' Finally, two lawsuits attributed the exclusion of
minority candidates from slating processes to partisanship rather
than race.
5. Ongoing Effects of Discrimination (Education, Employment,
Health)-The fifth Senate Factor calls for evaluation of "the extent
to which members of the minority group bear the effects of dis-
crimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
process." 333 Of the 133 lawsuits addressing this factor, 88 found the
factor to be met, 45 of which originated in covered jurisdictions.
Fifty-eight lawsuits finding Factor 5 ended favorably for the plain-
tiffs. 34 Courts have evaluated Factor 5 in several different ways.
326. See City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1369 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Westwego Litig.
(LA), 946 F.2d 1109, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991); Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546,
1569 (11th Cir. 1984); City of Norfolk Litig., 605 F. Supp. 377, 390-91 (E.D. Va. 1984).
327. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1322 (N.D. Tex. 1990); County of Big Horn
(Windy Boy) Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1016 (D. Mont. 1986).
328. City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Little Rock Litig., 831 F.
Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
329. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 221 F.3d 1218, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000); Jenkins v.
Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 221, 235 (D. Del. 1991); City of Austin Litig., No. A-
84-CA-189, 1985 WL 19986, at *8 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
330. Alamosa County Litig., 306 E Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Colo. 2004).
331. Id. at 1034.
332. See, e.g., LULAC %,. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 E2d 831, 880 (5th Cir. 1993); City of
Fort Lauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp. 1093, 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
333. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
334. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
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Depressed Socioeconomic Status Alone: Twelve courts found Factor 5
when there was a history of discrimination and a showing that the
minority group experienced comparatively low socioeconomic
status.
335
Nexus Between Discrimination and Participation: Most courts re-
quired some kind of nexus not only between a history of
discrimination and lowered socioeconomic status, but also between
depressed socioeconomic status and the ability to participate in the
political process. In 31 cases, courts assumed or deduced, some-
times aided by expert testimony, that lower socioeconomic status
hindered the minority group's ability to participate effectively in
the political process and found the factor met.36 These courts
pointed out, for example, that depressed socioeconomic status
hinders one's ability to raise money and mount a campaign,3 3 7 and
335. See Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897, 914 (9th Cir. 2004); Westwego Litig.
(LA), 946 F.2d 1109, 1115 (5th Cir. 1991); Albany County Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL
21524820, at *12 (N.D.N.YJuly 7, 2003); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 152,
159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1169-70 (D.
Colo. 1998); City of Holyoke Litig., 880 F. Supp. 911, 917-19 (D. Mass. 1995); Emison Litig.,
782 F. Supp. 427, 438 (D. Minn. 1992); Garza v. L.A. Litig., 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1339-41 (C.D.
Cal. 1990); Baytown Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1128, 1132, 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Houston v. Haley
Litig., 663 F. Supp. 346, 352-54 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Wamser Litig., 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1531
(E.D. Mo. 1987); Halifax County Litig., 594 F. Supp. 161,166-71 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
336. See Metts Litig. (RI), 347 F.3d 346, 349 (1st Cir. 2003); Old Person Litig. (MT), 230
F.3d 1113, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), 139 F.3d 1414, 1419 & n.10 (11th
Cir. 1998); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1370-71, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1997);
Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1322-24 (10th Cir. 1996); Blytheville Sch. Dist.
Litig. (AR), 71 E3d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir. 1995); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th
Cir. 1984); Berks County Litig., 277 E Supp. 2d 570, 575, 581 (E.D. Pa. 2003); St. Bernard
Parish Sch. Bd. Litig., No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589, at *8-10 (E.D. La. Aug. 26,
2002); Rural West II Litig., 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Chickasaw County II
Litig., No. CIVA. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); City
of LaGrange Litig., 969 F Supp. 749, 757, 776 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Cousin Litig., 904 F. Supp.
686, 708-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 903 F. Supp. 1071,
1085-86 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1060-61 (D. Md. 1994);
Rural West I Litig., 836 F. Supp. 453, 461-62 (W.D. Tenn. 1993); Brunswick County, VA
Litig., 801 F. Supp. 1513, 1518, 1524 (E.D. Va. 1992); De Grandy Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1076,
1079 (N.D. Fla. 1992); Magnolia Bar Association Litig., 793 E Supp. 1386, 1409 (S.D. Miss.
1992); Hall Litig., 757 F. Supp. 1560, 1562-63 (M.D. Ga. 1991); City of Dallas Litig., 734 F.
Supp. 1317, 1403-05 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Chisom Litig., No. 86-4057, 1989 WL 106485, at *8-9
(E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1989); White Litig., No. 88-0568-R, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16117, at *9-
11, 22-23 (E.D. Va. Aug. 31, 1989); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466-67
(M.D. Ala. 1988); City of Jackson, TN Litig., 683 E Supp. 1515, 1533-1534 (W.D. Tenn.
1988); Clark Litig., 725 F. Supp. 285, 290-91, 299 (M.D. La. 1988); Mehfoud Litig., 702 F.
Supp. 588, 594-95 (E.D. Va. 1988); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1317
(E.D. Ark. 1988); Kirksey v. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1194-95 (S.D. Miss. 1987); Op-
eration Push Litig., 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1253-54, 1264-65 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Gretna Litig.,
636 F. Supp. 1113,1116-20 (E.D. La. 1986).
337. See, e.g., Rural West II Litig., 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Cousin
Litig., 904 F. Supp. 686, 708-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); Chisom Litig., No. 86-4057, 1989 WL
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to campaign in large districts. Some noted that lower socioeco-
nomic status may create geographic and social isolation from other
members of the community-connection with whom may be criti-
cal to engage in effective political action. One district court
specifically noted that depressed socioeconomic status makes it
difficult for minority candidates to run for particularly low paying
340public positions.
In the majority of lawsuits, however, courts required concrete
evidence of depressed participation, measured through voter regis-
tration and turnout statistics. In finding Factor 5, courts in 14
lawsuits in covered jurisdictions documented minority voter regis-
tration rates that lag behind the white voter registration rate,
compared with three such lawsuits in non-covered jurisdictions.341
Thirteen lawsuits in non-covered jurisdictions identified lower rates
of minority voter turnout notwithstanding equivalent voter regis-
tration rates.4 2 Courts in five lawsuits in covered jurisdictions found
106485, at *8-9 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1989); Mehfoud Litig., 702 E Supp. 588, 594-95 (E.D. Va.
1988).
338. See, e.g., City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1370-71, 1385-86 (11th Cir.
1997); Cousin Litig., 904 F. Supp. 686, 708-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); Columbus County Litig.,
782 F. Supp. 1097, 1103-05 (E.D.N.C. 1991); City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1403-04
(N.D. Tex. 1990).
339. See, e.g., Terrell Litig., 565 E Supp. 338, 342 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("It is clear to the
Court that a major reason for the white majority's lack of familiarity with many black candi-
dates is the severe de facto segregation of housing in Terrell.").
340. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1403-05 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ("The ridiculous
pay for Council Members-$50.00 for each meeting-further exacerbates the discrimina-
tory effect of these disparities by limiting the pool of African-Americans and Hispanics who
can financially afford to serve on the Council where they would, in effect, volunteer their
full time service.").
341. For covered jurisdictions, see City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1371 (11th
Cir. 1997); Attala County Litig. (MS), 92 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 1996); Operation Push Litig.
(MS), 932 F.2d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 1991); Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546, 1552
(11th Cir. 1984); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 E Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004); City of LaGrange
Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 768 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 588, 594 (E.D. Va.
1988); Neal Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (E.D. Va. 1988); LULAC-Midland Litig., 648 F.
Supp. 596, 600 (W.D. Tex. 1986); Jordan Litig., 604 F. Supp. 807, 812 (N.D. Miss. 1984);
Terrazas Litig., 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Buskey v. Oliver Litig., 565 F. Supp.
1473, 1476 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Major Litig., 574 E Supp. 325, 342 (E.D. La. 1983); Mobile
Sch. Bd. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
In the three non-covered cases, the courts made general, non-quantitative statements
about lower minority registration. See Little Rock Litig., 831 F. Supp 1453, 1460 (E.D. Ark.
1993) (quoting expert testimony that blacks "suffer lower voter registration and lower voter
turnout" than whites); De Grandy Litig., 794 F Supp. 1076, 1084 (N.D. Fla. 1992); Garza v.
L.A. Litig., 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (Latino voter registration and turnout
in Los Angeles is "considerably lower" than that of non-Hispanics).
342. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez-Colo.
Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1324 (10th Cir. 1996); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d
1382, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995); Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 F.3d 1494, 1507 (11th Cir. 1994); Democ-
ratic Party of Ark. Litig. (AR), 890 E2d 1423, 1431-33 (8th Cir. 1989); City of Holyoke Litig.,
880 F Supp. 911, 925 (D. Mass. 1995); Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1061 (D. Md.
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lower turnout alone,43 while four additional lawsuits in covered
jurisdictions found both low minority registration and low minority
turnout.3 44 In contrast, 11 courts, with six in covered jurisdictions
and five in non-covered, found the factor unsatisfied when pre-
sented with nearly equal voting participation rates. 4 ' As a measure
of political participation, several courts view turnout as more pro-
346bative than registration rates.
In two lawsuits, courts made conclusory assertions that socio-
economic disadvantage did not hinder political participation by
the minority group in question. 47 In 10 lawsuits, courts did not find
Factor 5 because plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to
show the minority group actually suffered from lower political par-
ticipation .
1994); Bridgeport Litig., Civ. No. 3:93CV1476 (PCD), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19741, at *7 (D.
Conn. October 27, 1993); City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Co-
lumbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch.
Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 221, 234 (D. Del. 1991); City of Jackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp.
1515, 1534 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); City of Springfield Litig., 658 E Supp. 1015, 1027 (C.D. 1ll.
1987).
343. Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2004); Dallas County
Comm'n Litig. (AL), 739 F.2d 1529, 1538 (11th Cir. 1984); Gretna Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113,
1119 (E.D. La. 1986); Edgefield County Litig., 650 F. Supp. 1176 (D.S.C. 1986); City of
Greenwood Litig., 599 F Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss 1984).
344. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1039 (D.S.D. 2004); Neal Litig., 689 F. Supp.
1426, 1428 (E.D. Va. 1988); Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 588, 594 (E.D. Va. 1988); Terrazas
Litig., 581 F Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
345. Covered cases include: NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361, 367-68 (5th
Cir. 2001); France Litig., 71 F. Supp. 2d 317, 332 (S.D.N.Y 1999); S. Christian Leadership
Litig., 785 F. Supp. 1469, 1473, 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp.
417, 423-24 (N.D. Miss. 1990); City of Norfolk Litig., 605 F. Supp. 377, 391-92 (E.D. Va.
1984); Rocha Litig., No. V-79-26, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15164, at *21-22 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
1982). Non-covered cases: Liberty County Commissioners Litig. (FL), 865 F.2d 1566, 1582
(11th Cir. 1988); Metro Dade County Litig., 805 F. Supp. 967, 981, 991-92 (S.D. Fla. 1992);
City of Starke Litig., 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1989); City of Boston Litig., 609 F
Supp. 739, 744-45 (D. Mass. 1985); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp. 1093, 1104-
05 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
346. See, e.g., Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 F.3d 1494, 1507-08 (11 th Cir. 1994); Dallas County
Comm'n Litig. (AL), 739 E2d 1529, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1984); Columbus County Litig., 782
F. Supp. 1097, 1103-05 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (finding depressed socioeconomic status and lower
levels of minority voter turnout, despite roughly equivalent voter registration numbers);
County of Big Horn (Windy Boy) Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1016-17 (D. Mont. 1986) (same);
Gretna Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1116-20 (E.D. La. 1986) (same).
347. See Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), 89 F.3d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1996);
Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
348. See McCarty Litig. (TX), 749 F.2d 1134, 1135-37 (5th Cir. 1984); Rodriguez Litig.,
308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016,
1035-38 (D. Colo. 2003); Suffolk County Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2003);
City of Chi. Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C 5112, 88 C 9800, 1997 WL 102543, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
5, 1997); Mallory-Ohio Litig., 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 542, 566 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Town of Baby-
lon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 887-89 (E.D.N.Y 1996); Kent County Litig., 790 F. Supp 738,
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Other courts looked beyond registration and turnout statistics
when assessing Factor 5. Six courts, for example, examined the ef-
fect of various forms of de facto racial segregation on the ability of
minority groups to participate in the political process.349 Thus, the
district court in the Charleston County litigation noted severe socie-
tal and housing segregation and found that this ongoing racial
separation "makes it especially difficult for African-American can-
didates seeking county-wide office to reach out to and
communicate with the predominately white electorate from whom
they must obtain substantial support to win an at-large elections
[sic] .,,50 The district court in the Neal litigation likewise concluded
that similar segregation meant "that whites in the County have his-
torically had little personal knowledge of or social contact with
blacks .... Quite simply, whites do not know blacks and are, as a
result, highly unlikely to vote for black candidates."3 5'
Causation: Five courts found Factor 5 unsatisfied despite specific
evidence of both depressed socioeconomic status and low levels of
political participation. These courts required additional evidence
showing discrimination directly caused depressed participation.
Some defendants have argued that low participation results not
from discrimination, but instead from voter apathy. Courts in four
lawsuits agreed. 53 At least five other courts, however, attributed
voter apathy to the sources of discrimination Factor 5 identifies.
354
In the City of Gretna litigation, for example, the district court noted
744, 749 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Turner Litig., 784 F Supp. 553, 576-77 (E.D. Ark. 1991);
Chickasaw County I Litig., 705 F. Supp. 315, 320-21 (N.D. Miss. 1989).
349. See County of Thurston Litig. (NE), 129 E3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 1997); LULAC v.
Clements Litig. (TX), 986 F.2d 728, 782 & n.41 (5th Cir. 1993); Charleston County Litig.,
316 E Supp. 2d 268, 282-92 (D.S.C. 2003); Neal Litig., 689 R Supp. 1426, 1428-31 (E.D. Va.
1988); Terrazas Litig., 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1348-51 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Terrell Litig., 565 F.
Supp. 338, 341-342 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
350. Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 291 (D.S.C. 2003).
351. Neal Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (E.D. Va. 1988).
352. City of St. Louis Litig., 896 E Supp. 929, 942-43 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (notwithstanding
socioeconomic disparities, differences in turnout could be attributable to voter apathy);
Armstrong v Allain Litig., 893 F Supp. 1320, 1332-33 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (same); City of Co-
lumbia Litig., 850 F. Supp. 404, 423 (D.S.C. 1993) (same); Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist. Litig.,
No. DR-88-CA-18, 1991 WL 367969, at *3-7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 1991) (same); see also Car-
rollton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1561 (l1th Cir. 1987) (finding that the
defendant had sufficiently carried its burden to disprove "any causal connection between
economic disparities and reduced political participation by minorities").
353. See id.
354. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1040 (D.S.D. 2004) ("People living on a day-
to-day basis wonder if they can heat their home. Those are not the kinds of people who are
the most predisposed to go out and engage in a great deal of political campaigning or activ-
ity." (internal quotation omitted)); Attala County Litig. (MS), 92 F.3d 283, 293-95 (5th Cir.
1996); Gretna Litig., 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (E.D. La. 1986); Terrazas Litig., 581 F. Supp.
1329, 1348-51 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Major Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325, 339-41 (E.D. La. 1983).
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that "[d]epressed levels of participation in voting and candidacy
are inextricably involved in the perception of futility and impo-
tence" engendered by "severe historical disadvantage."3 5 The court
concluded that "[t]hese historical disadvantages continue through
the present day and undoubtedly hinder the ability of the black
community to participate effectively in the political process within
the City of Gretna."056
In two lawsuits, courts required plaintiffs to establish that official
discrimination by the defendant jurisdiction caused the current
socioeconomic disparities. In three cases, district courts dis-
counted evidence of low socioeconomic status among Latinos
because the evidence did not distinguish recent immigrants from
longstanding residents. This approach posits that new immigrants
cannot bear the effects of discrimination in housing, employment
or health within the meaning of Factor 5 and thus the failure to
distinguish them from other members of the minority group leaves
courts unable to find the factor satisfied .
Intransigence of Inequality: Some courts viewed low socioeconomic
status as too intransigent to receive significant weight.3 9 In the
Magnolia Bar Association litigation, the district court concluded that
Factor 5 described a condition too common to weigh heavily in
plaintiffs' favor. The court observed that because "the socioeco-
nomic standing of blacks vis-A-vis whites has changed little and it is
unlikely that standing will improve markedly in the foreseeable fu-
ture," continuing socioeconomic effects of discrimination "will be a
factor on which the plaintiffs in voting rights cases will always win
in the foreseeable future. 360
6. Racial Appeals in Campaigns-The sixth factor in the Senate
Report instructs courts to assess whether political campaigns have
been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals. 6' In 33 cases
courts identified one or more such appeals and found the factor
355. Gretna Litig., 636 E Supp. 1113, 1120 (E.D. La. 1986).
356. Id.
357. Milwaukee NAACP Litig., 935 F. Supp. 1419, 1427, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (finding
no evidence had traced the continuing socioeconomic disparities to discrimination in the
challenged county or state of Wisconsin); Cincinnati Litig., No. C-1-92-278, 1993 WL 761489,
at *11 (S.D. OhioJuly 8, 1993) ("While the effects of discrimination in such areas as educa-
tion, employment and housing do hinder the ability of some African-Americans personally
to finance political campaigns, the defendants have neither created these conditions nor do
they intentionally maintain them.").
358. See Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 958 F. Supp. 1196, 1225 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Al-
dasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F. Supp. 339, 365 (S.D. Cal. 1995); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist.
Litig., 591 F. Supp. 802, 807, 809-10 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
359. See, e.g., Calhoun County Litig., 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1200-01 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
360. See Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1409 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
361. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
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met. Eighteen (or 54.5%) of these 33 lawsuits were in covered ju-
risdictions, while 15 were in non-covered jurisdictions. Of the 20
successful lawsuits finding this factor, 12 (or 60%) occurred in cov-.... 362
ered jurisdictions.
Some courts noted that campaigns generally have been marked
by racial appeals, but most decisions finding Factor 6 identified
appeals in specific campaign years. These courts identified racial
appeals in 73 specific elections occurring in 1950, 1954, 1960,
1968, 1970, 1972-1977, 1982-1985, 1987-1992, 1994, 1995, 2000
and 2002.64 Courts finding Factor 6 identified 47 specific racial ap-
peals or campaigns characterized by racial appeals since 1982. Of
these, 30 occurred in covered jurisdictions. 36
While some courts have stated without elaboration that specific
elections have been marked by racial appeals, 66 others have identi-
fied racial appeals in a wide range of conduct. Courts have
disagreed, however, as to what conduct should be considered a ra-
cial appeal.
Identification of the Candidate's Race: In six lawsuits, courts identi-
fied as racial appeals a variety of statements in which a candidate's
race was identified, including comments by white candidates or
367their campaign workers that their opponent was black, state-
ments by minority candidates in which they identified their
minority status,3" and newspaper articles that mentioned the race
of the candidates. 69
362. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
363. See, e.g., Columbus County Litig., 782 E. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
364. See Racial Appeals Documented in Section 2 Litigation: Timeline and Citations, Ellen Katz
and the Voting Rights Initiative (2006), at http://www.votingreport.org.
365. See id.
366. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 649 F. Supp. 289, 295 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
367. See LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 879 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that
a judicial candidate had been labeled a "Black Muslim" by his opponent); City of Dallas
Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1339 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (finding in the 1972 Precinct 7 Constable's
race, the incumbent used ads describing his African-American opponent in this manner: "A
black man (no qualifications of any kind)").
368. SeeAlamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025-26 (D. Colo. 2004) (identify-
ing as a "subtle ethnic appeal" Marguerite Salazar's 1992 campaign for county commission
in which "she ran as a designated Hispanic role model immediately after joining the His-
panic Leadership Institute").
369. See Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1041 (D.S.D. 2004) (characterizing as a
racial appeal the headline in the state's largest newspaper, trumpeting "HUNHOFF PICKS
INDIAN WOMAN AS RUNNING MATE"); Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) ("[T]hroughout the [1985] primary race, the media focused on Starks' race,
consistently describing him as the black candidate for Mayor."); Neal Litig., 689 F. Supp.
1426, 1431-32 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting a racial appeal in an editorial that identified two
candidates as black and "clearly favored the re-election of the 'more experienced' incum-
bents.").
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Photographs: Numerous courts have identified the use of photo-
graphs in campaign flyers and advertisements as racial appeals.
The majority of these cases involved campaign materials distrib-
uted by a white candidate or the candidate's supporters that
featured the photograph of an African-American opponent.
70
No court has deemed the decision by a newspaper to publish
candidates' photographs a racial appeal.37' In the City ofJackson liti-
gation, for example, the district court acknowledged that the
publication of candidates' photographs might prompt "some white
voters [to] vote for a white candidate and some black voters [to]
vote for a black candidate," but, the court concluded, "that is
merely a fact of political life in Jackson."
3 7
1
Two lawsuits characterized as racial appeals the manipulation of
photographs to darken the skin of opposing candidates, be they
minority or white. The Charleston County litigation recounted the
use of this tactic in three separate campaigns occurring in 1988,
1990, and 1992. In each instance, white candidates and their cam-
paigns distributed official campaign literature or placed newspaper
ads featuring the darkened photos of African-American oppo-
nents.3 73 The City of Philadelphia litigation discussed the use of
similar tactics in two different campaigns. In a state senate cam-
paign in the early 1990s, one white candidate published a brochure
containing a darkened photograph of his white opponent next to a
photograph of Philadelphia's black mayor.374 The other involved a
televised campaign advertisement in the 1985 district attorney
campaign that portrayed light-skinned African-American candi-
dates as having much darker skin. 75
The Specter of Minority Governance: Courts have held Factor 6 satis-
fied by a variety of allusions or threats of minority control of
370. See S. Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281, 1290 n.17 (11th Cir. 1995);
LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 E2d 831, 879 (5th Cir. 1993); Charleston County Litig.,
316 E Supp. 2d 268, 294-97 (D.S.C. 2003); White v. Ala. Litig., 867 E Supp. 1519, 1556
(M.D. Ala. 1994); Brunswick County, VA Litig., 801 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (E.D. Va. 1992);
Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1410 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Mehfoud Litig., 702 F.
Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 1988); see also Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 295
(D.S.C. 2003) (classifying as a racial appeal a campaign flyer from a race involving two white
candidates that featured the photograph of an African-American elected official unassoci-
ated with either of the white candidates).
371. See, e.g.,Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F Supp. 221, 237 (D. Del. 1991)
(concluding that a newspaper article with accompanying photographs of black and white
candidates was not a racial appeal because the "candidates [were] not referred to in any
disparaging manner"); City of Jackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1534-35 (W.D. Tenn.
1988).
372. City ofJackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1534-35 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
373. Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 294-97 (D.S.C. 2003).
374. City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
375. Id.
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government. Conduct of this sort includes references by white
candidates or their campaigns that minority voters will engage in
"bloc voting" and turn out in high numbers,3 7 6 that a minority will
be elected if whites do not turn out,37 7 and that minority candi-
dates, when elected, will appoint other minorities to positions of
378power.
Statements by white candidates that the minority community
wants to "take over" the local government and the country are simi-1 • 1379
larly characterized. In the Armour litigation, for example,
campaign workers for a white 1985 mayoral candidate went door-
to-door telling voters that if the black candidate was elected, "his
cabinet would be black."3 m They also drove a sound truck around
Youngstown announcing that should the minority candidate be
elected "we will have a black police chief, we will have a black fire
chief," and adding "we cannot have that. 38 1 More recently, in the
Bone Shirt litigation, the district court identified racial appeals oc-
curring during the 2002 primary elections for county commission,
in which three Native American candidates confronted accusations
that Indians were seeking to "take over the county politically ...
[and] trying to take land back and put it in trust."'
In-group and Out-group, Two courts identified as racial appeals
campaign advertisements making reference to a candidate's being
"one of us ' '3Ss or promising to stand against vandalism and crime
376. See, e.g., City of Dallas Litig., 734 E Supp. 1317, 1339 n.34 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (noting
that a white slating group warned of the "Mass Block Voting Tactics" in the black areas of
South Dallas in 1970); id. at 1348 ("Folsom also distributed a leaflet charging that Weber was
attempting to win the election with a 'massive black turnout,' and threatening that 'Garry
Weber's South Dallas Machine is going to elect the next mayor' thanks to the efforts of 'pro-
fessional black campaigners who will turn out unprecedented numbers of blacks voting for
Weber.'"); Neal Litig., 689 F Supp. 1426, 1431-32 (E.D. Va. 1988) (quoting newspaper edi-
torial statement that a black candidate's campaign was " 'of great concern to many county
residents' because [he] could earn 'solid black support' to defeat the veteran incumbent").
377. See, e.g.,Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196, 212 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("In the Mayor's race
in Pine Bluff in 1975, for example, a supporter of a white candidate publicly warned that if
white voters didn't turn out, there would be a black mayor.").
378. See, e.g., Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
379. See, e.g., City of Phila. Litig., 824 E Supp. 514, 536 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("In the
1983 mayoral election, Mayor Goode testified that his opponent, former Mayor Frank Rizzo,
attempted to associate Mayor Goode with Jesse Jackson and Harold Washington, implying
that Mayor Goode's candidacy was part of 'a movement by blacks to take over all across the
country.' ").
380. Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
381. Id.
382. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1041 (D.S.D. 2004).
383. Jordan Litig., 604 F. Supp. 807, 813 n.8 (N.D. Miss. 1984) ("One campaign televi-
sion commercial sponsored by the white candidate whose slogan was 'He's one of us'
opened and closed with a view of Confederate monuments accompanied by this audio mes-
sage: You know, there's something about Mississippi that outsiders will never, ever
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that "drive our people and our businesses out" of the community.
3 4
In the City of Holyoke litigation the district court categorized as a
racial appeal the "us versus them" sentiment featured in one can-
didate's 1987 campaign materials where "[t]he 'us' was fairly
clearly the longtime white residential community, the 'them' the
more recent Hispanic minority."38 5 The district court noted, for ex-
ample, the campaign's focus on "teach[ing] the 'Spanish' English
... as an answer to increasing crime and vandalism" and featured
an advertisement with a "large picture of an Hispanic young man,
cigarette dangling from his lips and the caption 'The people who
really should read this, can't.' ,116
Race-baiting: In the Charleston County litigation, the district court
identified as a racial appeal the efforts to increase turnout among
voters perceived to be "anti-black."3 87 In 1990, the campaign of a
candidate for Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina paid Benja-
min Hunt, Jr., "a nearly illiterate African-American man" to run in
a congressional primary.38 8 The candidate took no part in the cam-
paign beyond allowing his picture to be taken while standing in
front of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. The would-be Lieu-
tenant Governor's campaign mailed out thousands of leaflets
featuring this picture with the caption "Hunt for Congress.
's8 9
Also counting as racial appeals are statements suggesting racial
strife or even violence will ensue if minority candidates or candi-
dates associated with minority interests were supported or
elected.3 90
Guilt by Association: Efforts to link a candidate with polarizing fig-
ures or organizations have been deemed racial appeals. Three
courts, for example, have identified as racial appeals statements by
white candidates linking a minority candidate with Jesse Jackson or
understand. The way we feel about our family and God, and the traditions that we have.
There is a new Mississippi, a Mississippi of newjobs and new opportunity for all our citizens.
[video pan of black factory workers] We welcome the new, but we must never, ever forget
what has gone before. [video pan of Confederate monuments] We cannot forget a heritage
that has been sacred through our generations.").
384. City of Holyoke Litig., 880 F. Supp. 911,922 (D. Mass. 1995).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 296 (D.S.C. 2003).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. See, e.g., City of Dallas Litig., 734 F Supp. 1317, 1368 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (counting as
a racial appeal a 1989 newspaper column indicating that "a 'protest vote' for lawyer and
'civic gadfly,' Peter Lesser ... could lead to racial violence and white flight"); id. at 1348
(citing a leaflet that accused opponent's campaign of "planting lies and rekindling old fires
that could set Black/White relations back 20 years," and told black voters "[n]o one, Black
or White, will benefit from the hostilities between the Races [that] Garry Weber's hate-
campaign is trying to force").
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Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam."1 Another characterized
as a racial appeal statements by an African-American candidate
that his white opponent was supported by the Ku Klux Klan.392
Courts have also found evidence supporting a finding of Factor
6 in efforts to link a white opponent with minority elected officials
or issues of minority concern. For example, two district courts clas-
sified as racial appeals the campaign literature of white candidates
who featured photographs of their opponents, also white, along-1 93
side pictures of African-American elected officials. Another
district court identified as a racial appeal a private slating organiza-
tion's reference to a white candidate's association with a black
candidate and his support for voter registration in the minority
community
94
Discussion of Racially Charged Issues: In five lawsuits courts identi-
fied as racial appeals candidates' statements on certain racially
391. See, e.g., Metro Dade County Litig., 805 F. Supp. 967, 981-82 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("Re-
cent elections demonstrate how successfully candidates and their supporters have engaged
in a tactic of 'guilt by association' to defeat Black opponents.... For example, voters have
been told that Black candidates share common goals with Jesse Jackson or Nelson Mandela,
two political figures strongly supported in the Black community, but opposed in some Cu-
ban and Jewish communities."); City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 536 n.19 (E.D. Pa.
1993) ("Mayor Goode testified that in the 1987 mayoral primary election, Ed Rendell,
Goode's opponent, attempted to associate Mayor Goode with Louis Farrakhan, a controver-
sial Muslim leader."); City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1365 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ("On
March 4, 1988, a Dallas Morning News article reported that a candidate for Criminal District
Court No. 2, who was running against the African-American incumbent, mailed 77,000 fliers
criticizing her opponent because he had changed his name to 'Baraka' after converting to
Islam and becoming 'a follower of Malcolm X, the slain Islamic leader and black national-
ist.'").
392. Wamser Litig., 679 F Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Mo. 1987) ("In his 1987 primary
campaign, Roberts [an African-American] made overt racial appeals to black voters. Roberts
accused a white opponent-Osborn-of being backed by 'the Klan."').
393. Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 295 (D.S.C. 2003) (noting a cam-
paign flyer from a 2000 race involving two white candidates that featured the darkened
photograph of an African-American school board member from a separate district whose
permission to use the picture had neither been sought nor granted); City of Phila. Litig.,
824 F. Supp. 514, 537 n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (mentioning campaign material distributed in an
early 1990s state senate race between two white candidates where one candidate published a
darkened picture of his white opponent in a brochure along with the picture of Philadel-
phia's black mayor).
394. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1339 n.34 (W.D. Tex. 1990) ("During the
run-off election for two State Representative districts in June of 1970, the 'Democratic
Committee for Responsible Government' attacked a white candidate ... because he was
'running in South Dallas... as a team' with a black candidate ... and because he had raised
money 'for voter registration activities, mostly in predominately Black or Latin-American
neighborhoods.'"); see also Gingles Litig., 590 F. Supp. 345, 364 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (noting
crude cartoons and pamphlets of the campaigns marked by outright white supremacy in the
1890s which featured white political opponents in the company of black political leaders
and later appeals with the same theme).
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charged issues. These issues included illegal immigration,3 95 low
income housing,96  busing and school desegregation, 97  and
crime.9  In the Town of Hempstead litigation, the district court found
a racial appeal in a campaign brochure distributed by a candidate
for town council in 1987. The brochure noted the candidate's
awareness of "his community's proximity to the City of New York,"
his opposition to those who would seek to "Queensify" the town,
and his concern about the danger of "urban crime spilling over the
county border." The brochure celebrated the candidate's efforts to
"sensitize[] local patrolmen to the special concerns of the commu-
nity," a statement the court identified as a reference to an
"unofficial border patrol policy" under which the police were to
stop black youth from Queens, "find out their business and ensure
that they 'go back where they belong.',399
One district court identified as a racial appeal public debate on
a racially charged issue, absent any linkage to any particular candi-
date or campaign. 4° Another viewed such debate as evidence
supporting the inference that other campaigns are characterized
by racial appeals. 0'
395. Garza v. L.A. Litig., 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("Mr. Brophy distrib-
uted mailers which included Mr. Alatorre's photograph and alluded that Alatorre was
sympathetic to undocumented aliens.").
396. City of Holyoke Litig., 880 F. Supp. 911, 922 (D. Mass. 1995) ("Proulx, for his part,
attacked Dunn for not calling for a moratorium on all subsidized housing programs in
Holyoke. Proulx explained that he supported such a moratorium with one important excep-
tion-subsidized elderly housing. The vast majority of government subsidized elderly
housing in Holyoke was occupied by white non-Hispanic senior citizens."); Butts v. NYC
Litig., 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Badillo's opponents distributed literature
misrepresenting or emphasizing Badillo's position on issues said to have racial connotations,
such as scatter site subsidized housing.").
397. Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In a late 1970s
campaign for a State Senate seat from an Assembly District within the Town, the incumbent
Republican appealed to the fears of Town residents that black students from Queens would
be bused to schools in the Town. The campaign literature used pictures of black children in
school buses to convey the message that voting for the Democratic opponent would result in
such busing."); City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1348 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ("In Place 9
[city council elections in 1976],Jesse Price campaigned against Bill Blackburn on a platform
that included opposition to busing for school desegregation-and opposition to any court
order requiring busing--saying he intended to 'hang Blackburn's stand on busing around
his neck.'").
398. Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326, 342-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); City of Holy-
oke Litig., 880 F. Supp. 911, 922 (D. Mass. 1995) ("Dunn's campaign literature featured the
slogan 'It takes guts,' coupled with a teach the 'Spanish' English theme as an answer to in-
creasing crime and vandalism.").
399. Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 E Supp. at 343.
400. City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("[P]ublic debate
about the consolidation of the local schools was marked by racial appeals and arguments.").
401. City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397, 403 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
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Not all courts treat the presence of racially charged issues in
campaigns or general public debate as racial appeals. Three district
courts rejected plaintiffs' contentions that candidates' discussion of
busing and school desegregation should be classified as racial ap-
peals.4 °2 The district court in the City of Norfolk litigation stated that
the inclusion of such issues in campaigns was of "legitimate public
concern and not an appeal to racial prejudices," and noted that
both black and white candidates addressed the issue of busing "re-
luctantly and often only when questioned by the public about their
stance."40 0 Similarly, the court in the St. Louis Board of Education liti-
gation stated that while school desegregation has "an undeniable
racial dimension," plaintiffs presented no evidence that the issue
was raised "in an effort to appeal to members of a particular
race."40 4 In the Jenkins v. Red Clay School District litigation, plaintiffs
introduced into evidence a candidate's flyer that warned of increas-
ing percentages of minority students at local high schools and the
potential for "major disruption for our children!!!" While the court
characterized the flyer as "shrill," it declined to characterize it as a
racial appeal because it did not identify the race of any candidate
nor "malign" them because of it.4°5
One district court refused to characterize debate about at-large
and single-member districts as a racial appeal. 4° Another district
court refused to "consider every discussion of or question about"
Indian exemption from certain taxes a racial appeal, notwithstand-
ing the district court's recognition that "white voters harbor a
resentment over this issue, making white support for Indian candi-
dates unlikely."
40 7
Racial Bias in Press Coverage: Racial bias exhibited by the press has
been deemed a racial appeal in two cases. In the Bone Shirt litigation,
the court credited as evidence of racial appeals unsubstantiated and
false news stories circulating throughout 2002 linking Native Ameri-
cans to voter fraud. 40 Likewise, in the City of Dallas litigation, a 1989
402. St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig., 896 F. Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mo. 1995);Jenkins v. Red
Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 221, 237-38 (D. Del. 1991); City of Norfolk Litig., 605 F.
Supp. 377, 392 (E.D. Va. 1984).
403. City of Norfolk Litig., 605 F. Supp. 377, 392 (E.D. Va. 1984).
404. St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig.,896 F Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
405. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 221, 237-38 (D. Del. 1991).
406. City of Austin Litig. (TX), 871 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting the lower
court's dismissal of "appellants' contention that subliminal racial appeals accompanied the
voters' rejection in 1985 of an amendment proposing single-member districts").
407. County of Big Horn (Windy Boy) Litig., 647 F Supp. 1002, 1017-18 (D.
Mont. 1986) ("Unlike plaintiffs, this court does not consider every discussion of or question
about the taxation issue to be a racial campaign appeal.").
408. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 E Supp. 2d 976, 1041 (D.S.D. 2004).
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newspaper column warning that a vote for the African-American
candidate running against the incumbent white mayor "could lead
to racial violence and white flight" was classified as a racial ap-
peal.4°9
Candidate Intimidation: Some courts have characterized as racial
appeals conduct directed at minority candidates as opposed to vot-
ers. In the Jeffers litigation, for example, the court termed a racial
appeal a black candidate's receipt of anonymous calls where the
caller used obscenities and racial slurs as well as a later incident in
which the same candidate was run off the road by a group of indi-
viduals wearing hoods.410 Jeffers also deemed government retaliation
against an unsuccessful minority candidate to be a racial appeal.
Prior to his political involvement, the candidate had enjoyed a
business relationship with the county that was terminated after his
campaign.1
In the Garza v. Los Angeles litigation, the district court cited "sub-
stantial evidence" of racial appeals including hostility directed at a
Latino candidate for city council who "had doors slammed in his
face" while campaigning in a predominantly white neighborhood,
and had his campaign literature destroyed. 12
Racial Slurs or Stereotypes: Courts have also deemed a racial appeal
the public use of racial epithets and slurs by white candidates run-
ning against black candidates.' 3 One district court found a white
official's admission before the court in 2002 that he casually and
regularly used the word "nigger" to be a racial appeal, even though
the plaintiffs made no allegation that racial appeals existed 44
So too, courts have identified stereotypes about minority candi-
dates' lack of qualifications as racial appeals. The district court in
the Brunswick County, VA litigation pointed to materials distributed
in a 1991 election for Virginia State Senate. Although ultimately
successful, the African-American female candidate was referred to
as "'a welfare bureaucrat' and 'an inner-city resident' in her oppo-
nent's campaign literature.,
415
Additional examples described by the district court in the City of
Dallas litigation include a 1970 advertisement where the white
409. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1368 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
410. Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196, 212-13 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
411. Id.
412. Garza v. L.A. Litig., 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
413. Jeffers Litig., 730 E Supp. 196, 212 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("[A]t a public rally [a white
candidate running against a black candidate] used profanity and a racial epithet-not in his
actual speech, to be sure, but in open conversation.").
414. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd. Litig., No. 02-2209, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16540, at
*33-34 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002).
415. Brunswick County, VA Litig., 801 E Supp. 1513, 1518 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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incumbent described his opponent simply as "A black man (no
qualifications of any kind) .,46 In the same case, the district court
noted a boast made by a white female candidate and printed in the
League of Women Voters 1972 voter guide that "[e]vidence of
[her] proven ability" was the fact that no white men had filed to
run against her, and that her only opponents were black men.417
The district court in the Neal litigation identified a similar type of
racial appeal in an editorial run in the local newspaper. The edito-
rial announced the race of two black candidates only to go on to
urge voters "not to vote on account of race, but rather on merit."
Still, the editorial noted that one of the elections involving an Afri-
can-American candidate was "of great concern to many county
residents" because the black candidate could win "solid black sup-
port" and defeat the white incumbent. The editorial weighed in for
the re-election of the "more experienced" incumbents. 41s
In most cases, plaintiffs seeking to prove Factor 6 introduce cam-
paign literature and advertisements from previous elections,
documentation of media coverage, and witness testimony from mi-
nority and non-minority candidates, elected officials, and
community members. In the Wamser litigation, the district court
looked beyond these usual sources of evidence and appeared to
dismiss the defendant's expert testimony on racial appeals, based
on the judge's own experience-"Dr. Wendel's observation that
other political campaigns are devoid of racial appeals would be
most credible perhaps to persons who were not in St. Louis during
the recent campaign for the City school board.,
419
Several lawsuits identifying racial appeals discounted their im-
port. Some characterized the appeals as merely "isolated"
incidents. 420 Others called the appeals ineffective because the tar-
geted candidate was elected, at times with significant white
416. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1339 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
417. Id.
418. Neal Litig., 689 E Supp. 1426, 1432 (E.D. Va. 1988).
419. Wamser Litig., 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1527 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
420. LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 E2d 831, 879 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
("Nothing in the district court's opinion indicates that these racial appeals were anything
more than isolated incidents."); Milwaukee NAACP Litig., 935 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (E.D.
Wis. 1996) ("[P]laintiffs ... are able to point to only one judicial election which appears to
have involved racial appeals: the 1996 general election between Judge Stamper and Robert
Crawford. Assuming that the Stamper/Crawford election did, in fact, involve hostile racial
conduct, one election in the past 25 years is hardly enough to prove a pattern."); City of
Springfield Litig., 658 E Supp. 1015, 1032 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (noting a racial slur directed at a
black candidate at a luncheon meeting in 1982 and stating that this "single occurrence can-
not support a claim that political campaigns in Springfield are carried out through subtle or
overt racial appeals").
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421
support. In the Alamosa County litigation, the court identified "a
fundamental electoral truth-that to be elected in Alamosa
County, a candidate must appeal to both Anglo and Hispanic vot-
ers." 422 Racial appeals by Latino candidates certainly did not weigh
in favor of a finding of vote dilution.
Eight lawsuits held that racial appeals occurred too long ago to
be probative in contemporary claims. 3 Appeals deemed too re-
mote include those occurring more than 30 years earlier,4 4 as well
as those occurring a decade past.42 5 Two courts discounted evidence
of racial appeals as outdated by noting a new political reality char-
acterized by "racial harmony."
4 26
In the Charleston County litigation, the court identified numerous
racial appeals, but concluded without explanation that "[e]vidence
of racial appeals has not materially assisted the Court in reaching a
conclusion" on Section 2 liability.4 2 7 Likewise, in the Magnolia Bar
Association litigation, the district court acknowledged the presence
of both overt and subtle racial appeals in campaigns, while con-
cluding that "the appeal for voters by both black and white
candidates crosses racial lines, thereby minimizing the importance
of this factor under the totality of the circumstances."
42 1
7. Success of Minority Candidates-Under Senate Factor 7, courts
must evaluate the "extent to which members of the minority group
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction., 42 9 Of the law-
suits analyzed, 143 specifically addressed this factor, and 90 found a
lack of minority candidate success. 3° Of these, 66 (or 73.3%) also
421. S. Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281, 1290 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
that appeals were "ineffective" as targeted black candidates won their races); LULAC v.
Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 879 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) ("In the only judicial elec-
tion affected by a racial appeal, Judge Baraka, the black candidate, won both the Republican
primary and the general election, winning a majority of the white vote in both elections.");
Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025-26 (D. Colo. 2004) (noting ethnic ap-
peals only by minority candidates who subsequently lost their elections).
422. Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025-26 (D. Colo. 2004).
423. City of Chi.-Barnett Litig., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1449 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Liberty County
Comm'rs Litig., 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1565 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Town of Babylon Litig., 914 F.
Supp. 843, 889 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Sanchez-Colo. Litig., 861 F. Supp. 1516, 1529 (D.
Colo. 1994); City of Columbia Litig., 850 F. Supp. 404, 424 (D.S.C. 1993); Chattanooga
Litig., 722 F. Supp. 380, 396 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); City of Boston Litig., 609 F. Supp. 739, 744-
45 (D. Mass. 1985); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 802, 810 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
424. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 E Supp. 802, 810 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
425. Town of Babylon Litig., 914 E Supp. 843,889 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
426. City of Columbia Litig., 850 E Supp. 404, 424. (D.S.C. 1993); see also City of Boston
Litig., 609 F Supp. 739, 745 (D. Mass. 1985).
427. Charleston County Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 304 (D.S.C. 2004).
428. Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1410 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
429. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
430. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
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resulted in a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs. Fifty-one (56.7%)
of the Factor 7 findings were in covered jurisdictions, while 39
(43.3%) were in non-covered jurisdictions.3 '
Courts evaluating Factor 7 generally examined minority success
over the course of several elections, typically spanning decades.432
Several cases distinguished elections occurring before the lawsuit
was initiated from those occurring afterward, and often discounted
evidence of post-filing minority success as the result of a strategic
effort to frustrate the lawsuit.
43 3
Unsurprisingly, Factor 7 weighed heavily in the plaintiffs' favor
in cases where electoral results revealed a total failure or near-total
failure of minority candidates to be elected.434 Conversely, Factor 7
favored defendants where electoral results showed significant mi-
435
nority candidate success.
A complete lack of modern electoral success was found more of-
ten in covered than in non-covered jurisdictions. In covered
jurisdictions, 24 lawsuits challenging 32 governing bodies specifi-
cally found that no minority candidate had ever been elected in
the post-1964 era.436 Fourteen lawsuits in non-covered jurisdictions
431. See id.
432. See, e.g., Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1319 (10th Cir. 1996); Jefferson
Parish I Lirig. (IA), 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1991).
433. See, e.g., City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), 160 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1998); Chicka-
saw County ii Litig., No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct.
28, 1997); City of Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1031 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
434. See, e.g., Seastrunk Litig. (IA), 772 E2d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 1985); Albany County
Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820, at *11 (N.D.N.Y.July 7, 2003).
435. See, e.g., Little Rock Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1453,1460 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
436. See Hardee County Litig. (FL), 906 F.2d 524, 525 (11th Cir. 1990); Carrollton
NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1559-61 (11th Cir. 1987); Seastrunk Litig. (LA), 772 F.2d
143, 153 (5th Cir. 1985); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1984); Ma-
rengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546, 1572 (11th Cir. 1984); Opelika Litig. (AL), 748
F.2d 1473, 1476 (11th Cir. 1984); St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd. Litig., No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002
WL 2022589, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002); LU[AC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 903 F.
Supp. 1071, 1084-85 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Calhoun County Litig., 813 E Supp. 1189, 1193
(N.D. Miss. 1993); Holder v. Hall Litig., 757 E Supp. 1560, 1564-65 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Mon-
roe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Westwego Litig., NO. 84-5599,
1989 WL 73332, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 1989); Chickasaw County 1, 705 F. Supp. 315, 319-
20 (N.D. Miss. 1989); Jefferson Parish I Litig., 691 F. Supp. 991, 995 (E.D. La. 1988);
Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 588, 590 (E.D. Va. 1988); Baytown Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1128,
1136 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Houston v. Haley Litig., 663 E Supp. 346, 354 (N.D. Miss. 1987);
Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (M.D. Ala. 1986); Gretna Litig., 636 F.
Supp. 1113, 1122 (E.D. La. 1986); Halifax County Litig., 594 F. Supp. 161, 165 (E.D.N.C.
1984); Jordan Litig., 604 F. Supp. 807, 812 (N.D. Miss. 1984); City of Greenwood Litig., 534
F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (N.D. Miss. 1982); Dallas County Comm'n Litig., 548 F. Supp. 794, 850-
51 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Rocha Litig., No. V-79-26, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15164, at * 16-17 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 1982).
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challenging 17 governing bodies made the same finding.3 7 In 22
suits, courts in non-covered areas found significant and sustained.... 438
electoral success in the defendant jurisdictions while the same
finding was made in only eight covered suits.
43
1
Electoral results do not constitute the entire inquiry under Fac-
tor 7. Numerous courts have also considered the record of
minority electoral success in conjunction with population statistics.
While Section 2 is explicit that the statute provides no right to pro-
portional representation,4 ° some courts have viewed proportional
minority representation (or its absence) as informing the Factor 7
inquiry. Several courts deemed the absence of such representation
to suggest a lack of minority electoral success under Factor 7,441
437. See Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. Chiles
Litig. (FL), 139 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (11th Cir. 1998); Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d
1303, 1319 (10th Cir. 1996); Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 E3d 1407, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988);
Escambia County Litig. (FL), 638 E2d 1239, 1240-41 (5th Cir. 1981); Montezuma-Cortez
Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 E Supp. 2d 1152, 1170 (D. Colo. 1998); Cousin Litig., 840 F. Supp. 1210,
1219 (E.D. Tenn. 1994); DeSoto County Litig., 868 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
Emison v. Growe, 782 E Supp. 427, 437 (D. Minn. 1992); Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044,
1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991); City of Jackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1535 (W.D. Tenn.
1988); Smith-Crittendon County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (E.D. Ark. 1988); City of
Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1031 (C.D. Il. 1987); Haywood County Litig., 544 F.
Supp. 1122, 1135 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
438. Old Person Litig. (MT), 230 E3d 1113, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000);Jenkins v. Red Clay
Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 116 F.3d 685, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1997); Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 F.3d
904, 911 (8th Cir. 1995); Nat'l City Litig. (CA), 976 F.2d 1293, 1294 (9th Cir. 1992); City of
Fort Lauderdale Litig. (FL), 787 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir. 1986); Alamosa County Litig.,
306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024 (D. Colo. 2004); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d
291, 313 (D. Mass. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y 2004); Guy
Litig., No. Civ.A. 00-831-KAJ, 2003 WL 22005853, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2003); African-
American Voting Rights LDF Litig., 994 E Supp. 1105, 1125 (E.D. Mo. 1997); City of Chi.-
Barnett Litig., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1449 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding for both Barnett and Bonilla
plaintiffs' suits); City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 515, 526 (D. Mass. 1997); Milwaukee
NAACP Litig., 935 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Aldasoro Litig., 922 E Supp. 339,
343-44 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Cincinnati Litig., No. C-1-92-278, 1993 WL 761489, at *23 (S.D.
Ohio July 8, 1993); City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 537-58 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Kent
County Litig., 790 F Supp. 738, 748-49 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Nash Litig., 797 E Supp. 1488,
1506 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Orange County Litig., 783 F. Supp. 1348, 1359-60 (M.D. Fla. 1992);
Stockton Litig., No. S-87-1726 EJG, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17601, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10,
1988); City of Boston Litig., 609 F. Supp. 739, 748 (D. Mass. 1985).
439. City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1381 (11th Cir. 1997); Lucas Litig. (GA),
967 F.2d 549, 553 (11th Cir. 1992); City of Austin Litig. (TX), 871 F.2d 529, 538 (5th Cir.
1989); City of Cleveland Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907-08 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Perry Litig.,
298 F Supp. 2d 451, 499-500 (E.D. Tex. 2004); S.C. Democratic Party Litig., No. 4-04-CV-
2171-25, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27299, at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2004); City of Columbia Litig.,
850 F. Supp. 404, 425 (D.S.C. 1993); Butts v. NYC Litig., 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1547 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
440. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2005) (providing that "nothing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population").
441. See, e.g., Bridgeport Litig., No. 3:93CV1476 (PCD), 1993 WL 742750, at *3 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 1993); Operation Push Litig., 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
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while others viewed evidence that minority officeholders ap-
proached or exceeded the proportion of minorities in the
electorate as proof of minority electoral success. 42
The nature and prominence of the offices to which minority
candidates had been elected also informed the Factor 7 inquiry.
Some courts deemed the absence of minority candidates in top
offices evidence of a lack of minority success, notwithstanding mi-
nority election to "lesser" positions.443 Other courts viewed minority
success in these "lesser" elections as sufficient evidence of minority
electoral success, even where minority candidates did not win top
offices.
4 4 4
Many courts compared minority electoral success in endogenous
elections to elections for governing bodies not challenged in the
same suit. For some courts, the success of minority candidates in
exogenous elections was sufficient evidence of minority electoral
success, even where minority candidates did not win any office in
the challenged jurisdiction.445 Most, however, emphasized that such
exogenous elections were less probative of electoral difficulty or
success. 46 Some courts accorded almost no weight to exogenous
electoral evidence,"7 and several appellate courts reversed district
court decisions which found plaintiffs had failed to meet Factor 7
based on exogenous electoral success.448
Some courts cited the appointment of minority officials to sup-
port a finding that Factor 7 had,449 or had not been met.4 50 Where,
for instance, minority electoral "success" hinges on the advantages
of incumbency secured through appointment, some courts have
found that such "success" has little bearing on the ability of minor-
ity candidates to win elections generally 1
442. See, e.g., City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1381 (11th Cir. 1997); Suffolk
County Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). But see Old Person Litig. (MT), 312
E3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002); Terrazas Litig., 581 E Supp. 1329, 1355-56 (N.D. Tex.
1984).
443. See, e.g., Bridgeport Litig., No. 3:93CV1476 (PCD), 1993 WL 742750, at *3 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 1993).
444. See, e.g., Butts v. NYC Litig. (NY), 779 F.2d 141,150 (2d Cir. 1985).
445. See, e.g., Meza Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 72 (D. Mass. 2004).
446. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2001); Lafayette
County Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1998).
447. See, e.g., Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (E.D. Ark. 1988);
City ofJackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
448. See, e.g., Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1996); Car-
rollton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1987).
449. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1042-43 (D.S.D. 2004); Metro Dade
Cotnty Litig., 805 F. Supp. 967, 982 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
450. See City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1384 n.18 (11th Cir. 1997); Niagara
Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1021 (2d Cir. 1995).
451. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 495 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Several lawsuits looked beyond electoral results to assess the
number of minority candidates participating in given races. Some
courts noted that the failure of minority citizens to "offer them-
selves" as candidates weighed against finding a lack of minority
electoral success. Other courts, however, considered the possibil-
ity that a dearth of minority candidates might itself stem from "the
very barriers to political participation that Congress has sought to
remove" 53 and weighed the small number of minority candidates
in favor of plaintiffs. 454 A few lawsuits included within the Factor 7
inquiry undertake an examination of the qualifications of success-
ful and unsuccessful minority candidates. Evidence suggesting that
minority candidates were not serious or viable weighed against
plaintiffs in the Fort Bend Independent School District litigation,455
while the defeat of well-qualified minority candidates contributed
to findings of a lack of minority electoral success in a small number
of cases. 6 The failure of prominent white Democrats to rally be-
hind a minority candidate contributed to finding Factor 7 in at
4517least one case.
Under certain circumstances, courts discounted evidence of mi-
nority electoral success or an apparent lack thereof. Some lawsuits,
for example, viewed the defeat of minority candidates by relatively
small margins as mitigating evidence of limited minority electoral
success.4 58 At least one lawsuit discounted the election of a minority
candidate where that candidate was "emphatically not the candi-
date of choice of the county's African-American voters.,
459
Several courts examining Factor 7 tended to discount minority
electoral success absent evidence that the minority candidate re-
ceived the support of white voters. Apparently agreeing with the
Supreme Court's characterization of the majority-minority district
as the "politics of second best,"4 60 these courts seemed to place
more weight on minority success in at-large elections than in ma-
jority-minority districts.4' So too, a few courts discounted as
452. See, e.g., McCarty Litig. (TX), 749 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1984);Jenkins v. Red
Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 221, 226 n.2 (D. Del. 1991).
453. Calhoun County Litig. (MS), 88 F.3d 1393, 1398 (5th Cir. 1996).
454. See, e.g., id.; City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 776 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
455. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), 89 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1996).
456. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 E3d 897, 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2004); Gretna Litig.,
636 F. Supp. 1113, 1122 (E.D. La. 1986).
457. See Bridgeport Litig., 26 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1994).
458. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1022 (2d Cir. 1995); City of
Pomona Litig., 665 F. Supp. 853, 861 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
459. Charleston County Litig., 316 E Supp. 2d 268, 279 n.14 (D.S.C. 2003).
460. See De Grandy Litigation, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (internal citation omitted).
461. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 2001); Stockton
Litig. (CA), 956 F.2d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Cleveland Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 901,
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evidence of minority electoral success the experience of an African-
American official, first appointed to the city board and then
re-elected because the official not only enjoyed the benefits of in-
cumbency but also never faced a white opponent.6 Conversely,
another court credited as evidence of minority electoral success the
election of candidates who had originally been appointed to office
where these candidates subsequently developed "sustained biracial
coalitions" and retained their positions through more than "sheer
power of incumbency.
46
8. Significant Lack of Responsiveness-In addition to the seven
"typical" factors listed above, the Senate Report adds two additional
factors "that in some cases have had probative value" in establish-
ing a Section 2 violation. The first is whether there "is a significant
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particu-
larized needs of the members of the minority group."64 Of the
lawsuits surveyed, 107 lawsuits addressed this factor and 20 (or
18.7%) found responsiveness lacking. Of those finding the factor,
15 (or 75%) ended favorably for the plaintiffs.66 Ten (50%) of the
lawsuits that found a significant lack of responsiveness were in ju-
risdictions covered under Section 5; 10 (50%) were not.
4 67
The Senate Report did not define responsiveness, and courts
have rarely attempted a general definition, opting instead to evalu-
ate Factor 8 based on case-specific examples.46  The cases
nevertheless suggest that courts have viewed responsiveness as hav-
ing a substantive and procedural component.
Substantive Responsiveness: Most courts addressing Factor 8 have
examined the substantive policies enacted or implemented by the
jurisdiction. Evidence of affirmative discrimination directed at the
minority group has unsurprisingly been found to establish a lack of
908 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Niagara Falls Litig., 913 F. Supp. 722, 748-49 (W.D.N.Y 1994); City of
Boston Litig., 609 E Supp. 739, 748 (D. Mass. 1985).
462. See, e.g., Texarkana Litig., 861 F. Supp. 756, 764 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Columbus
County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Clark Litig., 725 F Supp. 285, 299
(M.D. La. 1988); Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 347-48 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
463. See, e.g., City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355, 1384 n.18 (11th Cir. 1997).
464. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
465. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
466. See id.
467. See id.
468. But see Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), 117 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 1997) ("An official
is responsive if he/she ensures that minorities are not excluded from municipal posts, even-
handedly allocates municipal services, and addresses minority complaints."); Niagara Falls
Litig. (NY), 65 E3d 1002, 1023 n.24 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The 'responsiveness' inquiry here in-
volves review of tangible efforts of elected officials and the impact of these efforts on
particular members of the community.").
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responsivenessj while 24 lawsuits found the absence of such evi-
dence sufficient proof that elected officials are responsive . 7  In
lawsuits challenging judicial elections, courts similarly equated
nondiscrimination with responsiveness, with none of the eight law-
suits to address unresponsiveness in this context finding Factor 8.471
Courts have also deemed as responsive efforts by local officials to
address or correct discriminatory practices,4 while the failure of
localities to make such efforts supports finding Factor 8. 7
469. Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 116 F.3d 685, 698 (3d Cir. 1997); Ma-
rengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546, 1572 (11th Cir. 1984); Town of Hempstead Litig.,
956 F. Supp. 326, 344 (E.D.N.Y 1997); Bridgeport Litig., No. 3:93CV1476 (PCD), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19741 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 1993); City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 538 (E.D.
Penn. 1993); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 E Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1988); City of
Jackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp.
338, 343 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Mobile Sch. Bd. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 1078, 1104-07 (S.D. Ala.
1982).
470. NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 E3d 361, 372 (5th Cir. 2001); Holder v. Hall
Litig. (GA), 117 F.3d 1222, 1227 (llth Cir. 1997); City of Woodville Litig. (MS), 881 F.2d
1327, 1335 (5th Cir. 1989); Baytown Litig. (TX), 840 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (5th Cir. 1988);
Houston v. Haley Litig. (MS), 859 F2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1988); Dallas County Bd. of Educ.
Litig. (AL), 739 E2d 1529, 1540 (11th Cir. 1984); Escambia County Litig. (FL), 748 F.2d
1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984); Opelika Litig. (AL), 748 E2d 1473, 1476 (l1th Cir. 1984); Ala-
mosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1039 (D. Colo. 2004); Hamrick Litig., 155 F. Supp.
2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2001); City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. Ga.
1997); Harris v. Houston Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Texarkana Litig.,
861 F. Supp. 756, 765 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Chickasaw County I Litig., 705 F. Supp. 315, 321
(N.D. Miss. 1989); City of Starke Litig., 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Jeffers
Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196, 213 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Westwego Litig., No. 84-5599, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7298, at *14 (E.D. La. 1989); City of Norfolk Litig., 679 F. Supp. 557, 585 (E.D. Va.
1988); City of Woodville Litig., 688 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Pomona Litig., 665 F.
Supp. 853, 862 (C.D. Cal. 1987); City of Austin Litig., No. A-84-CA-189, 1985 WL 19986, at
*12 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1985); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp. 1093, 1107 (S.D.
Fla. 1985); Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N.D. Tex. 1983); City of Greenwood Litig.,
534 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Miss. 1982).
471. Cousin Litig. (TN), 145 F.3d 818, 833 (6th Cir. 1998); S. Christian Leadership
Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 1995); Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 E3d 1494, 1591-92
(11th Cir. 1994); Mallory-Ohio Litig., 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 543 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Bradley v.
Work Litig., 916 F. Supp. 1446, 1467 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Milwaukee NAACP Litig., 935 F. Supp.
1419, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Chisom Litig., No. 86-4057, 1989 WL 106485, at *11 (E.D. La.
Sept. 19, 1989); Kirksey v. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1203 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
472. See, e.g., Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), 89 F.3d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1996);
Cincinnati Litig., No. C-1-92-278, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21009, at *36 (S.D. Ohio July 8,
1993); Monroe County Litig., 740 E Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Houston v. Haley
Litig., 663 E Supp. 346, 355 (N.D. Miss. 1987); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp.
1093, 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1985); City of Norfolk Litig., 605 F. Supp. 377, 394 (E.D. Va. 1984);
Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig., 548 F. Supp. 794, 821 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
473. See, e.g., Bridgeport Litig., No. 3:93CV1476 (PCD), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19741, at
*15-16 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 1993);Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 221, 240
(D. Del. 1991); Operation Push Litig., 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Citizen
Action Litig., No. N 84-431, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24869, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 1984);
Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 347 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Mobile Sch. Bd. Litig., 542 F. Supp.
1078,1106 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
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Many lawsuits suggested, though, that nondiscrimination alone
was insufficient to establish responsiveness and looked instead for
evidence of affirmative measures serving the minority community.
Under this approach, the failure to adopt an affirmative action pol-
icy signaled unresponsiveness,474 while adopting such a plan
suggested responsiveness. 7' The failure to hire or to appoint mi-
476nority employees showed a lack of responsiveness, and some
lawsuits found inclusive hiring practices an indication of respon-
siveness.4 7  So too, the provision of bilingual education supported a
478finding of responsiveness.
Some courts have suggested that equal funding of particular
projects-road paving in particular-is insufficient to establish re-
sponsiveness, where the needs of minority communities had long
been neglected.7  Some courts found a lack of responsiveness
where elected officials failed to fund projects in minority
4810neighborhoods, (particularly while funding comparable projects
in white neighborhoods),4 s' or failed to participate in federal pro
grams which would fund such projects. s Courts have found
responsiveness where officials provided minority communities dis-
474. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999); Bridge-
port Litig., No. 3:93CV1476 (PCD), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19741 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 1993).
475. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F73d 1002, 1023 (2d Cir. 1995); El Paso Indep.
Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 802, 811 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
476. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999); Carroll-
ton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987); Columbus County Litig., 782
F Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Chickasaw County I Litig., 705 F. Supp. 315, 321 (N.D.
Miss. 1989); City of Starke Litig., 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Operation Push
Litig., 674 F Supp. 1245, 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
477. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), 117 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 1997); City of
Austin Litig. (TX), 871 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1989); Houston v. Haley Litig. (MS), 859 E2d
341, 347 (5th Cir. 1988); City of Chi.-Barnett Litig., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1449 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
Niagara Falls Litig., 913 F. Supp. 722, 749 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Calhoun County Litig., 813 F.
Supp. 1189, 1201 (N.D. Miss. 1993); City of Columbia Litig., 850 F. Supp. 404, 425 (D.S.C.
1993).
478. Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F. Supp. 339, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1995); El Paso Indep.
Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 802, 811 (W.D. Tex. 1984); Rybicki Litig., 574 F. Supp. 1082,
1122 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
479. See, e.g., City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1407 (N.D. Tex 1990).
480. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Colum-
bus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991). But see City of LaGrange Litig.,
969 F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("Several of Plaintiff's witnesses testified that the
council had failed to address certain problems within the African-American community.
However, these examples seemed to reflect the typical shortcomings of government entities
rather than an institutional unresponsiveness to the minority community.").
481. See, e.g., City of Phila. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also City of
Jackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515, 1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (historical evidence).
482. See, e.g., Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N. D. Tex. 1983); Rocha Litig., No. V-
79-26, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15164, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1982).
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proportionately large amounts of funding48 3 and directed funds to
minority neighborhoods for improvements.4 s4 A few courts viewed
the acceptance of federal aid or efforts to secure such aid directed
to minority interests as evidence of responsiveness,4 while others
viewed the same conduct as "suspect" because it required no actual
commitment on the part of the jurisdiction to minority interests.86
Procedural Responsiveness: A number of courts viewed responsive-
ness more as a question of process than of outcome. Here, courts
focus on communication between elected officials and their minor-
ity constituents and the extent to which elected representatives
advocate for measures that serve the particularized needs of the
minority community. The effort to secure enactment or implemen-
tation of such measures matters as much as, if not more than,
achieving the desired outcome.
Officials are unresponsive under this model when they actively
oppose or otherwise evince hostility to the desires of the minority
community,487 when they are unable to identify any concerns par-
ticular to their constituent minority community48 when they fail to
address these concerns, and when they do not respond to requests
from or advocate for the needs of the minority community.4 9 For
instance, the Jeffers litigation considered the reluctance of white
legislators to co-sponsor "bills of interest to black voters," the
483. See, e.g., City of Austin Litig. (TX), 871 F.2d 529, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1989); Rural West
II Litig., 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Chickasaw County II Litig., No.
1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087, at *8 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); Town of
Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 890 (E.D.N.Y 1996); Sanchez-Colo. Litig., 861 E Supp.
1516, 1530 (D. Colo. 1994); City of Columbia Litig., 850 E Supp. 404, 425 (D.S.C. 1993);
Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Miss. 1990).
484. See, e.g., McCarty Litig. (TX), 749 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1984); Hamrick Litig.,
155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 957 F. Supp.
1522, 1566 (N.D. Fla. 1997); City of Springfield Litig., 658 E Supp. 1015, 1032 (C.D. Ill.
1987); Houston v. Haley Litig., 663 E Supp. 346, 355 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
485. See, e.g., Houston v. Haley Litig. (MS), 859 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1988); Dallas
County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 739 F.2d 1529, 1540 (11th Cir. 1984); Hamrick Litig., 155 F.
Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2001); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 E Supp. 802, 811
(W.D. Tex. 1984).
486. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1407 (N.D. Tex. 1990); see also Lubbock
Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 382 (5th Cir. 1984).
487. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1044 (D.S.D. 2004) (discussing numerous
legislative bills that affect the Indian community; noting the consistent opposition by certain
members of the legislature to any legislation that the Indian community lobbied for, includ-
ing voting against bills with overwhelming support and no organized opposition, and
keeping bills that affect only the minority community from reaching a floor vote).
488. See, e.g., Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 1988).
489. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999); Sisseton
Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), 804 F.2d 469, 477 (8th Cir. 1986); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist.
Litig., 7 E Supp. 2d 1152, 1170 (D. Colo. 1998); Sanchez-Colo. Litig., 861 F. Supp. 1516,
1530 (D. Colo. 1994); Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991);
City of Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1032 (C.D. 11. 1987).
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difficulties faced by both black constituents and black members of
the Arkansas State Legislature when lobbying for such support,
and the practice of at least one white state representative to refer
black constituents to black members of the state legislature, rather
than meeting with them.49°
By contrast, responsiveness is shown when an official knows and
supports causes favored by minority voters,49' meets with minority
constituents,4 9 2 and seeks out minority groups or otherwise pur-
posely includes them in the decision making process. 93 In 12
lawsuits, courts found responsiveness when an elected official was
dependent on minority votes either for election or to implement a
desired policy.
494
Such "dependent" officials tend to meet with their minority con-
stituents, seek out their views, familiarize themselves with their
concerns, and advocate on their behalf. In the same way, the Su-
preme Court in the recent Perry litigation suggested that a lack of
responsiveness may be shown by the simple fact that minority vot-
ers refuse to support an elected official.49 '
According to judicial findings, responsive officials actively solicit
minority votes, either via "door-knocking" or seeking endorse-ment fro minrity. . 496
ments from minority organizations. They promote voter
490. Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
491. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 313 (D. Mass. 2004);
Cincinnati Litig., No. C-1-92-278, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21009, at *37-38 (S.D. Ohio July 8,
1993); Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1990); see alsoJeffers Litig., 730 F.
Supp. 196, 213 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("Members of the House like Representatives Cunningham,
McGinnis, Flanagin, and Dawson are anything but unresponsive. They are well aware that a
large proportion of their constituency is black, and they make assiduous and sincere efforts
to represent these voters.").
492. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), 117 F.3d 1222, 1227 (lth Cir. 1997); Liberty
County Comm'rs Litig., 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1567 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Niagara Falls Litig., 913 F.
Supp. 722, 749 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
493. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 313 (D. Mass. 2004);
Calhoun County Litig., 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1201 (N.D. Miss. 1993); Terrazas Litig., 581 F.
Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
494. City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F3d 1355, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1997); Ketchum Litig.
(IL), 740 F.2d 1398, 1405 (7th Cir. 1984); Hamrick Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D.
Ga. 2001); City of Chi.-Bonilla Litig., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Town of Baby-
lon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Attala County Litig., No. 1:91CV209-D-D,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21569, at *19 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 20, 1995); Rural West I Litig., 877 F.
Supp. 1096, 1106 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Calhoun County Litig., 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1201 (N.D.
Miss. 1993); Cincinnati Litig., No. C-1-92-278, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21009, at *36 (S.D.
Ohio July 8, 1993); Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1058 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Rybicki Litig.,
574 F. Supp. 1147, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1983); City of Greenwood Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D.
Miss. 1982).
495. Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2622 (2006).
496. Rural West II Litig., 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Rural West I
Litig., 836 F. Supp. 453,463 (W.D. Tenn. 1993); City ofJackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515,
1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); Houston v. Haley Litig., 663 E Supp. 346, 354 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
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registration, or otherwise encourage political participation by the
minority community.497 By contrast, a lack of responsiveness has
been found when jurisdictions did not facilitate minority political
participation by failing, for instance, to establish a polling place in
a minority community or to appoint as volunteer registrars minor-
495ity community members offering their services.
9. Tenuous Policy Justification for the Challenged Practice-The sec-
ond additional factor the Senate Report lists for consideration,
called in this report Factor 9, is "whether the policy underlying the
... practice ... is tenuous." '499 Governmental policy underlying a
practice is "less important under the results test" than it was under
the intent test °00 It remains relevant, however, both because a bad
purpose or policy "is circumstantial evidence that the device has a
discriminatory result," and because "the tenuousness of the justifi-
cation for a state policy may indicate that the policy is unfair.",
0 1
Of the lawsuits analyzed, 67 considered whether the policy un-
derlying the challenged practice or procedure was tenuous.
Twenty-three of these lawsuits, 13 coming from Section 5-covered
jurisdictions and 10 from non-covered jurisdictions, held the iden-
tified justification to be tenuous. Of this total, 22 lawsuits also
reached a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs. The vast majority of
lawsuits ending favorably for the plaintiffs, however, did not find
Factor 9: most did not consider tenuousness, and the remainder
accepted the justification proffered.0
Twelve lawsuits addressed Factor 9 in cases where defendants of-
fered no justification for the challenged policy, with eight courts
deeming this non-justification tenuous. 5°0 Four did not, either
497. See France Lifig., 71 F. Supp. 2d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Chickasaw County II
Litig., No. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087, at *8 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997);
City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Calhoun County Litig., 813 F.
Supp. 1189, 1201 (N.D. Miss. 1993); El Paso lndep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 802, 811
(W.D. Tex. 1984); Terrazas Litig., 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
498. Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 F.2d 1546, 1572 (11th Cir. 1984); Operation Push
Litig., 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Citizen Action Litig., No. N 84-431, 1984
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24869, at *12-13 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 1984); Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338,
343 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
499. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
500. Marengo CountyLitig. (AL), 731 E2d 1546,1571 (1lth Cir. 1984).
501. Id.
502. See VRI Database Master List, supra note 39.
503. Marengo County Litig. (AL), 731 E2d 1546, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984); Armour Litig.,
775 F. Supp. 1044, 1058 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Monroe County Litig., 740 E Supp. 417, 424
(N.D. Miss. 1990); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1988);
Wamser Litig., 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1531-32 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd and dismissed for lack of
standing ly, 883 E2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989); City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F Supp. 397, 404
(N.D. Miss. 1984); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591 F Supp. 802, 811-12 (W.D. Tex.
1984); Major v. Treen Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325, 352 (E.D. La. 1983).
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because the plaintiffs presented no evidence on tenuousness, or
because the court itself came up with what it deemed to be a le-
gitimate justification for the policy.
50 4
Defendants offered a number of substantive justifications for
plans challenged under Section 2. Most courts accepted these justi-
fications as not tenuous. Those that did not generally deemed the
reason proffered to be (1) false, (2) impermissible, or (3) out-
weighed by other considerations.
In a number of cases, for example, defendants claimed chal-
lenged districting plans preserved municipal and other political
boundaries. Most courts accepted this justification as non-tenuous, 50 5
although one deemed this goal tenuous where the jurisdiction did
not consistently adhere to it. 50 6 So too, when defendants claimed
the challenged policy was based on political will, some courts ac-
cepted this justification, but others did not when they found it
was not the true underlying reason for the policy.
5 08
Several jurisdictions defended their at-large districts on the
ground that the practice fostered accountability and responsive-
ness among elected representatives. Many courts accepted this
policy justification as non-tenuous, 5°9 but some did not, including a
few that rejected the argument because they had already found the
jurisdiction was unresponsive under Factor 8."1 Courts, however,
have consistently upheld as non-tenuous the claim that defendant
jurisdictions designed at-large judicial election systems to prevent
judges from being too responsive to particular contituents. 5
504. Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th Cir. 1984); McCarty Litig. (TX), 749
F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1984); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Ark.
1988); City ofJackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
505. See, e.g., Forest County Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 867 (E.D. Wis. 2002); Rural West I
Litig., 836 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Tenn. 1993); Chattanooga Litig., 722 F Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn.
1989); City ofJackson, TN Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
506. Rural West II Litig. (TN), 209 E3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000).
507. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 1218 (11 th Cir. 2000); Town of Baby-
lon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Niagara Falls Litig., 913 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.N.Y.
1994); City of Austin Litig., No. A-84-CA-189, 1985 WL 19986 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1985).
508. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1048 (D.S.D. 2004); Terrell Litig.,
565 F. Supp. 338, 341 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
509. City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997);Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch.
Dist. Litig. (DE), 116 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1997); City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Mass. 1997); Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 958 E Supp. 1196 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Holder v.
Hall Litig., 757 F. Supp. 1560 (M.D. Ga. 1991); City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D.
Tex. 1990); City of Norfolk Litig., 679 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Va. 1988).
510. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897, 914 (9th Cir. 2004); Escambia County
Litig. (FL), 748 E2d 1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984); Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326,
346 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); City of Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1033 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
511. See, e.g., Prejean Litig. (LA), 227 F.3d 504, 516 (5th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Chiles Litig.
(FL), 139 F.3d 1414, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998); S. Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d
1281, 1295 (11th Cir 1995); Nipper Litig. (FL), 39 F.3d 1494, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994); LULAC
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Many jurisdictions defended their districting choices or other
electoral practices on the ground that the plans or practices pro-
tected incumbents or other political allies. Some courts accepted
this justification as non-tenuous."2 And yet, a number of courts,
including the Supreme Court in the recent Perry litigation, deemed
this justification tenuous when protecting white incumbents neces-
sarily diluted minority voting strength and the defendant was aware
of this consequence.' Indeed, some courts have concluded that
these policies amount to intentional racial discrimination.
51 4
In several lawsuits, jurisdictions defended challenged practices
on grounds of efficiency or ease of administration, and many
courts accepted these justifications. 5'5 The court in the Operation
Push litigation, however, found the "administrative ease" justifica-
tion for a dual registration system to be tenuous, concluding that
"[m] ere inconvenience to the state is no justification for burden-
ing citizens in the exercise of their protected right to register to
vote." 5 6
In several lawsuits, jurisdictions invoked historical practice to
justify challenged electoral practices. Most courts accepted this jus-
tification as nontenuous. 7 In the Milwaukee NAACP litigation, for
example, the court noted that Wisconsin's historic practice of
electing judges at-large, a practice dating to 1848, set the default
basis for what was reasonable in the state. In the Kirksey v. Allain
litigation, however, the court found historic practice to be a
v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831, 857-58 (5th Cir. 1993); France Litig., 71 F Supp. 2d
317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Cousin Litig. (TN), 904 F. Supp. 686, 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); Mag-
nolia Bar Ass'n Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1411 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
512. See, e.g., Prejean Litig. (IA), 83 F. App'x 5, 11 (5th Cir. 2003); Escambia County
Litig. (FL), 638 F.2d 1239, 1245 (5th Cir. 1981); Fund for Accurate & Informed Representa-
tion Litig., 796 F. Supp. 662, 670, 672 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
513. See, e.g., Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2623 (2006); see also Gingles Litig., 590
F. Supp. 345,374 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
514. See, e.g., Ketchum Litig. (IL), 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 (7th Cir. 1984); Black Political
Taskforce Litig., 300 E Supp. 2d 291, 313 (D. Mass. 2004); Buskey v. Oliver Litig., 565 F.
Supp. 1473, 1483 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
515. See, e.g., NAACP v Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2001); City of
Phila. Litig. (PA), 28 F.3d 306, 334-35 (3d Cir. 1994); Cincinnati Litig. (OH), 40 F.3d 807,
814 (6th Cir. 1994); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 E Supp. 339, 366, 377 (S.D. Cal.
1995); Armstrong v. Allain Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1320, 1336 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Calhoun County
Litig., 813 E Supp. 1189, 1202 (N.D. Miss. 1993); Lafayette County Litig., 841 F. Supp. 751,
768 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
516. Operation Push Litig., 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1266 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
517. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall Litig., 757 E Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Houston v.
Haley Litig., 663 E Supp. 346, 347 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Dallas County Comm'n Litig., 636 F.
Supp. 704, 709 (S.D. Ala. 1986); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp. 1093, 1107 (S.D.
Fla. 1985).
518. Milwaukee NAACP Litig. (WI), 116 F 3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997).
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tenuous justification for using a numbered post system because
otherjudicial bodies in the state no longer used it.519
Some jurisdictions defended challenged practices on the
ground that the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA required
the adopted policy. Some courts have held such claims to be non-
tenuous. 2t In the Bone Shirt litigation, however, the district court
found this justification to be tenuous, holding that Section 2 did
not require South Dakota to create a district that was 90% Native
American, and rejecting the State's claim that low turnout among
Native American voters rendered such a district necessary in order
for Native Americans to elect their preferred candidate. Bone Shirt
held that Section 2 does not compel a district with this concentra-
tion of minority residents, and that the statute in fact prohibits
packing of this sort as a form of racial vote dilution.
10. Proportionality as a Tenth Factor?-In 1994, Johnson v. De
Grandy introduced "proportionality" as a consideration in the total-
ity of the circumstances analysis. The Court stated that
proportionality-which "links the number of majority-minority vot-
ing districts to minority members' share of the relevant
population"-is not a "safe harbor" insulating a jurisdiction from
liability under Section 2, but that its existence weighs against a
5213finding of vote dilution.
Eighteen lawsuits both considered and made a finding on pro-
portionality or the lack thereof, treating it as a distinct factor under
the totality of the circumstances test.524 The 10 lawsuits that found
519. Kirkseyv. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1195-96 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
520. See, e.g., Sanchez-Colo. Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303, 1325 (10th Cir. 1996); Terrazas
Litig., 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1357 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
521. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1048 (D.S.D. 2004).
522. As explained by the Court, proportionality is distinct from proportional represen-
tation, which links the proportion of minority officeholders to the minority group's share of
the relevant population. SeeDe Grandy Litig. (FL), 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.ll (1994).
523. Id.
524. Old Person Litig. (MT), 312 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); Liberty County Comm'rs
Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2000); Rural West 1I Litig. (TN), 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir.
2000); City of Chi.-Bonilla Litig, (IL), 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998); County of Thurston
Litig. (NE), 129 E3d 1015 (8th Cir. 1997); St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig. (MO), 90 F.3d 1357
(8th Cir. 1996); City of St. Louis Litig. (MO), 54 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1995); Little Rock Litig.
(AR), 56 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1995); City of Columbia Litig. (SC), 33 F.3d 52, 1994 WL 449081
(4th Cir. Aug. 22, 1994) (unpublished table decision); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300
E Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004); Perry
Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Campuzano Litig., 200 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Il1. 2002); African-American Voting
Rights LDF Litig., 994 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Mo. 1997); City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp.
515 (D. Mass. 1997); Rural West I Litig., 877 F Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); City of Austin
Litig., 857 E Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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proportionality identified no violation of Section 2. 25 Five lawsuits
found a lack of proportionality,5 6 and of these four identified a
Section 2 violation. One lawsuit found neither proportionality
nor a violation of Section 2.2 Most courts considered proportion-
ality one of many factors, although in the City of St. Louis litigation,
the appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants solely on the basis of "sustained proportional-
ity. 
5.9
De Grandy spoke of proportionality as involving districts with a
"clear majority" of minority voters.30 Some courts assessing propor-
tionality have consequently refused to consider the presence of
"opportunity" or "coalition" districts, 531 or districts with a majority
minority population where low voter turnout or other factors
means the majorities in these districts are not "effective.,
532
De Grandy found proportionality by comparing the number of
majority-Hispanic districts to the proportion of Hispanics of voting
age living in the Miami-Dade area, as opposed to making that
comparison statewide. 33 Lower courts have generally followed this
approach.5" The Rural West I court acknowledged the difficulty it
faced "in using regional statistics ... because there are several
equally valid ways to decide precisely which districts should be in-
cluded in a regional analysis., 53 5 In Rural West II, the Sixth Circuit
525. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 1218 (11 th Cir. 2000); St. Louis Bd.
of Educ. Litig. (MO), 90 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1996); City of St. Louis Litig. (MO), 54 F.3d
1345 (8th Cir. 1995); Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 E3d 904 (8th Cir. 1995); City of Columbia
Litig. (SC), 33 F.3d 52 (4th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y 2004);
Campuzano Litig., 200 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. I1. 2002); City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp.
515 (D. Mass. 1997); African-American Voting Rights LDF Litig., 994 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D.
Mo. 1997); Austin Litig., 857 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
526. Old Person Litig. (MT), 312 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); Rural West II Litig. (TN),
209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); County of Thurston Litig. (NE), 129 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 1997);
Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig., 336
F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004).
527. Rural West II Litig. (TN), 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); County of Thurston Litig.
(NE), 129 E3d 1015 (8th Cir. 1997); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291
(D. Mass. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004).
528. Old Person Litig. (MT), 312 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002).
529. City of St. Louis Litig. (MO), 54 E3d 1345, 1357 (8th Cir. 1995).
530. De Grandy Litig. (FL), 512 U.S. 997, 1023 (1994).
531. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 312 (D. Mass. 2004).
532. Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 494, 495 & n.134 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
533. De Grandy Litig. (FL), 512 U.S. 997, 1022 (1994). As such the Court "[had] no oc-
casion to decide which frame of reference should have been used" had the matter not
already been agreed upon by the parties in the district court. Id.
534. Rural West II Litig. (TN), 209 F.3d 835, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2000); Bone Shirt Litig.,
336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1048-49 (D.S.D. 2004); Rural West I Litig., 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1109-10
(W.D. Tenn. 1995); Austin Litig., 857 F. Supp. 560, 570-71 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
535. Rural West I Litig., 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1109-10 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
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explained its regional, rather than statewide, focus, finding that
"neither over-proportionality in one area of the State nor substan-
tial proportionality in the State as a whole should ordinarily be
used to offset a problem of vote dilution in one discrete area of the
State."53 6 The district court in Austin offered a distinct explanation
for its regional focus, pointing out that it limited "the geographic
scope of [its] assessment to Wayne and Oakland Counties, because
the plaintiffs d[id] not dispute the State's drawing of district lines






Still, the district court in Perry examined proportionality state-
wide,3 s an approach the Supreme Court ratified this past June.39
The Court noted that plaintiffs had alleged "statewide vote dilution
based on a statewide plan," which made examination of propor-
540tionality on a statewide basis the appropriate measure.
Two courts substituted proportional representation for propor-
tionality when confronted with challenges to at-large elections for
which no majority-minority districts existed.5 41 The district court in
the Liberty County litigation made the same substitution,542 but the
appellate court reversed, emphasizing that proportionality and
proportional representation are distinct concepts, and that "Sec-
tion 2 explicitly disclaims any 'right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.' ,543
CONCLUSION
This June, the Supreme Court handed down its first major Sec-
tion 2 decision in a number of years. LULAC v. Perry held that
Texas violated Section 2 when it adopted a districting plan that
placed part of the City of Laredo into one congressional district
and the rest into another.544 That action displaced nearly 100,000
Latino residents from a congressional district that previously en-
536. Rural West II Litig. (TN), 209 E3d 835, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
537. Austin Litig., 857 F. Supp. 560, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
538. Perry Litig., 298 F Supp. 2d 451, 494 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
539. Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2006).
540. Id.
541. Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d 1382, 1389 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995); City of St.
Louis Litig., 896 E Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
542. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1570 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
543. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 1218, 1224 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
544. Perry Litig. (TX), 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
[VOL. 39:4
Documenting Discrimination in Voting
compassed Laredo and in which Latino voters refused to support
the Republican incumbent. At the same time, the Justices let stand
the dismantling of a so-called "coalition" district in Fort Worth.
Leaving open the question whether Section 2 protects coalition
districts-where minority voters comprising a minority of the dis-
trict's population enjoy effective control in deciding the district's
representative-Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion in Perry
holds that African-American voters in Fort Worth did not exercise
such control, mainly because the Democrat incumbent whom they
supported never faced a challenger in the Democratic primary.45
Perry highlights many ways in which opportunities for minority
political participation have both changed and remained the same
in the years since Congress amended the statute in 1982. Prior to
that amendment, African-American voters were unable to exercise
meaningful influence in Mobile, Alabama, where white Democrats
long controlled city government and the at-large elections in which
city commissioners were elected. A quarter century later, the Re-
publican-controlled Texas government finds it cannot splinter the
vibrant, "politically-active" Latino community in Laredo into two
single-member districts, but that it may shatter a safe, Democratic
district in Fort Worth, where the elected representative consistently
received African-American support both in the primary and the
general election.
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down Perry, President
Bush signed into law a twenty-five year extension of the expiring
provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 546 His signature shifted the de-
bate on reauthorization from the question whether Congress
should reauthorize the statute to the question whether it has the
power to do so. The legal challenge to reauthorization that is cer-
tain to be brought will assert that discrimination in covered
jurisdictions is no longer sufficiently dire to warrant the retention
of preclearance, and that covered jurisdictions are no longer suffi-
ciently different from non-covered ones to justify keeping only
covered jurisdictions subject to Section 5.
Perry highlights why these claims are difficult to assess, and in
particular the extent to which the preclearance process constrains
behavior in covered jurisdictions to a significant degree.547 These
545. Id. at 2624-25.
546. The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Re-
authorization and Aemdnemtns Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
547. See, e.g., Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ("By the
time the plan now under attack was first proposed, the Voting Rights Act had effectively
taken six Democratic Party seats off the table, rendering them untouchable .... "); Tex.
House Journal, 78th Leg., 3rd Sess. 462 (Tex. 2003) (statement by Representative Phil King)
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constraints shape present opportunities for minority political par-
ticipation in covered jurisdictions and render predicting the
nature and scope of such opportunities absent preclearance a chal-
lenging task.
Decisions like Perry nevertheless provide an important lens
through which to consider this prospect. Judicial findings in such
decisions offer a basis upon which to evaluate opportunities for
minority political participation in covered and non-covered juris-
dictions alike. Analysis of these findings gives rise to a complex
portrait of political participation nationwide, and a footing that
can be used to compare jurisdictions subject to Section 5 and those
that operate free from its constraints.
To be sure, the resulting portrait is necessarily incomplete, re-
flecting the limits that inhere in relying on published Section 2
decisions as a source describing political participation nationwide.
Claims must be filed, resources devoted to their prosecution, and
judgments must be reached and published. Attorneys involved vary
in skill, diligence, and their access to resources, while judges adju-
dicating these claims have differing inclinations to read the statute
expansively or narrowly, articulate the findings they make, and
publish the judgments they reach. And yet, the Section 2 cases
themselves suggest that these factors may well vary in similar ways
nationwide. If so, the differences in judicial findings in Section 2
lawsuits in covered and non-covered jurisdictions suggest real dif-
ferences operating on the ground, differences that should inform
and shape the current debate on reauthorization.
("quite frankly, it's very, very difficult to draw a district in South Texas because of the Voting
Rights Act and the only way you can do it, is to do it in the manner in which we did"); see also
Karlan, supra note 28, at 16 ('Jurisdictions that know that a change will not be precleared
may decide not even to attempt making it.").
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APPENDIX
This Appendix includes three tables providing an abridged
view of the master list and the Section 2 lawsuits analyzed in this
study. For the full data included in the master list, visit:
http://www.votingreport.org.
Table A provides basic data on the lawsuits. Table B lists Senate
Factor and legal findings. Table C offers a timeline of citations for
racial appeals in campaigns, cited in Part II.C.6. The below guides
give an explanation of the field contents of Tables A and B.
TABLE A
G uide to Table A ............................................................... 738
Basic Data for Section 2 Lawsuits, 1982-2005 ....................... 739
TABLE B
G uide to Table B ................................................................ 756
Factor and Legal Findings in Section 2 Lawsuits,
1982-2005 ................................................................. 757
TABLE C
Racial Appeals Cited in Section 2 Litigation:
Timeline and Citations .................................................. 771
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GUIDE TO TABLE A
Field Name Explanation of Contents
Litigation Shorthand reference title for each lawsuit or litigation string of cases.
Title
Citation The citation of the final word case is given for ease of reference, but is used to
represent all opinions in the lawsuit analyzed as a whole. Shepardize or key-cite
this citation to find all related opinions in the lawsuit that may include factor
findings.
Court Abbreviation for the court making the final published merits or success
determination.
Year Year the final word case was decided.
State State where the lawsuit was filed. Note that some states are fully covered and
some are partially covered by Section 5, so some lawsuits brought in a covered
county may originate in a state which is not fully covered.
Jurisd. y = Suit was brought in a jurisdiction covered by Section 5, requiring that all
voting changes be precleared.
n = Non-covered jurisdiction.
Type Case Type = L refers to Liability (the final word case is one where the legal
question before the court was whether or not the defendant had violated
Section 2); P = Preliminary (where the question before the court was a pre-
merits question, such as whether to grant a preliminary injunction); R = Remedy
(where the question was how to craft a remedy after a Section 2 violation was
found); S = Settlement (where the question was whether to approve a consent
decree or settlement agreement between the parties); F = Fees (where the
question was whether to grant a prevailing plaintiff or intervenor attorney's
fees).
Gov. Body Governing Body is the level of government responsible for the practice
challenged in the lawsuit. For example, if the plaintiff is challenging the at-large
election of school board officials, "school" is in this column.
Practice Practice Challenged is the electoral law or practice which the plaintiff claims
violates Section 2.
At-large = At-large election system.
Elec. Procedure = Election administration procedures or requirements for
voting, voter registration, or running for office.
Reapp = Reapportionment or redistricting plan.
MV = Majority vote requirement.
Other includes all other practices challenged, such as felon disfanchisement
statutes, annexation, appointment of public officials.
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GUIDE TO TABLE B
Field Name Explanation of Contents
Consid. y = At least one court within this lawsuit considered Senate Factors under the
totality of circumstances and/or Gingles test. For all findings, a blank field
means that it was unclear from published opinions whether or not factors were
considered or found.
1 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 1 to be met
(history of official discrimination), and this finding was not overturned.
2 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 2 (racially
polarized voting), and this finding was not overturned.
3 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 3 (enhancing
practices), and this finding was not overturned.
4 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 4 (candidate
slating), and this finding was not overturned.
5 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 5 (socioeconomic
effects of discrimination), and this finding was not overturned.
6 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 6 (racial campaign
appeals), and this finding was not overturned.
7 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 7 (lack of
candidate success), and this finding was not overturned.
8 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 8 (lack of
responsiveness), and this finding was not overturned.
9 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Senate Factor 9 (tenuous policy),
and this finding was not overturned.
G-1 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Gingles I, and this finding was
not overturned.
G-11 y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Gingles II, and this finding was
not overtumed.
G-Ill y = At least one court within this lawsuit found Gingles III, and this finding was
not overturned.
G-all y = At least one court within this lawsuit found the Gingles test satisfied and this
finding was not overturned.
Intent y = A court in this lawsuit found the defendant had engaged in intentional voting
discrimination.
f = A court in this lawsuit made a finding of intentional discrimination, not
necessarily connected to the lawsuit at hand.
Success y = The ultimate outcome of this lawsuit was plaintiff success on the merits by
proving a violation, or (if no published opinion stating a violation) in winning an
injunction, attorney's fees, remedy or settlement.
Viol. y = The court found or the defendant stipulated a violation of Section 2.
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TABLE C
RACIAL APPEALS CITED IN SECTION 2 LITIGATION:
TIMELINE AND CITATIONS
Seventy-three distinct racial appeals are identified in post-1982
opinions under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Forty-two of
these appeals occurred in covered jurisdictions while 31 occurred
in non-covered ones. Of the 47 racial appeals identified in cam-
paigns since 1982, 30 are from covered jurisdictions with the
remaining 17 from non-covered jurisdictions.
Year Covered Jurlsictions Non-Covered Jurisdictions
1950 Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 364 (E.D.N.C 1984)
1954 Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 364.
1960 Gingles, 590 F. Supp. 345 at 364.
1968 Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 364 (2 campaigns).
1970 Williams v. Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1339
(N.D. Tex. 1990) (3 campaigns).
1971 Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1341
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
1972 Dallas, 734 F. Supp. at 1339. Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 364.
1973 U.S. v. Chadeston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268,
295 (D.S.C. 2003);
Butts v. New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1531
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1975 Dallas, 734 F. Supp. at 1347. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 212 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
1976 Dallas, 734 F. Supp. at 1348 (2 campaigns). Jeffers, 730 F. Supp. at 212.
1977 Jordan v. Greenwood 599 F. Supp. 397, 403
(N.D. Miss. 1984);
Dallas, 734 F. Supp. at 1349.
1978 U.S. v. Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1026
(D. Colo. 2004).
1979 Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 859
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
1982 Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1341
Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1290 (11th Cir. 1995); (C.D. Cal. 1990).
Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807, 813
(N.D. Miss 1984);
White v. Alabama: 867 F.Supp. 1519, 1556
(M.D.Ala. 1994)
Dallas, 734 F. Supp. at 1360.
548. Years for otherwise specifically cited campaigns were not identified in the following
four instances: Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326, 342 (E.D.N.Y 1997); City of
Phila. Lifig., 824 F. Supp. 514, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (2 campaigns); Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig.,
793 F. Supp. 1386, 1410 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
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Year Covered Jurlsictlons Non-Covered Jurisdictions
1983 Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471 County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp at 1341;
(M.D. La. 2001);
Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 824 F.Supp. 514, 537
Neal v. Colebum, 689 F.Supp. 1426, 1431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
(E.D. Va. 1998) (2 campaigns);
MoDaniels v. Mehioud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 595
(E.D. Va. 1988).
1984 Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 364;
Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. at 860.
Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn,
647 F. Supp. 1002, 1018 (D. Mont. 1986).
1985 Magnolia Bar Association v. Lee, 793 F. Supp. Armour v. Ohio, 775 F.Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991);
1386, 1410 (S.D. Miss 1990);
Dallas, 734 F. Supp at 1363. City of Philadelphia, 824 F.Supp. 514 at 537.
1987 Clark, 777 F. Supp. at Appendix A; City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. at 537;
Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. at 595. Goosby v. Town of Hempstead, 956 F. Supp. 326, 342-
43 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 880 F. Supp. 911,
927 (D. Mass. 1995);
Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1515
(E.D. Mo. 1987).
1988 U.S. v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, U.S. v. Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016,1026
295 (D.S.C. 2003); (D. Colo. 2004).
Dallas, 734 F. Supp. at 1365.
1989 Magnolia BarAssn, 793 F. Supp. at 1409-10;
Dallas, 734 F. Supp at 1368.
1990 Southern Christian Leadership Conf., Meek v. Metro Dade County, 805 F. Supp 967, 982
56 F.3d at 1290; (S.D. Fla. 1992).
Magnolia Bar Ass'n, 793 F. Supp. at 1409-10;
Charleston County, 316 F. Supp.2d at 295
(2 campaigns).
1991 Smith v. Board of Sup'rs of Brunswick County, City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. at 537.
801 F. Supp. 1513,1518 (E.D. Va. 1992);
Magnolia Bar Ass'n, 793 F. Supp. at 1410.
1992 Charleston County, 316 F. Supp.2d at 295 Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
(2 campaigns).
1994 While, 867 F.Supp. at 1556.
1995 Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749,
777 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
1996 Coleman v. Board of Educ., 990 F. Supp. 221,231-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
1998 Shirt v. Hazelftine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1041
(D.S.D. 2004).
2000 Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
2002 St. Bernard Parish School Board, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16540, at 33 (E.D. La. 2002).
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